Creating a Common Polity. Emily Mackil

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СКАЧАТЬ Aeschin. 3.116 with Sánchez 2001: 229. For the technicality upon which the Athenians are indicted by the Amphissans in Aeschines’ account see Bommelaer and Bommelaer 1983: 21–26. Cf. Dem. 18.150.

      155. Aeschin. 3.115, 117–33; Dem. 18.155–57. Demosthenes’ claim (Dem. 18.143–51) that Aeschines fabricated the whole tradition about the consecration of Kirrha under a bribe from Philip, in order to have a war declared that would give Philip the right to be in central Greece with his army, is to be rejected in the face of earlier evidence for the duty of the amphiktyony to protect the sacred land (e.g., CID IV.1 with Sánchez 2001: 153–63 and Rousset 2002: 188–92). It is clearly intended to counter Aeschines’ charge (3.113–14) that Demosthenes had taken bribes from Amphissa.

      156. Dem. 18.167, 175; Plut. Dem. 18.1; Philoch. FGrHist 328 F 56; Diod. Sic. 16.85.3.

      157. Aeschin. 3.140; Philoch. FGrHist 328 F 56b; Dem. 18.153. Cf. Harris 1995: 100. How the Boiotians had come to control Nikaia is unclear. Dem. 11.12 calls it a Theban apoikia. See Nielsen in Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 669–70 for its shadowy history.

      158. Dem. 18.169–88; Diod. Sic. 16.84.2–85.1.

      159. Aeschin. 3.142.

      160. Dem. 16.169–79; Aeschin. 3.142–51; Diod. Sic. 16.85.5–86.6. See Harris 1995: 126–37.

      161. Justin 9.4.6–8.

      162. Paus. 4.27.10.

      163. Plataia: Paus. 4.27.10, 9.1.8.

      164. Arr. Anab. 1.7.11.

      165. Dem. 9.34.

      166. Theopomp. FGrHist 115 F 235. Cf. Bosworth 1976: 169–74. Most assume that Dem. 9.34 simply anticipates Strabo (9.4.7), who says only that Naupaktos was Aitolian in his own time, that Philip must have actually made Naupaktos Aitolian, which he could only have done shortly after Chaironeia, and misread Theopompos as supporting this reconstruction, when in fact he (the best of the three sources) contradicts it. See Oldfather, RE XVI.2 s.v. “Naupaktos,” col. 1990; Lerat 1952: II.49; Merker 1989: 306; Freitag 2000: 87–88; Rousset 2004: 396; BNP IX s.v. “Naupaktos,” col. 547.

      167. RO 76.

      168. Diod. Sic. 17.3.3–4, 8.1–3; Arr. Anab. 1.1.3, 7.1–3.

      169. Persian contributions: Din. 1.10, 18 with 1.20–22; Aeschin. 3.156–57, 239–40; Hyp. 5.17, 25. Uneven Arkadian support: Din. 1.19–20 with Arr. Anab. 1.10.1.

      170. Arr. Anab. 1.7.4–8.8, 9.6–10; Marm.Par. (IG XII.5.444 ll. 103–4); Din. 1.24; Aeschin. 3.157; Diod. Sic. 17.9–14; Plut. Alex. 11.6–12.6.

      171. Arr. Anab. 1.8.8 with Hurst 1989; Diod. Sic. 17.13.5; Justin 11.3.8.

      172. Akraiphia: Paus. 9.23.5. Athens: Aeschin. 3.159; Paus. 9.7.1; Plut. Alex. 13.1; Munn 1998: 53–54 for a Theban among the ephebes at Panakton ca. 330–320. Persian army: Hofstetter 1978: nos. 89, 313 with Arr. Anab. 2.15.2–4; Plut. Apophth. Alex. 22 (Mor. 181B). Some of the Thebans’ Boiotian enemies joined Alexander’s army: Anth.Pal. 6.344.

      173. Hyp. Epit. 17; Arr. Anab. 1.9.9.

      174. Arr. Anab. 1.9.9; Diod. Sic. 18.11.3–5; Din. 1.24. Cf. Gullath 1982: 77–82.

      175. Arr. Anab. 1.9.10; cf. Plut. Alex. 34.2; Plut. Arist. 11.9; Justin 11.3.8. The rebuilding of Plataia after 338 appears to have involved construction on an orthogonal plan: Konecny et al. 2008.

      176. Paus. 1.34.1; Σ Dem. 18.99 (176 Dilts) suggest that it was made Athenian after Chaironeia, and this has been the dominant view until recently (e.g., Robert 1940–65: XI–XII.195). But now see Knoepfler 1993a: 295 and 2001a: 367–89 for 335 as the date when Oropos was handed over to the Athenians. After its transfer, the Athenians disputed how the territory would be divided up among the tribes; see Hyp. 4 and Agora I.6793 with Langdon 1987; Lewis 1990a; Papazarkadas 2009b.

      177. Arr. Anab. 1.10.2.

      178. Bosworth 1976: 166–67; Scholten 2000: 16.

      179. Sordi 1953b: 435. Compare the dispatch of three ambassadors by the Aitolians, one to represent each of the three major ethnē, to the Spartans in 426, after Demosthenes’ invasion: Th. 3.100.1. See above, p. 56. For detailed discussion see Funke 1997: 159–60.

      180. FDelph III.4.399 (SEG 17.228). The date of the grant is controversial. I follow Arnush 1995 (cf. Arnush 2000: 299–300) contra Bousquet 1988a: 58 n. 50. Even if we accept Arnush’s argument for the Delphic archonship of Sarpadon belonging to the year 335/4, we cannot determine the relative chronology of the grant and the destruction of Thebes.

      181. Hyp. 5.18.

      182. Achaian participation in revolt of Agis: Aeschin. 3.165; Din. 1.34; Q.C. 6.1.20. This suggestion is hypothetical, and it is difficult to know how to square it with the claim of Hyp. 5.18 that the Achaian koinon was in existence in 323.

      183. Mendels 1984: 129–49.

      3

      The Hellenistic Period

      MAINLAND GREECE AND THE WARS OF THE SUCCESSORS, 323–285

      During the Hellenistic period, the koina of mainland Greece and the Peloponnese were strengthened and expanded both to achieve greater security against powerful enemies and to gain control over greater and more diversified sets of resources. Attempts to retain regional autonomy led to a series of shifting alliances, especially complex during the wars of Alexander’s successors. The city of Thebes was rebuilt and eventually rejoined the Boiotian koinon, which became robust in this period, with a set of institutions refined to prevent the old hegemon from regaining its former position of dominance over the other member poleis and the koinon as a whole. The Aitolian koinon grew rapidly through much of the third century, acquiring members by an unusual variety of diplomatic means and experimenting with how—and how far—to integrate these newcomers into the Aitolian state. The Achaian koinon was refounded around 280 following the successful expulsion of Macedonian-installed tyrants from the Achaian cities and grew rapidly for the rest of the third century, eventually encompassing almost the entire Peloponnese. Resistance to integration came most notably from Sparta during the reign of Kleomenes, whom the Achaians defeated narrowly and only at the high price of forging an alliance with their longtime enemy Antigonos Doson. The short but bitter Social War (220–217) pitted the Achaians and Aitolians, former allies, against each other and paved the way for Roman intervention in Greece before the end of the third century. The koina of mainland Greece struggled, ultimately unsuccessfully, to retain their autonomy in the face of increasing Roman power over the next half-century. The means by which they were dismembered tell us a great deal both about what made koina such effective states and about the nature of Roman ambitions in mainland Greece in the second century.

      Despite their conciliatory embassies to Alexander after the destruction of Thebes, the Aitolians remained resolutely hostile toward Macedonian rulers. If most Greek cities were hard hit by Alexander’s decree for the restoration of exiles, the Aitolians and Athenians were united in their virulent resistance to the order. The Aitolians had seized the Akarnanian polis of Oiniadai and expelled its entire population (a clear illustration of the Aitolians’ urgent need to gain greater access to the coast in this period), while the Athenians worried that they would lose their cleruchy on Samos.¹ When news of Alexander’s death reached Greece, the Athenian general Leosthenes “went to Aitolia to arrange a common undertaking. The Aitolians gladly acknowledged his request СКАЧАТЬ