Imperfect Cosmopolis. Georg Cavallar

Чтение книги онлайн.

СКАЧАТЬ think it Safety, to be devoured by Lions’.¹⁹

      Now the logical step would have been to overcome the equally ‘unsafe’ and ‘insecure’ international state of nature and form a social contract among states. Locke notes that there is a difference between mere promises and compacts or treaties where states or individuals are still in a state of nature and a social contract or compact where parties agree ‘together mutually to enter into one Community, and make one Body Politick’.²⁰ Locke seems to hold that this community of states is theoretically possible. We do not get the standard argument that international anarchy ‘is not that bad’ (as in Hobbes and others). Locke does assert that being judge in one’s own case – a key feature of the state of nature – is unreasonable. But Locke does not draw the logical conclusion that the international state of nature has to be left. Instead, we get a rather conventional theory of the law of nations: for instance, defensive wars are acceptable and politics should be based on the people’s consent.²¹ As in Hume, foreign policy is a matter of ‘prudence’ and ‘wisdom’ of politicians, and cannot be regulated by ‘antecedent, standing, positive laws’ as in domestic affairs. In short, Locke gives foreign ministers a free hand as long as ‘the advantages of the Commonwealth’ are not lost sight of.²²

      Locke’s famous labour theory of property has important consequences on an international level. His labour theory is fully compatible with colonial expansion at the expense of native nomadic populations who, according to Locke, do not really own the land because they do not permanently enclose and farm it (see Chapter 2). Locke’s international relations theory is incomplete and contradictory. His contractual theory and his normative individualism hint at an inherent cosmopolitan dimension but do not spell it out.²³

      David Hume’s vision of international society is clear, but also rather conventional. Enlightened political economy teaches us that transborder interaction is usually both mutually advantageous and ‘even sometimes necessary’, because resources and commodities are unevenly distributed over the globe. However, all states can exist without international society, albeit perhaps not luxuriously. Individuals, by contrast, depend on civil society for their very survival.²⁴ With this distinction between domestic and international society in mind, Hume rehearses arguments of the natural law tradition, for example Pufendorf. Compared with his attempt to revolutionize moral philosophy, Hume’s account of the law of nations and international society is highly conventional. The same principles of natural justice, namely ‘the stability of possession, its transference by consent, and the performance of promises’, should be operative both in the domestic and the international sphere.

      However, the domestic analogy is soon qualified. The principles of natural justice have lesser ‘force’ based on the just-mentioned utilitarian calculus: the comparatively smaller usefulness or utility of international society translates into reduced moral necessity.²⁵ As the philosopher is in no position to assess with accuracy the precise degree of the moral ‘force’ of the right of nations, it is left to the politicians and their experience and judgement to do so. Again, this is reminiscent of Pufendorf: state sovereignty is emphasized, international lawlessness accepted as inevitable and political decisions are most likely a matter of reasons of state. Like some other representatives of the Enlightenment, Hume goes out of his way to argue for the European system of a balance of power. For him, it is a safeguard against the threat of a universal monarchy, checks the ambition of rulers such as Charles V and Louis XIV, maintains the independence of states and guarantees common security and relative stability.²⁶

      Hume endorses what could be labelled qualified, indirect or long-term economic cosmopolitanism. The upshot of his economic analysis is that trading partners naturally profit from commercial interaction, without directly intending this result. In other words,

      while every man consults the good of his own community, we are sensible, that the general interest of mankind is better promoted, than by loose indeterminate views to the good of a species, whence no beneficial action could ever result, for want of a duly limited object, on which they could exert themselves.²⁷

      It is better to focus on specific objects or projects than on lofty ones, Hume asserts. Because of the law of unintended consequences, the more limited perspective inevitably promotes the broader ‘general interest of mankind’. It does not make sense to characterize Hume as either cosmopolitan or anti-cosmopolitan. To some extent, he is both: there is no doubt that the interests of one’s own state or community come first. However, assuming that interests converge if unintended consequences are operative, Hume can also claim that his version of economic cosmopolitanism is more efficient and thus better than direct, traditional natural law cosmopolitanism. He implies that only if societies or regions become trading partners and thus part of the economic market, do they qualify as members of this – either European or truly global – community.

      Of the classical British authors, Adam Smith is the most original thinker. To some extent, Smith can be interpreted as a representative of political realism who follows a Hobbesian approach: he does not assume a natural harmony of interests across borders, his focus is on the state or commonwealth, he views international relations as anarchic, endorses the balance-of-power doctrine, and emphasizes the importance of defence.²⁸ Smith combines a weak form of political realism with a state-centred and patriotic perspective and cosmopolitan ideas. On the one hand, he asserts that the love of humanity is too vague, that patriotism is more feasible and that Britain should be loved ‘for its own sake’. However, as in Hume, the great society is indirectly supported by efforts consciously focusing on the domestic sphere. Worldwide economic gains are an unintended by-product. Free trade would turn states into a sort of ‘provinces’ of one great empire: the idea of a monarchia universalis is transformed into the vision of a truly global free exchange of commodities, with overall beneficial results such as the end of local famines, and a situation where respect for rights is guaranteed by a roughly equal distribution of economic and military power. In addition, people with ‘enlarged and enlightened’ minds would overcome the passions of ‘savage patriotism’.²⁹

      Distinguishing between European politics and global international relations, Smith holds that the balance of power in Europe is efficient, with the overall result being ‘peace and tranquillity’ and the protection of the freedom and independence of the sovereign European states. The situation is different on a global scale. Since 1492, Europeans have enjoyed military superiority, which enabled them ‘to commit with impunity every sort of injustice’ wherever they wanted to.³⁰ Smith speaks as an impartial spectator; he is not interested in defending or trivializing European atrocities, or constructing a teleological theory of possible benefits arising from these injustices. However, as in European politics, the global remedy is a system of power balance (the standard remedy of political realism). Smith speculates that perhaps in the future, European power will decline and that of non-European communities will increase, so that in the long run ‘the inhabitants of all the different quarters of the world may arrive at that equality of courage and force which, by inspiring mutual fear, can alone overawe the injustice of independent nations into some sort of respect for the rights of one another’. This equality of force can be established by worldwide commerce and the transfer of technology.³¹ In short, commerce reduces material inequalities among nations and parts of the globe, and contributes to peace and ‘respect for rights’ in the long run. A natural superiority of Europeans, or a right to civilize backward barbarians, is not implied.

      Smith became famous for his elaborated version of the so-called four-stage theory. While his account is developmental and culminates in the commercial society, Smith avoids, and warns against, what he sees as civilizational self-deception: the belief that one’s own society or culture is superior to others. Smith’s moral balance-sheet of commercial society is much more nuanced than Hume’s, emphasizing the paradoxes, ambivalences and negative side-effects of commercial progress.³² In addition, Smith explains societal change in Europe, at least partially, with the help of material or physical СКАЧАТЬ