Into the Land of Bones. Frank L. Holt

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СКАЧАТЬ to the uglier version presented in these pages. Beneath the whitewash, bloodstains run deep.

      Second, we must acknowledge that the wars waged in Afghanistan by Alexander, Britain, the Soviet Union, and now the United States share some salient features that may not bode well for our future. For example, all these invasions of Afghanistan went well at first, but so far no superpower has found a workable alternative to what might be called the recipe for ruin in Afghanistan:

      1. Estimate the time and resources necessary to conquer and control the region.

      2. Double all estimates.

      3. Repeat as needed.

      Afghanistan cannot be subdued by half measures. Invaders must consider the deadly demands of winter warfare, since all gains from seasonal campaigns are erased at every lull. Invaders must resolve to hunt down every warlord, for the one exception will surely rot the fruits of all other victories. Invaders cannot succeed by avoiding cross-border fighting, since the mobile insurgents can otherwise hide and reinforce with impunity. Invaders must calculate where to draw the decisive line between killing and conciliation, for too much of either means interminable conflict. Finally, all invaders so far have had to face one more difficult choice: once mired in a winless situation, they have tried to cut their losses through one of two exit strategies:

      1. Retreat, as did the British and Soviets, with staggering losses.

      2. Leave a large army of occupation permanently settled in the area, as Alexander did.

      Neither option seems acceptable to the United States, which must therefore learn from its predecessors’ mistakes and seek another path.

      That process must take into account the same problems encountered throughout Afghan history, beginning in antiquity. As one scholar has adroitly observed in a study of Alexander’s cities, “the requirements of imperial rule in Central Asia are laid down by nature, and were as valid in the time of Alexander (and earlier) as in that of Queen Victoria.”⁵² Alexander therefore drew a timeless map of the region, both politically and militantly, which still can be recognized spread across planning tables in modern military headquarters. But that is only the beginning. Alexander’s reputation as a military genius, though richly deserved, cannot mask some of the miscalculations he pioneered in Bactria. He led his men into a war whose mission necessarily evolved. This often confused his troops and contributed to great disappointments. Morale suffered as men realized that they had been given false expectations about the nature of the resistance and the timetable for their return home to their families. In Bactria, allies and enemies were often indistinguishable until it was too late. Alexander’s soldiers had been trained to wage and win major battles, but the king now shifted them into new and uncomfortable roles: they juggled awkwardly the jobs of conqueror, peacekeeper, builder, and settler. One minute they were asked to kill with ruthless and indiscriminate intensity, the next they were expected to show deference to the survivors. Enemies might suddenly become allies and exercise authority over Macedonians and Greeks. Some of Darius’s generals and satraps (governors) regained power as Alexander’s appointees. Alexander was the first ruler to underestimate the deleterious effect of such a conflict on his armed forces.

      Third, let us not forget that Afghanistan has always been an inherently unstable territory. Even now, it barely qualifies to be called a nation in any conventional sense. Sure, it has (at times) a figurehead leader, flag, currency, and provisional constitution, but its traditions of local independence overwhelm all grander political notions. After all, Afghanistan is a collection of peoples who speak three times more languages (over thirty) than there are paved airfields (ten) in an area the size of England and France. It is an impoverished land with little to lose by resisting foreign intruders. Only 12 percent of the land is arable, and even then its main crop, opium, is illegal. Most of the population lacks access to safe water and sufficient food. Malnutrition has been a constant. About a quarter of the population has malaria, and perhaps half suffer from tuberculosis. The life expectancy for Afghans remains less than forty-five years. Poor but proud and defiant, the people there are not intimidated easily. The vaunted power of the West has little leverage beyond the immediate range of its weapons.⁵³

      In Afghanistan, a little rebellion always goes a long way. A force composed of a mere 10 percent of the population can use the rugged terrain and hostile climate very effectively against larger, better-armed forces. And that insurgent 10 percent, forever present, can swell in an instant to 90 percent or more. Nor can the populace be cowed by capturing its heartland. Afghanistan has no center to speak of, and no clear edges. Afghanistan’s few large cities all perch on its periphery: Mazar-i-Sharif in the north, Herat in the west, Kandahar in the south, and Kabul in the east. They all lie nearer to other nations than to each other. Indeed, many segments of the population feel a closer kinship to ethnic groups outside Afghanistan than to compatriots within. The borders are nominal, not natural. They are porous to such a degree that rebels can easily drift across and regroup among friendly brethren. Under these conditions, whether cities fall or not, an invader can never really know who is winning the war.

      That explains why we stand today (albeit for different reasons) where the Soviets did in 1980, the British in 1879 and 1839, and even the Greeks and Macedonians in 329 B.C.E. To see our way forward, we must first take a long look back. For recent history, that task is relatively simple. Accounts of the British and Soviet experience in Afghanistan are numerous, and some analysts have made good use of them. Unheroized historical studies of Alexander’s invasion are considerably rarer, though no less vital. The events of 9–11 and their aftermath have given new urgency to that research, and this book is one result. The following pages provide a fresh look into Alexander’s invasion; this book is written for those who seek a millennial perspective on one of the defining conflicts of our time.

      CHAPTER TWO

      Hunting the Enemy

      CITY OF BONES

      In the spring of 329 B.C.E., at the age of twenty-six, Alexander set up camp in a city rumored to be the oldest in the world. Zariaspa lay beside the Bactrus River and served as the administrative capital of Bactria, an old province of the Persian Empire; for these reasons, the city itself was generally referred to simply as Bactra (without an i). Today the site, called Balkh, is a sprawling ruin in northern Afghanistan with miles of crumbling walls enclosing a small village in a dusty tract.¹ In Islamic tradition, old Noah himself founded this city after floating through the Great Flood. Thousands of years later, Balkh was still “a splendid city of great size” (though already declining) when Marco Polo passed by in the thirteenth century C.E.² Gradually, its population shifted fourteen miles eastward to Mazar-i-Sharif, particularly after the establishment there of the popular shrine of Hazrat ‘Ali, son-in-law of Muhammad, in 1481.³ It was at Mazar-i-Sharif that the United States and its allies won their first victory in Afghanistan (with the cavalry charge mentioned in chapter 1), and at the tomb of ‘Ali that large crowds celebrated the event.⁴ Ironically, many Muslims revere an alternate burial place for this same ‘Ali, a rival shrine located at Najaf in Iraq—the scene of so much strife in an even more recent war.⁵

      Neither Najaf nor Mazar-i-Sharif existed as cities in the fourth century B.C.E. When Alexander rode by on his way from Babylon to Bactra, Islam had not yet redrawn the maps of ancient empires. Zoroastrianism prevailed in much of the Persian realm conquered by Alexander, and Bactra was the holy city of its prophet.⁶ A famous golden shrine of Anahita, worshiped by Zoroastrians as a goddess of fertility and purifying waters, still stood astride the Bactrus River when the Greeks and Macedonians arrived.⁷ In later legends, Anahita would become the wife of Alexander and use her powers to help her husband win his wars.⁸ In reality, the only thing her cult could do for the king was to preside over the nourishing waters that refreshed his troops in this arid land. The Bactrus River, and the dozens of irrigation canals drawing from СКАЧАТЬ