THE COMPLETE WORKS OF PLATO. Plato
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Название: THE COMPLETE WORKS OF PLATO

Автор: Plato

Издательство: Bookwire

Жанр: Документальная литература

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isbn: 9788027201082

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СКАЧАТЬ you admit gold to be a good?

      Certainly, he replied.

      And ought not a man then to have gold everywhere and always, and as much as possible in himself, and may he not be deemed the happiest of men who has three talents of gold in his belly, and a talent in his pate, and a stater of gold in either eye?

      Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; and the Scythians reckon those who have gold in their own skulls to be the happiest and bravest of men (that is only another instance of your manner of speaking about the dog and father), and what is still more extraordinary, they drink out of their own skulls gilt, and see the inside of them, and hold their own head in their hands.

      And do the Scythians and others see that which has the quality of vision, or that which has not? said Euthydemus.

      That which has the quality of vision clearly.

      And you also see that which has the quality of vision? he said. (Note: the ambiguity of (Greek), 'things visible and able to see,' (Greek), 'the speaking of the silent,' the silent denoting either the speaker or the subject of the speech, cannot be perfectly rendered in English. Compare Aristot. Soph. Elenchi (Poste's translation):—

      'Of ambiguous propositions the following are instances:—

      'I hope that you the enemy may slay.

      'Whom one knows, he knows. Either the person knowing or the person known is here affirmed to know.

      'What one sees, that one sees: one sees a pillar: ergo, that one pillar sees.

      'What you ARE holding, that you are: you are holding a stone: ergo, a stone you are.

      'Is a speaking of the silent possible? "The silent" denotes either the speaker are the subject of speech.

      'There are three kinds of ambiguity of term or proposition. The first is when there is an equal linguistic propriety in several interpretations; the second when one is improper but customary; the third when the ambiguity arises in the combination of elements that are in themselves unambiguous, as in "knowing letters." "Knowing" and "letters" are perhaps separately unambiguous, but in combination may imply either that the letters are known, or that they themselves have knowledge. Such are the modes in which propositions and terms may be ambiguous.'

      Yes, I do.

      Then do you see our garments?

      Yes.

      Then our garments have the quality of vision.

      They can see to any extent, said Ctesippus.

      What can they see?

      Nothing; but you, my sweet man, may perhaps imagine that they do not see; and certainly, Euthydemus, you do seem to me to have been caught napping when you were not asleep, and that if it be possible to speak and say nothing—you are doing so.

      And may there not be a silence of the speaker? said Dionysodorus.

      Impossible, said Ctesippus.

      Or a speaking of the silent?

      That is still more impossible, he said.

      But when you speak of stones, wood, iron bars, do you not speak of the silent?

      Not when I pass a smithy; for then the iron bars make a tremendous noise and outcry if they are touched: so that here your wisdom is strangely mistaken; please, however, to tell me how you can be silent when speaking (I thought that Ctesippus was put upon his mettle because Cleinias was present).

      When you are silent, said Euthydemus, is there not a silence of all things?

      Yes, he said.

      But if speaking things are included in all things, then the speaking are silent.

      What, said Ctesippus; then all things are not silent?

      Certainly not, said Euthydemus.

      Then, my good friend, do they all speak?

      Yes; those which speak.

      Nay, said Ctesippus, but the question which I ask is whether all things are silent or speak?

      Neither and both, said Dionysodorus, quickly interposing; I am sure that you will be 'non-plussed' at that answer.

      Here Ctesippus, as his manner was, burst into a roar of laughter; he said, That brother of yours, Euthydemus, has got into a dilemma; all is over with him. This delighted Cleinias, whose laughter made Ctesippus ten times as uproarious; but I cannot help thinking that the rogue must have picked up this answer from them; for there has been no wisdom like theirs in our time. Why do you laugh, Cleinias, I said, at such solemn and beautiful things?

      Why, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, did you ever see a beautiful thing?

      Yes, Dionysodorus, I replied, I have seen many.

      Were they other than the beautiful, or the same as the beautiful?

      Now I was in a great quandary at having to answer this question, and I thought that I was rightly served for having opened my mouth at all: I said however, They are not the same as absolute beauty, but they have beauty present with each of them.

      And are you an ox because an ox is present with you, or are you Dionysodorus, because Dionysodorus is present with you?

      God forbid, I replied.

      But how, he said, by reason of one thing being present with another, will one thing be another?

      Is that your difficulty? I said. For I was beginning to imitate their skill, on which my heart was set.

      Of course, he replied, I and all the world are in a difficulty about the non-existent.

      What do you mean, Dionysodorus? I said. Is not the honourable honourable and the base base?

      That, he said, is as I please.

      And do you please?

      Yes, he said.

      And you will admit that the same is the same, and the other other; for surely the other is not the same; I should imagine that even a child will hardly deny the other to be other. But I think, Dionysodorus, that you must have intentionally missed the last question; for in general you and your brother seem to me to be good workmen in your own department, and to do the dialectician's business excellently well.

      What, said he, is the business of a good workman? tell me, in the first place, whose business is hammering?

      The smith's.

      And whose the making of pots?

      The potter's.

      And who has to kill and skin and mince and boil and roast?

      The cook, I said.

      And if a man does his business he does rightly?

      Certainly.

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