Dividing Divided States. Gregory F. Treverton

Чтение книги онлайн.

СКАЧАТЬ For example, IDPs were granted the right to acquire property in Georgia while maintaining their IDP status (and thus the right to return to and reclaim their property in Abkhazia). As yet there is no change in Georgia’s official policy toward Abkhazia, which is of course the most significant determinant of IDPs’ prospects for return.

      Russia’s role has continually been a complicating factor. Initially, Russia refused to recognize Abkhazia’s independence for fear that it would be used to legitimate Chechnya’s calls for independence. However, Russia supplied weapons to Abkhazia and passports and pensions to its citizens, and imposed economic sanctions on Georgia at various times since 1994.⁵⁷ Given that Russia had clearly taken sides in the conflict, it was an inappropriate choice to be the sole supplier of peacekeeping forces in the UNOMIG operation. This, no doubt, harmed relations between Georgia and Abkhazia.

      So long as no political solution to the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia is in sight, there remains little hope for the peaceful return of many ethnic Georgian IDPs to their homes in Abkhazia. Moreover, in recent years the Georgian government has begun to recognize that many IDPs may prefer not to return to Abkhazia, given their safety concerns. Thus, a durable solution may take the form of resettlement in Georgia rather than repatriation, regardless of how the territorial dispute is resolved. The Gali region may be an exception, as both Georgia and Abkhazia benefit from reversing the decline in agricultural production, which would involve restoring ethnic Georgian farmers to their land. Outside of this one area, there are no immediate prospects for the return of the remaining 220,000 to 250,000 Georgians to Abkhazia.⁵⁸

      Many national and international forces were marshaled to resolve the conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia in such a way that those who fled their homes could return without fear of recurrent violence. However, the best agreements and outside assistance could not overcome the discord between parties, both of which have used the IDPs for political gain. This case study provides a cautionary tale of the importance of addressing the root cause of the dispute. The following are several lessons from the experience of Georgia and Abkhazia that may have broader relevance:

      While formal agreements can be valuable for outlining the principles of returning IDPs to their homes, they are woefully inadequate if both parties are not committed to the process. The language of such agreements is typically broad enough that either party can stall the process without violating the letter of the law. In short, formal agreements are a necessary condition for resettling IDPs but not a sufficient one.

      Without peace, repatriation is infeasible. The ethnic divide that caused the conflict between neighbors in the first place will reemerge if efforts to resolve the underlying issues are not successful. This was made apparent when, in 1998, the homes, schools, and farms of Georgian returnees to Gali, which had been rebuilt with international donor assistance and under international monitoring, were decimated by partisan attacks once again. In a matter of days, 40,000 people fled the renewed violence.⁵⁹

      Prolonged periods of displacement may make either eventual return or integration into the receiving country more difficult as IDPs’ lives remain fractured. Evidence collected from interviews with IDPs in communal centers in Georgia suggests that living as IDPs without integrating into Georgian society encourages many to relive the memory of the ethnic conflict in Abkhazia, thus hardening their outlook. They become less able to reconcile with the ethnic Abkhaz in their homeland and remain isolated from fellow ethnic Georgians in Georgia.⁶⁰

      IDPs can be used as a political bargaining chip, thus slowing progress on repatriation or other forms of settlement. It is important to understand what stake each party to the negotiations has in the outcome. The commitment to returning displaced persons to their homes can inadvertently lead to further disadvantaging them in the meantime. Granting the legal rights to vote, purchase property, and make a living is vital to the well-being of IDPs, and this can be pursued without abandoning efforts to return them to their homes.

      The details of the conflict are critical to determining what will and will not be feasible solutions. For example, it has been argued that the solution offered by Georgia, namely that Abkhazia become a largely autonomous region within the Republic of Georgia, is dismissed out of hand by Abkhaz leaders because it is likened to the “autonomy” former Soviet republics had under Soviet rule, which was a fig leaf.⁶¹ Thus, improving the communication and trust between parties is critical to overcoming such semantic debates and developing a resolution to the conflict.

       Bosnia and Herzegovina

      Issue and Outcome

      In 1992, after the collapse of Yugoslavia and declaration of independence by Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bosnian Serb leaders, especially, embarked on armed conflict and ethnic cleansing.⁶² During the three-year conflict that ensued, more than one million people were driven out of the country and an equal number were internally displaced. In December 1995 the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed, ending the conflict and establishing BiH as a federal republic made up of two “entities,” divided largely along ethnic lines. The DPA outlined a path to peace and provided for the return of displaced peoples, with involvement from NATO and the UNHCR. The Office of the High Representative was established to oversee the civilian implementation of the DPA.

      In the decade following the DPA, refugees and IDPs have steadily returned to BiH, many under a registration program run by the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees to monitor and assist resettlement, including through reconstruction assistance. Although half of the displaced seem to have returned, the drive for ethnically “pure” areas that drove ethnic cleansing in the early 1990s continues to threaten the recovery of returnees and the long-term displaced alike.

      Course of the Dispute

      For three years immediately after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, BiH was plagued by the atrocities of ethnic cleansing, primarily carried out by Bosnian Serbs. By the time the war ended with the signing of the DPA in December 1995, more than half of the 4.4 million people of BiH had been hounded from their homes. Approximately 1.3 million people were internally displaced, and nearly the same number fled the country. In addition to calling a ceasefire, the DPA established the framework for the transition to peace and democracy. BiH was split into two “entities”—the mainly Serb Republika Srpska (RS) and the predominantly Croat and Muslim Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH). Initially, each entity had its own government while progress toward national integration was being made.

      The DPA outlined pivotal roles for NATO peacekeeping forces and for the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which was in charge of civilian affairs. The 1997 Bonn Conference conferred upon the OHR the power to guide the reconciliation process. The so-called Bonn powers included the authority to remove public officials and ban legislation that violated the DPA or otherwise hindered progress toward peace and reconciliation. Under this arrangement many roadblocks were eliminated, but the formation of a fully functioning, integrated political system is still to be accomplished.

      The DPA also made explicit provisions for the rights of displaced people to return to the areas from which they fled (Annex VII).⁶³ Underlying the emphasis on return was the “moral and political imperative to reverse ‘ethnic cleansing.’”⁶⁴ To accomplish the objective of a speedy return, the DPA designated the UNHCR as the lead international agency to oversee the return of refugees and IDPs. The Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees (MHRR) coordinated return efforts at the national level, while both “entities”—RS and FBiH—also maintained their own ministry for refugees.⁶⁵ A registry was established by the MHRR to monitor and assist resettlement, and to provide reconstruction assistance, when applicable.

      As is the case in other instances of ethnically motivated displacements, the return of displaced persons to the communities they fled can be used to fan fresh ethnic tensions. Depending on their ethnicity, returnees will bolster a majority group or weaken its numbers. Thus, vested interests СКАЧАТЬ