Creating a Common Polity. Emily Mackil

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СКАЧАТЬ poleis in a Theban-led koinon was no more a violation of autonomy than the subordination of the perioikic towns of Lakonia to Sparta.⁷¹ Xenophon claims that when the allies agreed to renew the common peace and took their oaths, the Thebans did too, in their own name, but on the following day asked to change their oath, so that it would be in the name of all Boiotia. Agesilaos refused and sent orders to Kleombrotos, the Spartan general stationed in Phokis, to invade Boiotia.⁷² The implication is clear: the Spartans refused to recognize the Boiotian koinon as a state, insisting that it violated the autonomy clause of the King’s Peace. As a result, all sources agree, the Thebans remained outside the peace, and we know of no other Boiotian poleis taking the oath in their own names. Kleombrotos, already in Phokis, could act quickly and launched an invasion of Boiotia, which led to a decisive engagement at Leuktra late in the year 371. The stunning defeat suffered by the Spartans at this battle is one of the major turning points in the history of fourth-century Greece. Leuktra led, undeniably, to a wholly different world, in which the Spartans were badly weakened and the Thebans wildly emboldened.⁷³ That different world is described by modern historians as the Theban hegemony, adopting the language of hēgemonia used by the ancient sources about Thebes’ position vis-à-vis the rest of Greece for the next nine years. Yet this label captures only a part of the story that interests us, for these years also witnessed the burgeoning of formal koinon institutions throughout mainland Greece, a phenomenon that cannot be tied in every case to the energies of the Boiotians’ brilliant statesman Epameinondas.

      THEBAN HEGEMONY AND THE HEGEMONY OF THE KOINON, 371–346

      The Athenians received Theban news of their victory at Leuktra with obvious distress; the herald was not even offered hospitality, much less a promise of aid.⁷⁴ Several attempts were made to arbitrate in the dispute between Thebes and Sparta, but the status of the Boiotian and the Lakonian perioikic poleis remained unresolved.⁷⁵ The Athenians soon took the lead in reaffirming the terms of the peace reached before the battle; the only difference appears to be that no one was prepared to force the issue of autonomy for the poleis of Boiotia.⁷⁶

      The Thebans now set about consolidating the Boiotian state and cementing alliances with central Greek neighbors. In 370 they punished the intransigence of Orchomenos, with which they had been in open conflict before Leuktra.⁷⁷ The original intention, according to Diodoros, was to enslave the city, but Epameinondas persuaded them of the political importance of philanthrōpia, so instead “they reckoned the Orchomenians among the territory of their allies,” a mysterious phrase.⁷⁸ Whether that was equivalent to the treatment originally meted out to Thespiai in 373 (being compelled “to contribute to the Thebans”), or whether they allowed them independence from the koinon on condition of agreeing to an alliance, is unclear. They then established friendship with the Phokians, Lokrians, and Aitolians, all of whom turned out to be valuable supporters.⁷⁹ The Thebans now approached a hegemonic position within the mainland, which means in practice only that they tended to be the ones who were most effective at deciding disputes (usually by force) and received appeals for help by other states for that reason. Although Xenophon’s account of these years focuses heavily on Theban relations with the Peloponnesian states, we know from other sources that they were also vigorously active in northern Greece and in the Aegean. The history of Thebes and Boiotia in the 360s thus demands a consideration of virtually the whole of the Greek world. But my aim is merely to show the outlines of the major events of the period in order to facilitate a better understanding of the developments of the institutions of the koinon and its internal workings.⁸⁰

      The Arkadians took the common peace reached in Athens, which implicitly sanctioned the existence of the Boiotian koinon, as an opportunity for political revolution. The Mantineians took it as a signal that they were free to resynoikize their city and did so despite Spartan anger, while in Tegea the first steps were taken toward the creation of an Arkadian regional state; it was proposed that whatever was decided in common would be binding upon all poleis.⁸¹ But the proposal met with opposition in some places, at Tegea so strongly that a violent stasis erupted over the issue. As the Arkadian army grew with the adherence of each new member polis, it was used to compel recalcitrant poleis to join the koinon. It was probably in these earliest days of Arkadian unification after Leuktra, when there was heightened awareness of the need for physical security and institutional support for a newly created regional state, that the Arkadians began the process of creating their new Megalopolis by synoikism.⁸² Spartan attempts to break what they clearly saw as a very real threat were unsuccessful, but the Arkadians needed help and appealed to the Athenians in late 370. There they were rebuffed, but they received a much warmer reception in Thebes.⁸³

      The Boiotian army invaded the Peloponnese in late winter 370 to help the Arkadians, with virtually all central Greece in their alliance.⁸⁴ The army of Boiotians and Arkadians that invaded Lakonia was the first the Spartan women had ever seen, and the shock was so severe that the Spartans offered freedom to all helots who assisted in the defense of Lakonia.⁸⁵ After an indecisive battle at Sparta itself the Thebans attacked Gytheion, the southern port of Lakonia opposite Kythera, and won the support of Lakonian perioikoi.⁸⁶ It was probably at this juncture, in early spring 369, that they delivered a more significant blow to Sparta’s ancient supremacy in the Peloponnese by helping to refound Messene as a city well situated, geographically and in a sense structurally, for opposition to Sparta.⁸⁷ The Messenian communities now formed themselves into a koinon, with the help not only of the Boiotians but also of the Arkadians and Argives.⁸⁸ The Thebans’ invasion of the Peloponnese in winter 370/69 was focused primarily on damaging the Spartans indirectly by bolstering nascent Arkadian political union and strengthening the Messenians, and this was precisely what was accomplished before their withdrawal in the early spring of 369.⁸⁹ As they withdrew, however, they encountered Athenian forces, now allied with the Spartans, in the Corinthia. Fighting in the area, extending into summer 369, was indecisive.⁹⁰

      During the same period the Thebans became more heavily involved in northern Greece, and as they did so the Arkadians began to withdraw their support.⁹¹ In Thessaly, one Alexander came to power in Pherai after a series of bloody power struggles, and the Boiotians responded to a call for help from Larisa, which Alexander held by force.⁹² In Macedon similar dynastic struggles were unfolding, and the Thebans were asked to arbitrate. Most of the Boiotian army was in the Peloponnese with Epameinondas, so the Thebans sent their other star general, Pelopidas, at the head of a force that was able to expel Alexander’s garrison from Larisa before continuing north to Macedon. The primary outcome of this first official Theban visit to Macedon was that Philip II, the brother of the reigning king, along with other noble youths, was taken back to Thebes as a hostage for the good behavior of the Macedonian ruler.⁹³

      Neither the Thessalian nor the Macedonian arrangement lasted long: Ptolemy assassinated Alexander II and took the throne for himself, sparking the complaints of Alexander’s supporters, while the Thessalian poleis renewed their complaints against Alexander of Pherai.⁹⁴ Pelopidas returned to Macedonia, where he managed to extract a promise from Ptolemy that he would hold the throne only as regent for Alexander’s heirs, but the agreement was made, according to Plutarch, more out of deference on Ptolemy’s part to the prestige of the Thebans than as a result of military victory.⁹⁵ Indeed Pelopidas had been forced to hire mercenaries within Thessaly for his expedition to Macedonia, because the bulk of the Theban army was again in the Peloponnese with Epameinondas, but they were susceptible to Ptolemy’s bribes. Pelopidas then entered Thessaly: whether he did so with the intention of punishing his treacherous mercenaries or to arbitrate again in the dispute between Alexander of Pherai and some of the Thessalian cities is not clear.⁹⁶ Whatever his intention, Pelopidas was seized by Alexander of Pherai and held at Pharsalos; it took two expeditions by the Thebans to rescue him, in the course of which Alexander of Pherai was so alarmed that he sought, and won, an alliance with the Athenians.⁹⁷

      The Athenian alliance first with Sparta and then with Alexander of Pherai in these years, and the Arkadians’ increasing independence from СКАЧАТЬ