The Real Trump Deal. Martin E. Latz

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СКАЧАТЬ by promising either:

       A network TV contract for a fall season despite the USFL being in the midst of a multi-year $14 million annual ABC contract for the next few spring seasons. The idea? Head-to-head competition with the NFL in the fall would convince it to merge with the USFL. Or;

       A lawsuit against the NFL for antitrust violations for preventing a fall USFL schedule and get a massive judgment forcing a merger.

      Trump’s language at the January 1984 USFL owners’ meeting, according to the owners’ meeting notes, reflects Trump’s win–lose mindset:

      I guarantee you folks in this room that I will produce CBS and I will produce NBC and that I will produce ABC, guaranteed, and for a hell of a lot more money than the horseshit you’re getting right now…. I don’t want to be a loser. I’ve never been a loser before, and if we’re losers in this, fellows, I tell you what, it’s going to haunt us…. Every time there’s an article written about you, it’s going to be that you owned this goddamn team which failed… and I’m not going to be a failure.⁴⁰

      Trump convinced the owners in August 1984 to switch, starting fall of 1986. Unfortunately for the owners, though, it took place after an aggressive media campaign highlighted a nasty personal war between Trump on one side and USFL Commissioner Chet Simmons and Tampa Bay Bandits owner John Bassett on the other.

      A Bassett letter to Trump illustrates how Trump interacted with the other owners—his seeming partners with common interests. Bassett, who originally liked Trump, opposed Trump’s strategy but shared interests with him in an ultimate merger with the NFL.

      Dear Donald:… I have listened with astonishment at your personal abuse of the commissioner and various of your partners if they did not happen to espouse one of your causes or agree with one of your arguments…. You are bigger, younger and stronger than I, which means I’ll have no regrets whatsoever punching you right in the mouth the next time an instance occurs where you personally scorn me, or anyone else, who does not happen to salute and dance to your tune.⁴¹

      Trump’s attitude was win–lose, even with his partners.

      The owners interestingly voted to move to a fall schedule despite having commissioned an independent study from McKinsey consulting which found Trump’s strategy assumed events it deemed highly unlikely, including any new TV contract for the fall of 1986. This was because:

       NBC said it had no interest in televising the USFL in the fall;

       CBS said it wouldn’t be interested for the fall of 1986, but might for 1987 if the USFL’s ratings improved; and

       ABC’s contract with the USFL would be breached if the USFL moved to the fall of 1986.

      McKinsey’s recommendation? Cut costs, stay in the spring for 1986, launch an ad campaign to drive up attendance and revenue, and consider moving to the fall of 1987 when ABC and CBS might be interested.⁴²

      What happened after the owners decided to move to the fall of 1986?

      ABC, the only network possibly interested for the fall of 1986, was upset the USFL intended to breach its spring 1986 contract. It thus refused to sign a deal to broadcast any fall 1986 USFL games. CBS and NBC also confirmed their disinterest in televising the USFL’s fall 1986 games.

      “Winning” the battle to go to a fall 1986 season also meant that Trump and the USFL would lose their contractually solid deal with ABC to broadcast USFL spring games in 1986.

      No television contract for the fall of 1986 basically spelled the end of the USFL, except for a possible antitrust lawsuit against the NFL.⁴³

      “Wait,” you might say. “It’s obvious the USFL should have just followed McKinsey’s recommendations and waited to go to a fall 1987 season. Why did these owners vote for Trump’s move for 1986?”

      Three reasons. First, the owners were desperate financially. Many might not have even made it to a fall 1987 season. Even Ted Taube, who penned that early letter indicating “Don’s best strategy for the Generals could be devastating for the USFL as a whole,” came around, noting that the USFL had “no other financially viable alternative.”

      Second, Trump negotiates and communicates in clear and definitive language with an air of invincibility. He “guaranteed” the TV contracts. Clarity and certainty can be persuasive and convincing. The owners wanted to believe him too.

      And third, Trump threatened that if the USFL did not move to the fall, it might find itself playing without him. Since Trump was then practically the face of the USFL, this might spell its doom sooner rather than later.

      Trump tactically and smartly negotiated with the other owners to get them to vote for the move, despite their internal strife. All along he demonstrated his win–lose mindset.

      One final element of this “move to the fall” effort illustrates Trump’s mindset. Trump in March 1984 secretly met with long-time NFL head Pete Rozelle to discuss the NFL–USFL relationship.⁴⁴

      We know about this negotiation as it became a major element of the USFL’s antitrust lawsuit against the NFL. And Rozelle and Trump testified about it under oath.

      Rozelle also a) wrote a memo to his file immediately after describing what occurred, and b) discussed it later with the NFL’s finance chairman. This foreshadows former FBI Director James Comey’s testimony about his Trump meetings in 2016 and 2017, where he also wrote file memos about his meetings and discussed them with his FBI colleagues.

      Trump wrote no such memo nor discussed this meeting with any colleagues. (According to his testimony he said, “I would have considered notes to be a very unnatural thing to do. People don’t go around making notes of conversations in my opinion.”)

      What happened at the Trump–Rozelle meeting that illustrates Trump’s win–lose mindset? We have conflicting versions of it.

      According to Trump’s testimony:

       Rozelle promised him an NFL team if he would help keep the USFL in the spring and stop an antitrust lawsuit;

       Trump responded there is “no way I am going to sell out [my fellow USFL owners]” and would only consider an NFL team as part of a merger with “four or five or six teams” coming in from the USFL (18 USFL teams then existed); and

       Rozelle told him he would explore the possibility of at most one or two teams and get back with Trump.

      According to Rozelle’s testimony:

      – Trump started the meeting by threatening an antitrust lawsuit, but noting he didn’t want to sue;

      – Trump said he really just wanted an NFL expansion team for himself in New York;

      – Trump said if the NFL did not agree right away to his demands, he would sue and would become too committed to the USFL to walk away and cut a separate deal;

      – Trump offered to identify two or three other USFL owners Rozelle might reward with franchises; and,

      – Rozelle would get back with Trump on the possibility of adding one or two more teams later.⁴⁵

      Regardless СКАЧАТЬ