THE COMPLETE WORKS OF PLATO. Plato

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СКАЧАТЬ style="font-size:15px;">      POLUS: I did.

      SOCRATES: Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering, the more disgraceful must be more painful and must exceed in pain or in evil or both: does not that also follow?

      POLUS: Of course.

      SOCRATES: First, then, let us consider whether the doing of injustice exceeds the suffering in the consequent pain: Do the injurers suffer more than the injured?

      POLUS: No, Socrates; certainly not.

      SOCRATES: Then they do not exceed in pain?

      POLUS: No.

      SOCRATES: But if not in pain, then not in both?

      POLUS: Certainly not.

      SOCRATES: Then they can only exceed in the other?

      POLUS: Yes.

      SOCRATES: That is to say, in evil?

      POLUS: True.

      SOCRATES: Then doing injustice will have an excess of evil, and will therefore be a greater evil than suffering injustice?

      POLUS: Clearly.

      SOCRATES: But have not you and the world already agreed that to do injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer?

      POLUS: Yes.

      SOCRATES: And that is now discovered to be more evil?

      POLUS: True.

      SOCRATES: And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dishonour to a less one? Answer, Polus, and fear not; for you will come to no harm if you nobly resign yourself into the healing hand of the argument as to a physician without shrinking, and either say 'Yes' or 'No' to me.

      POLUS: I should say 'No.'

      SOCRATES: Would any other man prefer a greater to a less evil?

      POLUS: No, not according to this way of putting the case, Socrates.

      SOCRATES: Then I said truly, Polus, that neither you, nor I, nor any man, would rather do than suffer injustice; for to do injustice is the greater evil of the two.

      POLUS: That is the conclusion.

      SOCRATES: You see, Polus, when you compare the two kinds of refutations, how unlike they are. All men, with the exception of myself, are of your way of thinking; but your single assent and witness are enough for me,—I have no need of any other, I take your suffrage, and am regardless of the rest. Enough of this, and now let us proceed to the next question; which is, Whether the greatest of evils to a guilty man is to suffer punishment, as you supposed, or whether to escape punishment is not a greater evil, as I supposed. Consider:—You would say that to suffer punishment is another name for being justly corrected when you do wrong?

      POLUS: I should.

      SOCRATES: And would you not allow that all just things are honourable in so far as they are just? Please to reflect, and tell me your opinion.

      POLUS: Yes, Socrates, I think that they are.

      SOCRATES: Consider again:—Where there is an agent, must there not also be a patient?

      POLUS: I should say so.

      SOCRATES: And will not the patient suffer that which the agent does, and will not the suffering have the quality of the action? I mean, for example, that if a man strikes, there must be something which is stricken?

      POLUS: Yes.

      SOCRATES: And if the striker strikes violently or quickly, that which is struck will he struck violently or quickly?

      POLUS: True.

      SOCRATES: And the suffering to him who is stricken is of the same nature as the act of him who strikes?

      POLUS: Yes.

      SOCRATES: And if a man burns, there is something which is burned?

      POLUS: Certainly.

      SOCRATES: And if he burns in excess or so as to cause pain, the thing burned will be burned in the same way?

      POLUS: Truly.

      SOCRATES: And if he cuts, the same argument holds—there will be something cut?

      POLUS: Yes.

      SOCRATES: And if the cutting be great or deep or such as will cause pain, the cut will be of the same nature?

      POLUS: That is evident.

      SOCRATES: Then you would agree generally to the universal proposition which I was just now asserting: that the affection of the patient answers to the affection of the agent?

      POLUS: I agree.

      SOCRATES: Then, as this is admitted, let me ask whether being punished is suffering or acting?

      POLUS: Suffering, Socrates; there can be no doubt of that.

      SOCRATES: And suffering implies an agent?

      POLUS: Certainly, Socrates; and he is the punisher.

      SOCRATES: And he who punishes rightly, punishes justly?

      POLUS: Yes.

      SOCRATES: And therefore he acts justly?

      POLUS: Justly.

      SOCRATES: Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers justly?

      POLUS: That is evident.

      SOCRATES: And that which is just has been admitted to be honourable?

      POLUS: Certainly.

      SOCRATES: Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished suffers what is honourable?

      POLUS: True.

      SOCRATES: And if what is honourable, then what is good, for the honourable is either pleasant or useful?

      POLUS: Certainly.

      SOCRATES: Then he who is punished suffers what is good?

      POLUS: That is true.

      SOCRATES: Then he is benefited?

      POLUS: Yes.

      SOCRATES: Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term 'benefited'? I mean, that if he be justly punished his soul is improved.

      POLUS: Surely.

      SOCRATES: Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his soul?

      POLUS: Yes.

      SOCRATES: And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil? Look at the СКАЧАТЬ