Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 8. Charles S. Peirce
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Название: Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 8
Автор: Charles S. Peirce
Издательство: Ingram
Жанр: Философия
isbn: 9780253004215
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1. In using the conjunctions “either … or,” I always intend to leave open the possibility that both alternatives may hold good. By “either x or y,” I mean “Either x or y or both.”
2. A “rule” in algebra differs from most other rules, in that it requires nothing to be done, but only permits us to make certain transformations.
3. The Pythagorean notion was that odd was good, even bad.
19
Notes on the Question of the Existence of an External World
| c. 1890 | Houghton Library |
1. The idealistic argument turns upon the assumption that certain things are absolutely “present,” namely what we have in mind at the moment, and that nothing else can be immediately, that is, otherwise than inferentially known. When this is once granted, the idealist has no difficulty in showing that that external existence which we cannot know immediately we cannot know, at all. Some of the arguments used for this purpose are of little value, because they only go to show that our knowledge of an external world is fallible; now there is a world of difference between fallible knowledge and no knowledge. However, I think it would have to be admitted as a matter of logic that if we have no immediate perception of a non-ego, we can have no reason to admit the supposition of an existence so contrary to all experience as that would in that case be.
But what evidence is there that we can immediately know only what is “present” to the mind? The idealists generally treat this as self-evident; but, as Clifford jestingly says, “it is evident” is a phrase which only means “we do not know how to prove.” The proposition that we can immediately perceive only what is present seems to me parallel to that other vulgar prejudice that “a thing cannot act where it is not.” An opinion which can only defend itself by such a sounding phrase is pretty sure to be wrong. That a thing cannot act where it is not, is plainly an induction from ordinary experience which shows no forces except such as act through the resistance of materials, with the exception of gravity which, owing to its being the same for all bodies, does not appear in ordinary experience like a force. But further experience shows that attractions and repulsions are the universal types of forces. A thing may be said to be wherever it acts; but the notion that a particle is absolutely present in one part of space and absolutely absent from all the rest of space is devoid of all foundation. In like manner, the idea that we can immediately perceive only what is present, seems to be founded on our ordinary experience that we cannot recall and reexamine the events of yesterday nor know otherwise than by inference what is to happen tomorrow.
Peirce’s “Notes on the Question of the Existence of an External World” was written on the same type of laid paper as “The Architecture of Theories” and several other documents all dated 1890. The paper Peirce used for these notes is an important clue in dating this document circa 1890. (By permission of the Houghton Library, Harvard University.)
20
[Note on Kant’s Refutation of Idealism]
| c. 1890 | Houghton Library |
Kant’s refutation of idealism in the second edition of the Critic of the Pure Reason has been often held to be inconsistent with his main position or even to be knowingly sophistical. It appears to me to be one of the numerous passages in that work which betray an elaborated and vigorous analysis, marred in the exposition by the attempt to state the argument more abstractly and demonstratively than the thought would warrant.
In “Note 1,” Kant says that his argument beats idealism at its own game. How is that? The idealist says that all that we know immediately, that is, otherwise than inferentially, is what is present in the mind; and things out of the mind are not so present. The whole idealist position turns upon this conception of the present. Obviously, then, the first move toward beating idealism at its own game is to remark that we apprehend our own ideas only as flowing in time, and since neither the future nor the past, however near they may be, is present, there is as much difficulty in conceiving our perception of what passes within us as in conceiving external perception. If so, replies the idealist, instead of giving up idealism we must go still further to nihilism. Kant does not notice this retort; but it is clear from his footnote that he would have said: Not so; for it is impossible we should so much as think we think in time unless we do think in time; or rather, dismissing blind impossibility, the mere imagination of time is a clear perception of the past. Hamilton stupidly objects to Reid’s phrase “immediate memory”; but an immediate, intuitive, consciousness of time clearly exists wherever time exists. But once grant immediate knowledge in time, and what becomes of the idealist theory that we immediately know only the present? For the present can contain no time.
21
[Notes on Consciousness]
| c. 1890 | Houghton Library |
Utterly incredible that consciousness is a property of a particular mechanical contrivance or chemical combination.
The doctrine of “ultimate facts,” altogether illogical.
So that the only thing left is to say it is diffused throughout the universe.
But in that case of what nature is the unity of consciousness? And why cannot this continuous consciousness be in immediate connection?
First let us see what we can make out by considering the nature of conscious nerve matter. It has the general properties of nerve matter. Two states a calm and an excited. In the excited state protoplasm generally has a tendency to contract; but this is little seen in nerve matter. Excited state brought on by any disturbance. Propagated through the whole mass. Growth. This is stimulated by exercise which is perhaps necessary to it. Excessively complex & unstable chemical constitution. Great & endless variety of kind which growth keeps up & conserves. Takes habit.
Any way you can look upon these facts, the excited state (which is the conscious state) is a state of derangement, disturbance, disorder.
Shall we say then that perfect order and law is dead, and that disorder and irregularity is everywhere conscious?
Quality of feeling.
Shall we say a gas has feeling? Perhaps so but this is not a disorder propagating & spreading itself. It is not coordinated. Feeling is a small thing in itself.
Now this question arises. If a lot of balls in disorderly movement are conscious, where does that consciousness reside? What are the limits of its unity?
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