Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 8. Charles S. Peirce

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СКАЧАТЬ (16 Nov. 1891). James felt duty-bound to now come openly to Royce’s defense in the pages of the Nation.⁵⁷ He wrote that Peirce’s professed neutrality in the dispute was perhaps more apparent than real, given that Peirce’s knowledge of the facts had come principally from Abbot, so “it seems but fair that one with a less exparte knowledge of the facts should also be heard.” James sought to completely absolve Royce and the editors of International Journal of Ethics from any moral or legal blame and concluded by asserting that “Mr. Abbot’s remedy of heaping personal outrages upon Prof. Royce and his motives, admits of no excuse but a pathological one” and he chastised Peirce for spreading the quarrel “beyond the academic world.”

      Peirce, having been shown James’s letter in the offices of the Nation prior to its publication, wrote privately to express his irritation (17 Nov. 1891): “I am sorry you should see fit to sneer at my impartiality.” Peirce told James that he knew Abbot and Royce about equally well and that “in searching my consciousness, I cannot detect any more leaning to one side than to the other.” Peirce acknowledged that he had adduced some new facts concerning the conduct of the editors of the Journal which he would reflect on but he insisted that a philosopher could criticize another without hoping to injure him, contrary to what he thought James had implied: “Philosophy has not reached the position of an exact science where being in the wrong is somewhat of a reflection upon a man’s competence.” Royce was plainly trying to injure Abbot, Peirce wrote; his general tone “is that of contempt.”

      James showed Peirce’s letter to Royce and, to his credit, Royce wrote a long and respectful letter to Peirce hoping both to defuse the controversy and to win Peirce’s respect: “James knows that I like candid criticism … [and] that I deeply respect your work, and your opinion of philosophical matters” (18 Nov. 1891). Royce proceeded to set out a long explanation of the dispute and a detailed defense of his position—he assured Peirce that previously his relations with Abbot “had always been cordial” and that he deeply regretted “having so touched his heart when I struck home at his work.” This might have ended the matter for Peirce had not yet another letter appeared in the Nation, just two days later, purporting to present evidence mitigating, if not refuting, Peirce’s account of the Abbot-Royce dispute. The author of the new letter was Joseph Bangs Warner, a lawyer who had been retained by Royce as an advisor, and who, like Abbot, had been a member of the old Cambridge Metaphysical Club. Warner, like James, while admitting that Royce may have “transgressed the limits of courteous controversy,” contended that Abbot’s transgressions were greater than Royce’s. Warner downplayed any legal culpability on Royce’s part but openly warned Abbot that the circulation of his reply to Royce “in its present shape” might “entail a serious legal responsibility” on his part.⁵⁸ By so openly demanding that Abbot revise his reply or face legal consequences, Warner was unwittingly strengthening Abbot’s position and Peirce’s representation of the controversy.

      Yet, with Warner’s letter, the Abbot-Royce controversy had about run its course. On 3 December, one final letter would appear in the pages of the Nation, Abbot’s retort to Warner.⁵⁹ Abbot proclaimed Warner’s letter to be “the lawyer’s attempt to put forward his own baseless assumptions in his client’s behalf” and took the opportunity to quote three long paragraphs from his “suppressed” reply to Royce’s review. He concluded by arguing that “when Dr. Royce blew his bugle-blast of defiance, ‘We must show no mercy, as we ask none,’ he deprived himself of all excuse … for seeking refuge behind a menace of prosecution.” Following Abbot’s letter, Nation editor W. P. Garrison announced that no more letters respecting the controversy would be printed. Peirce had submitted a second letter but withdrew it and nothing further appeared in the Nation. Two months later, a second pamphlet by Abbot was issued: Is Not Harvard Responsible for the Conduct of her Professors, as well as of her Students? A Public Remonstrance Addressed to the Board of Overseers of Harvard University, but Harvard ignored it and the controversy came to an end.⁶⁰

      It is difficult to comprehend this strange altercation. Abbot and Royce, though cordial up to this point, could no longer hide their lack of mutual professional respect. Abbot hoped for a Harvard professorship and had even offered to endow a chair for himself, but Royce, as Assistant Professor, clearly had the inside track. Each may have seemed a threat to the other. Abbot was convinced of his importance as a philosopher,⁶¹ but was far from having garnered the professional recognition that the much younger Royce had achieved. Abbot was unstable and tended to react brashly to criticism, while Royce was surprisingly insensitive to the human factors involved in philosophical debate.⁶² In hindsight, Royce was admittedly the superior philosopher, but he unfairly discounted the strength and originality of Abbot’s thought. Royce’s review was overly aggressive, but Abbot’s response was so abrasive that there was really no chance for reconciliation.

      Why did Peirce, alone among Abbot’s peers, come to his defense? He had long harbored genuine esteem for Abbot’s philosophical powers, so that he could not but have been struck by how arbitrary Royce’s “professional warning” was. That sort of condemnation, to be credible, would require “that there could be no two opinions about it on the part of men qualified by mature study to pass judgment on the merits of philosophical writers” (W8: 245). Explaining to James why he had made a “plea for gentleness of criticism,” Peirce argued that a journal “is bound not to say a book is mere rubbish, when persons highly qualified to judge may regard it as valuable. As long as that is the case, it is not rubbish” (30 Nov. 1891). From Royce’s cynical dismissal of Abbot Peirce initially concluded that Royce had been trying to ruin Abbot. But as things evolved, particularly with the personal communications from James and Royce, Peirce warmed to Royce (who would eventually become Peirce’s hope for American philosophy). Without condoning Royce’s treatment of Abbot, Peirce was content to step away from the battle. In the end, Abbot’s pretentious and caustic treatment of Royce, and of Harvard, left him the loser and surely cost him any chance of a professorship. One general conclusion was well expressed in an editorial that appeared in January 1892 in the Educational Review, which described the controversy between Abbot and Royce as “the literary cause célèbre of the year.” Considering Abbot to be the main aggressor, the editors of the Review pinpointed his principal error: “University professors … will be surprised and amused to find Mr. Abbot assailing their Lehrfreiheit.” Abbot’s appeal to Harvard to discipline Royce, they said, was the sort of thing “expected from the political partisan and the religious fanatic, but not from a student and teacher of philosophy in this day and generation.”⁶³

      The meeting of the New York Mathematical Society that Peirce had come to New York to attend was held on Saturday, 7 November 1891, at Columbia College and Peirce was elected to its membership, along with Simon Newcomb and others. Peirce had been invited to join the society by Harold Jacoby, Professor of Astronomy at Columbia. Peirce would become an active participant in the meetings of the New York Mathematical Society and his intellectual development from this time on was to some degree influenced by his association with the society’s members and his involvement in debates over the latest developments in mathematics.⁶⁴

      The following Tuesday, 10 November, the National Academy of Sciences began its three days of meetings, also at Columbia College. Peirce was the discussant for a paper by Ogden Rood, “On a Color System,” and also for Seth C. Chandler’s paper, “On the Variation of Latitude.” A presentation that surely attracted Peirce’s attention was Mendenhall’s paper, “On the Use of a Free Pendulum as a Time Standard.” But principally, Peirce presented a paper entitled “Astronomical Methods of Determining the Curvature of Space,” described as presenting “astronomical evidence tending to show that space possesses a negative curvature, and [calling] attention to various methods of conducting an investigation of this property of space.” The paper, no longer extant, must have been based on methods set out in selection 36 and the results of subsequent measurements of curvature following those methods. Edward C. Pickering, Director of Harvard College Observatory, was the discussant. Three months prior to the meeting, on 9 August, Pickering had sent Peirce the following remark: “Your СКАЧАТЬ