Peace and Freedom. Simon Hall

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СКАЧАТЬ In a memorable peroration Potter declared, “we must name that system, we must name it, describe it, analyze it and change it. For it is only when that system is changed and brought under control that there can be any hope for stopping the forces that create a war in Vietnam today or a murder in the South tomorrow.” Potter then called for the creation of a massive social movement that understood “Vietnam in all its horror as but a symptom of a deeper malaise.” After applauding Potter’s speech enthusiastically, the large crowd marched from the Washington Monument down the mall toward the Capitol, singing “We Shall Overcome,” the anthem of the civil rights movement. About 150 yards from the Capitol the crowd stopped and a small contingent handed a peace petition to a congressional aide.⁶⁰

      In terms of linking Vietnam with the civil rights movement, the march appeared to be a success. The SDS action had been supported by CORE’s James Farmer as well as senior SNCC representatives. Indeed, SNCC’s Executive Committee had decided “with little discussion and no dissent” to support the April march. On the eve of the action, SNCC members meeting in Holly Springs, Mississippi, had discussed both Vietnam and the SDS march. Silas Norman argued that the war was a logical extension of American imperialism, and stated that a consensus existed within the organization over supporting the march. In addition—“we have people taking an active part in the march and we have helped people get students (from the South) for it.” SNCC chairman John Lewis also spoke in favor of taking an antiwar position, arguing that the U.S. should withdraw from Vietnam.⁶¹

      A group of black high school students from Mississippi were among those participating in the Washington protest. Signaling the continuity between the peace and freedom movements was the fact that all the students were veterans of the Freedom Schools that had been established during Freedom Summer. Otis Brown, a sixteen-year-old student leader from Indianola, explained that they had come to Washington “because we have to look beyond just Negro freedom. We don’t want to grow up ‘free’ at home in a country which supports this kind of war abroad.”⁶²

      The civil rights and antiwar movements were also linked by a common spirit, one SDS leader explained that the “breadth and urgency of the march could never have been achieved without the life instilled in the student movement by the Southern civil rights struggle.”⁶³ Many of the antiwar student radicals were veterans of the black freedom struggle, and a significant proportion of the peace marchers, perhaps 10 percent, were African American. This seemed to represent the beginning of a new working alliance between the peace and freedom movements. As one reporter commented, “the most important new liaison was that between the young, vibrant freedom workers of the South and the peace-oriented students of the North.”⁶⁴

      The growing opposition to the war within the civil rights movement seemed to suggest that the black movement might provide an important source of strength to the peace forces. Indeed, when Martin Luther King, his Christian conscience troubled by events in Vietnam, began to express hostility to the war, it seemed that the antiwar movement might have found a potential leader with huge crossover appeal. King first voiced opposition to the war on March 2, 1965. Speaking to an audience at Howard University, he called for a negotiated settlement and declared that the war was “accomplishing nothing.”⁶⁵ However, the road from civil rights to antiwar activism would not be an easy one for black leaders to tread.

      CORE’s national director James Farmer had endorsed the April march and had also linked the struggles for peace and freedom. On CBS’s Face the Nation, on April 25, he had stated “I think as American citizens, persons who participate in the civil rights movement have not only a right, but a duty to be interested in all activities of our government—domestic policies outside of the civil rights area and foreign policy.”⁶⁶ In early June, Farmer had been one of many sponsors of an “Emergency Rally on Vietnam,” held at New York’s Madison Square Garden. The rally, called by SANE and supported by SDS, had significant black support. SNCC and the Northeastern Regional Office of CORE gave their endorsement, black entertainer Ossie Davis was a co-chairman of the rally, and Martin Luther King’s wife Coretta gave a speech. Bayard Rustin, a featured speaker, talked about the “common ground” shared by the peace and freedom movements.⁶⁷

      At a news conference in Durham, North Carolina, on the eve of CORE’s 1965 national convention, a reporter asked Farmer whether the civil rights and peace movements were synonymous. He explained that the civil rights movement was an autonomous movement, but that it was proper for civil rights people “as concerned citizens” to be interested in such issues as peace.⁶⁸ As well as the involvement of civil rights leaders and organizations in anti-Vietnam activities, there was also growing opposition to the war within CORE itself. On April 10 the organization’s principal policy-making body, the National Action Council, decided to endorse “efforts across the country to gain peace in Vietnam and wage war on discrimination.”⁶⁹ However, events at its 23rd annual convention would reveal that the organization was deeply split over the nature of its relationship with the antiwar movement.

      During June, the membership of Brooklyn CORE had passed an antiwar resolution which had subsequently been unanimously endorsed at the Eastern Region CORE conference in New York City. The resolution declared that “to fight for human freedom at home and seek to destroy it abroad is the height of immorality”; described the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam as “utterly incomprehensible”; and called for the withdrawal of American troops.⁷⁰ Historians August Meier and Elliot Rudwick have argued that by the summer of 1965 CORE was split on a number of issues, one of which was Vietnam. One faction within the organization believed that, for tactical reasons, CORE should refrain from publicly opposing the Vietnam War. This put them in conflict with those who believed that the organization should move in a more radical direction.⁷¹

      On July 5, meeting in closed session, the convention debated an antiwar resolution. Although a majority of the 1,000 delegates opposed the war, many were wary of committing the organization to such a controversial stand. After a lengthy and heated discussion, a resolution calling for an “immediate withdrawal of American troops” from Vietnam, and condemning the Johnson administration’s foreign policy as racist, was passed by just ten votes.⁷² Farmer had not been present during this debate, and he quickly attempted to reverse the decision. At first sight his actions seem surprising—Farmer had personally made many antiwar statements and had taken an active role in peace demonstrations. In addition, his annual report to the convention had stated that “it is impossible for the Government to mount a decisive war on poverty and bigotry in the United States while it is pouring billions down the drain in a war against people in Vietnam.”⁷³ However, the national director urged the delegates to table the motion on Vietnam because it was not an issue on which CORE could get the unanimous support of the ghetto community, and opposing the war might also jeopardize public support for the civil rights movement.⁷⁴ Farmer argued that although individuals should support the peace movement, CORE as an organization should not “get out of step” with the community.⁷⁵

      The resolution was duly withdrawn, over the furious objections of chapter heads Ollie Leeds and Lincoln Lynch, and for the time being the organization refrained from taking an antiwar position.⁷⁶ Farmer subsequently explained that he believed that protesting Vietnam would “provide too easy a cop-out for some of our chapters who were trying to tackle complex Northern issues”; would confuse two issues which he felt should be separate; and would open up CORE to possible communist infiltration—which had been a problem in the past.⁷⁷ Although the organization had pulled back from opposing the Vietnam War, many of its members would become increasingly active in the antiwar movement. Indeed, the organization would continue to travel in a radical direction—moving from nonviolence to self-defense, and from integration to Black Power.

      The MFDP also found the Vietnam issue problematic. In July 1965 John D. Shaw joined the growing list of black American GIs who had been killed in Vietnam. Shaw, a twenty-three-year-old native of McComb, Mississippi, had been active in the local civil rights movement, having been involved in SNCC’s first direct action campaign in the state. СКАЧАТЬ