Point of View 2-Book Bundle. Douglas L. Bland

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      The motion of non-confidence came to a vote in late March of 2011. The motion carried by a vote of 165 to 145, predictably breaking entirely on party lines. As a fiscal conservative, I am now embarrassed by my vote of “nay,” but drunk on the daily diet of “partisan, coalition-conspiracy” Kool-Aid, I certainly did not feel ashamed at the time.

      In kicking off his campaign, the Liberal leader claimed that the Canadian people will “have the opportunity to replace an arrogant government with one that respects democracy.”

      For being the leader of the first government, not only in Canadian history, but in the history of the entire British Commonwealth, to have been found in contempt of Parliament, the Canadian electorate “punished” the prime minister by electing 166 Conservative MPs, giving Stephen Harper his long-desired majority government. Responsible government was actually borne out: lose the confidence of the House and it is necessary to either resign or seek a fresh mandate from the electorate. But financial oversight was now a distant memory. A minority government could withhold relevant financial information, be found in contempt of Parliament, lose the confidence of the House, and then be returned with a majority!

      With the check and balance of financial scrutiny diluted beyond repair, safeguards against irresponsible spending have been severely compromised. The emasculation of the comptroller general and the practice of deeming estimates approved on June 23, rather than actually vetting them, has resulted in the destruction of parliamentary oversight, overspending, and the death of financial accountability. The events leading to the election in the spring of 2011 confirmed that a government can ignore legitimate parliamentary requests with complete impunity.

      In the forty-five years since Canada starting disassembling financial oversight, spending has increased in both good and bad economic times, resulting in growing deficits and accumulated debt. With an accumulated debt of over $600 billion dollars — a debt that is growing by $49 million every day — we will be paying for these bad decisions and this deficient financial oversight for generations.

      3.

      Federal-Provincial Cost Sharing: There is Only One Taxpayer

      Long before I left the Conservative caucus, I had developed a reputation for fiscal hawkishness. I believe that taxpayers are entitled to expect that their governments, at all levels, spend their tax dollars prudently.

      In times of fiscal restraint, this kind of prudence requires carefully prioritizing projects and ensuring that those funded are done so on a cost-efficient basis to ensure that taxpayers receive value for money. Spending only where necessary invariably requires an examination of responsibility for the proposed project. Is it something that could be better managed, or funded, by the private sector? Is it a matter that could be better undertaken by the non-profit, charitable, or philanthropic sectors? And, most critically, once a project is indeed deemed to be for the public good and therefore ought to involve public financing, what level(s) of government is the most appropriate to fund it?

      Canada is a federal state, with, for the most part, a clear division of powers. The division of powers is set out in the Constitution Act in sections 91 and 92, where enumerated powers are listed for the various levels of government.

      A non-exhaustive list of federal responsibilities include criminal law, national defence, national security, border security, coastal security, native persons and native lands, fisheries and oceans, old age security and pensions, unemployment insurance, and provincial equalization.

      The legislative matters assigned to the provinces include hospitals and health care, education, provincial highways and social assistance. Municipalities receive their powers and authority directly from the provinces, and the matters they are responsible for are local in nature and include streets, curbs, sidewalks, gutters, parking, snow removal, pets, utilities, and public transit.

      As a newly elected Conservative MP, one of my first very public criticisms of the Conservative government occurred in November 2011, when I voiced opposition to the federal government’s decision to contribute $100 million toward the construction of the Royal Alberta Museum. Having an appreciation for history, education, and tourism, I was not opposed to the museum conceptually; however, with all three levels of government running growing deficits, I certainly questioned the project’s affordability and was definitely opposed to the proposed funding model.

      I believe that governments must distinguish between wants and needs; and must focus on the latter, providing basic, essential and required services to their population. “Wants” must be deferred until they become affordable. With the federal government running a nearly $50 billion deficit, I felt that 2011 was not that time.

      Moreover, I could find no authority in section 91 of the Constitution Act that makes the federal government responsible for, or, for that matter, expressly authorizes, funding local or provincial museums. The federal government does build and operate many great museums and galleries. I suspect, however, that neither the Province of Alberta nor the City of Edmonton contributed to the National Art Gallery.

      The sad reality, though, is that many Canadians generally, and proponents of these projects specifically, believe that if a proposed project is perceived to be meritorious, all levels of government should automatically fund it on that basis, without regard to which level of government in fact has jurisdiction and responsibility for project funding.

      Remembering that there is only one taxpayer, the question becomes: what possible advantage is there to involving all three levels of government in funding a project? If one believes that government is by nature expensive and inefficient, it is a logical conclusion that involving multiple levels of government exponentially increases the prospects for waste and mismanagement. Whenever jurisdiction is assumed by more than one government, the inevitable result will be argument, confrontation, delay, and increased cost.

      In fact, the differences that arose as a result of the varied engineering standards of the respective levels of governments threatened the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement for the building of the Royal Alberta Museum. In the end, the agreement was signed just before the expiration of the federal Building Canada Fund. Two plus years later, the ground was still not broken; but the “Economic Action Plan” signs had been erected! It was not until January 2014 that construction commenced on the Royal Alberta Museum in downtown Edmonton.

      Respective levels of government also have different priorities. The Building Canada Fund and one of its predecessor programs, Canada Works, were designed specifically to help cash-strapped municipalities repair crumbling infrastructure in aging cities. However, politicians soon realized that sewers and potholes were less valuable politically then sexy, high-profile, artsy, and athletic megaprojects like the aforementioned Royal Alberta Museum.

      Cutting the ribbon to a new sports arena or concert hall makes for a much better photo opportunity than opening a sewage treatment plant. As a result, replacing critical infrastructure (needs) gave way to the irresistible appeal of building more culturally and socially appealing megaprojects (wants). Ironically, municipal decision makers, who would have been in the best position to assess local needs, were frequently squeezed out of the final project selection process by the higher levels of government because of the latter’s deeper pockets.

      The creep toward blurred constitutional lines of authority started almost a half-century ago. It was at that time that the concept of “delegation” was first introduced. According to that concept, one level of government could agree to delegate spending authority to another level.[1] In practical terms, this meant that the federal government was able to use its spending powers for programs in areas in which it does not have constitutional jurisdiction to legislate.

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