Judgment Aggregation. Gabriella Pigozzi
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      Definition 2.1 Judgment aggregation problem. Let L be a propositional language on a given set of atoms At. A judgment aggregation problem for L is a tuple J = 〈N, A〉 where:

      • N is a finite non-empty set;

      • A ⊆ L such that

for some finite I ⊆ L which contains only positive contingent formulae.

      Set N is the set of individuals (or agents or voters). A is called the agenda and I is called the set of issues or the pre-agenda of A. An agenda based on a set of issues I will often be denoted ±I. Given an agenda A, we denote its pre-agenda by [A].4

      Intuitively, one can view a judgment aggregation problem as what specifies the space of possible situations in which the individuals in N have to reach some collective decision about the issues in I. An agenda A = ±I represents then all possible attitudes that can be assumed toward the issues in I. In the framework we are going to work with, such attitudes are of only two types: acceptance and rejection. The agenda is therefore a set of formulae which is closed under negation, i.e., ∀φ: φA iff ¬φA, and where double negations are eliminated. To make an example, the doctrinal paradox agenda

expresses all the acceptance/rejection attitudes that one individual can assume over the set of issues {p, q, pq}.

      Given a judgment aggregation problem, individuals are asked to express their opinions on the formulae of the agenda by accepting some and rejecting others. These opinions are called judgment sets and are defined as follows:

      • J is consistent;

      • J is complete, i.e., ∀φA, either φJ or ¬φJ.

      Instead of φJ we will often use the notation Jφ to indicate that φ belongs to judgment set J.5 The set of all judgment sets is denoted

where
denotes the power-set function. A judgment profile
is an |N|-tuple of judgment sets. With Pi we denote the ith entry of P, i.e., the judgment set of agent i in P. For φA, we use to denote the set of individuals accepting φ in
. Finally, we denote with P the set of all judgment profiles. Abusing notation, we will sometimes indicate that a judgment set Ji belongs to a profile P by writing JiP.

      So individuals express their opinions through sets of formulae of the agenda: the formulae contained in the set are the ones that are accepted by the individual, the ones belonging to the complement of the set are the ones that are rejected by the individual. The consistency and completeness criteria formalize a notion of ‘rationality’ for the views that might be held by individuals. Such views cannot be internally contradictory (consistency) and cannot abstain from accepting or rejecting any of the issues posed by the agenda (completeness).6

      Remark 2.3 Deductive closure A set of formulae Φ is deductively closed (w.r.t. agenda A) if any φA that follows logically from Φ is also contained in it: if Φφ, then φΦ. Since judgment sets are sets of formulae that are consistent and complete, they are also deductively closed. However, a set of formulae that is consistent and deductively closed is not necessarily complete. When working with judgment sets the two notations φJ (membership) and Jφ (consequence) can be seen as notational variants. However, when working with sets of formulae that are not judgment sets by the letter of Definition 2.2—in our context these will typically be sets of formulae accepted by a group of individuals—we will keep the two notations distinct.

      The judgment aggregation problem consists in the aggregation of the individuals’ judgment sets into one collective judgment set. The aggregation of individual judgments is viewed as a function:

. The output set f(P), where
, is sometimes denoted J. Set J is then called a collective set. A collective set J which is a judgment set is called a collective judgment set.

      So, an aggregation function takes as input a profile of consistent and complete subsets of the agenda (i.e., judgment sets) and outputs a subset of the agenda. Such subset is neither necessarily consistent nor necessarily complete. In other words, the collective set is not necessarily a judgment set. In view of our discussion of the doctrinal paradox and the discursive dilemma this should not come as a surprise: the output of an aggregation function might not be ‘rational’ in the sense in which individual judgment sets are.

      Remark 2.5 Universal domain and resoluteness We conclude our comment of Definition 2.4 by noticing that it builds two key properties into the notion of aggregation function. First, it assumes that the domain of the aggregation consists of all possible judgment profiles or, intuitively, that all profiles of individual opinions are admissible as input for the aggregation. This property is commonly referred to as universal domain. Second, it assumes the aggregation to be resolute, that is, to yield for each profile only one set of formulae. In this book we will work almost exclusively with functions that satisfy universal domain and resoluteness. Aggregation functions that do not satisfy universal domain will be presented later in Chapter 4. Irresolute functions yielding for each profile a non-empty set of sets of formulae will be studied later in Chapter 4 and especially in Chapter 6.

      We now give several examples of aggregation functions as rules for defining the collective set based on a judgment profile. We typically refer to concrete aggregation functions as aggregation rules. The ones that follow in this section will be discussed at several places throughout the book and are the ones most commonly considered in the literature.

       Threshold-based rules

      The rules below determine the collective outcome by checking, for СКАЧАТЬ