Caesar: The Gallic War & The Civil War. Julius Caesar

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СКАЧАТЬ assembled out of Gaul from all quarters, whom the hope of plundering and the love of fighting had called away from husbandry and their daily labour. Sabinus kept himself within his camp, which was in a position convenient for everything; while Viridovix encamped over against him at a distance of two miles, and daily bringing out his forces, gave him an opportunity of fighting; so that Sabinus had now not only come into contempt with the enemy, but also was somewhat taunted by the speeches of our soldiers; and furnished so great a suspicion of his cowardice that the enemy presumed to approach even to the very rampart of our camp. He adopted this conduct for the following reason: because he did not think that a lieutenant ought to engage in battle with so great a force, especially while he who held the chief command was absent, except on advantageous ground or some favourable circumstance presented itself.

      XVIII.—After having established this suspicion of his cowardice, he selected a certain suitable and crafty Gaul, who was one of those whom he had with him as auxiliaries. He induces him by great gifts and promises to go over to the enemy; and informs (him) of what he wished to be done. Who, when he arrives amongst them as a deserter, lays before them the fears of the Romans; and informs them by what difficulties Caesar himself was harassed, and that the matter was not far removed from this—that Sabinus would the next night privately draw off his army out of the camp and set forth to Caesar, for the purpose of carrying (him) assistance, which, when they heard, they all cry out together that an opportunity of successfully conducting their enterprise ought not to be thrown away; that they ought to go to the (Roman) camp. Many things persuaded the Gauls to this measure; the delay of Sabinus during the previous days; the positive assertion of the (pretended) deserter; want of provisions, for a supply of which they had not taken the requisite precautions; the hope springing from the Venetic war; and (also) because in most cases men willingly believe what they wish. Influenced by these things, they do not discharge Viridovix and the other leaders from the council, before they gained permission from them to take up arms and hasten to (our) camp; which being granted, rejoicing as if victory were fully certain, they collected faggots and brushwood, with which to fill up the Roman trenches, and hasten to the camp.

      XIX.—The situation of the camp was a rising ground, gently sloping from the bottom for about a mile. Thither they proceeded with great speed (in order that as little time as possible might be given to the Romans to collect and arm themselves), and arrived quite out of breath. Sabinus having encouraged his men, gives them the signal, which they earnestly desired. While the enemy were encumbered by reason of the burdens which they were carrying, he orders a sally to be suddenly made from two gates (of the camp). It happened, by the advantage of situation, by the unskilfulness and the fatigue of the enemy, by the valour of our soldiers, and their experience in former battles, that they could not stand one attack of our men, and immediately turned their backs: and our men with full vigour followed them while disordered, and slew a great number of them; the horse pursuing the rest, left but few, who escaped by flight. Thus at the same time, Sabinus was informed of the naval battle and Caesar of victory gained by Sabinus; and all the states immediately surrendered themselves to Titurius: for as the temper of the Gauls is impetuous and ready to undertake wars, so their mind is weak, and by no means resolute in enduring calamities.

      XX.—About the same time, P. Crassus, when he had arrived in Aquitania (which, as has been before said, both from its extent of territory and the great number of its people, is to be reckoned a third part of Gaul), understanding that he was to wage war in these parts, where a few years before L. Valerius Praeconinus, the lieutenant, had been killed, and his army routed, and from which L. Manilius, the proconsul, had fled with the loss of his baggage, he perceived that no ordinary care must be used by him. Wherefore, having provided corn, procured auxiliaries and cavalry, (and) having summoned by name many valiant men from Tolosa, Carcaso, and Narbo, which are the states of the province of Gaul, that border on these regions (Aquitania), he led his army into the territories of the Sotiates. On his arrival being known, the Sotiates having brought together great forces and (much) cavalry, in which their strength principally lay, and assailing our army on the march, engaged first in a cavalry action, then when their cavalry was routed, and our men pursuing, they suddenly display their infantry forces, which they had placed in ambuscade in a valley. These attacked our men (while) disordered, and renewed the fight.

      XXI.—The battle was long and vigorously contested, since the Sotiates, relying on their former victories, imagined that the safety of the whole of Aquitania rested on their valour; (and) our men, on the other hand, desired it might be seen what they could accomplish without their general and without the other legions, under a very young commander; at length the enemy, worn out with wounds, began to turn their backs, and a great number of them being slain, Crassus began to besiege the (principal) town of the Sotiates on his march. Upon their valiantly resisting, he raised vineae and turrets. They at one time attempting a sally, at another forming mines to our rampart and vineae (at which the Aquitani are eminently skilled, because in many places amongst them there are copper mines); when they perceived that nothing could be gained by these operations through the perseverance of our men, they send ambassadors to Crassus, and entreat him to admit them to a surrender. Having obtained it, they, being ordered to deliver up their arms, comply.

      XXII.—And while the attention of our men is engaged in that matter, in another part Adcantuannus, who held the chief command, with 600 devoted followers, whom they call soldurii (the conditions of whose association are these,—that they enjoy all the conveniences of life with those to whose friendship they have devoted themselves: if anything calamitous happen to them, either they endure the same destiny together with them, or commit suicide: nor hitherto, in the memory of men, has there been found any one who, upon his being slain to whose friendship he had devoted himself, refused to die); Adcantuannus, (I say) endeavouring to make a sally with these, when our soldiers had rushed together to arms, upon a shout being raised at that part of the fortification, and a fierce battle had been fought there, was driven back into the town, yet he obtained from Crassus (the indulgence) that he should enjoy the same terms of surrender (as the other inhabitants).

      XXIII.—Crassus, having received their arms and hostages, marched into the territories of the Vocates and the Tarusates. But then, the barbarians being alarmed, because they had heard that a town fortified by the nature of the place and by art had been taken by us in a few days after our arrival there, began to send ambassadors into all quarters, to combine, to give hostages one to another, to raise troops. Ambassadors also are sent to those states of Hither Spain which are nearest to Aquitania, and auxiliaries and leaders are summoned from them; on whose arrival they proceed to carry on the war with great confidence, and with a great host of men. They who had been with Q. Sertorius the whole period (of his war in Spain) and were supposed to have very great skill in military matters, are chosen leaders. These, adopting the practice of the Roman people, begin to select (advantageous) places, to fortify their camp, to cut off our men from provisions, which, when Crassus observes, (and likewise) that his forces, on account of their small number, could not safely be separated; that the enemy both made excursions and beset the passes, and (yet) left sufficient guard for their camp; that on that account, corn and provision could not very conveniently be brought up to him, and that the number of the enemy was daily increased, he thought that he ought not to delay in giving battle. This matter being brought to a council, when he discovered that all thought the same thing, he appointed the next day for the fight.

      XXIV.—Having drawn out all his forces at the break of day, and marshalled them in a double line, he posted the auxiliaries in the centre, and waited to see what measures the enemy would take. They, although on account of their great number and their ancient renown in war, and the small number of our men, they supposed they might safely fight, nevertheless considered it safer to gain the victory without any wound, by besetting the passes (and) cutting off the provisions: and if the Romans, on account of the want of corn, should begin to retreat, they intended to attack them while encumbered in their march and depressed in spirit (as being assailed while) under baggage. This measure being approved of by the leaders and the forces of the Romans drawn out, the enemy (still) kept themselves in their camp. Crassus having remarked this circumstance, since the enemy, intimidated by their own delay, and by the reputation (i.e. for cowardice arising thence) had rendered our soldiers more СКАЧАТЬ