Название: Blood, Tears and Folly: An Objective Look at World War II
Автор: Len Deighton
Издательство: HarperCollins
Жанр: Историческая литература
isbn: 9780007549498
isbn:
According to plan and aided by a national railway service that was built to a military design, Moltke’s armies rolled through Belgium, suffering only a brief delay before flattening its massive fortresses with Krupp’s incomparable howitzers. But the Germans failed to capture Paris.
At first it was a war of movement but then weary regiments, slowed by mud and cold and suffering the losses of their best and most experienced soldiers, came to a standstill. Here and there the order to stand fast was best met by digging a trench in which to shelter. Soon, from the North Sea to the Alps the armies were standing in a vast line of muddy trenches garlanded with barbed-wire and traversed by machine-guns. Behind them the cavalry regiments were held in reserve. There they remained, waiting for a gap through which to gallop, until the war ended. Meanwhile the infantry gradually abandoned their fine uniforms as part of the process of adapting to living in wet ditches where artfully positioned machine-guns ensured that any man who climbed out and stood up, almost certainly died. High-ranking officers – who unfortunately never went to the trenches, climbed out and stood up – resolutely refused to recognize the fact that the machine-gun had changed warfare as much as had gunpowder itself.
Lord Kitchener, who had been responsible for the organization and transport of the British Expeditionary Force sent to France, said: ‘I don’t know what is to be done – this isn’t war.’ What he really meant was that this was not the short sharp action that so many volunteers had envisaged.
On the Eastern Front, the Germans (and to their south the soldiers of Austria-Hungary) faced the mammoth armies of Russia. Their men were stretched more thinly than in the West, and now and again attacks broke through the front-line defences. But for most of the time the Eastern Front was as static as the Western Front. There the weather was even more cruel.
The British and German armies
Unlike other continental nations, the British had never revered army officers, nor indeed given the army much attention at all. Until 1870 the British army remained a hundred years behind the times. Officers purchased their commissions, men were enlisted for life and flogging was a regular punishment. Reforms were slow and heartily resisted. By the time war came in 1914 the small professional army was made up of poor human material. A prewar study found that British soldiers had a mental age between 10 and 13. Many were illiterate. Troops going on leave were marched to the railway station and put on the trains, because of the problems they had if doing this unaided.
Supporting the regular army there was a part-time defence force called the Territorial Army. In 1914 it had about 250,000 men instead of its establishment of 320,000. Youngsters were not given a medical: ‘The men were enlisted only for Home Defence and an inquiry in time of peace as to those willing to serve abroad in event of war disclosed 20,000 ready to take this obligation. The training of the men was limited to an hour’s drill at odd times, and an annual training of eight to fifteen days.’14 The ‘Terriers’ carried long Lee-Enfield rifles and were armed with converted 15-pounder guns, both weapons which the regular army had discarded.
British Lee-Enfield rifle Mk 111
The army may have been unfit for battle but the civilians were in high spirits. When war started in the summer of 1914 great numbers of men volunteered. The nation’s health was still poor but medical examinations were cursory. According to the chief recruiting officer for the London District at that time, some doctors examined over 300 men per day while between 20 and 30 per cent of the recruits were given no medical examination at all.15
By the middle of 1915 over 3 million British men had volunteered to fight but casualties meant ‘the outflow was greater than the intake’.16 To maintain the field army envisaged for 1916, men would have to be drafted. A Conscription Bill passed through Parliament with overwhelming majorities, and Britain’s traditional opposition to citizen armies was overcome with scarcely a ripple of protest.
The drafted men were subjected to no greater scrutiny than had been given to the volunteers. It was only after three years of war that the medical boards were re-organized and improved. Then the doctors were examining about 60 men a day. A very high percentage of these were found unfit for front-line service,17 but by this time many men unsuited to the physical and mental strains of trench warfare were fighting in France.
All through the war there were shortages of uniforms and equipment and also of instructors. The exceptionally high casualty rate suffered by junior officers might have been met by commissioning experienced NCOs, but this was not considered. The British army believed that officers must be recruited from the middle classes. The normal way to officer rank was through the Officers’ Training Corps which were formed in Britain’s ‘public’ schools. The OTC did not provide serious military training. It organized summer camps and training drills, and gave the schoolboys Certificate A, which guaranteed them officer rank.
Young patriotic clerks and manual workers responded well to being commanded by 18-year-old subalterns fresh from school. For the first time ‘nicely raised young men from West Country vicarages or South Coast watering places came face to face with forty Durham miners, Yorkshire furnacemen, Clydeside riveters, and the two sides found that they could scarcely understand each other’s speech’.18 All ranks were motivated by patriotism. Their officers were fired also with the public school ethic of service, but they had never been properly trained to fight or to command. Committed to the leadership ideas of the sports field, youthful officers were unyielding in their courage, which is why they suffered disproportionate casualties. A junior officer reporting to his infantry battalion had a 50 per cent chance of being killed or seriously wounded within six months.
War poets have provided an interesting record of the good relationship between British officers and men in the front line. But whatever its virtue and valour, an army based upon improvisation was no match for German professionalism. Neither were the British high commanders.
The commander-in-chief of the British Expeditionary Force in France from December 1915 onwards was Lieutenant-General Sir Douglas Haig. ‘A dour hard-working ambitious Scot with little money and few friends, who was not too particular about the methods he used to get to the top of his profession,’ said the historian Michael Howard. ‘But he was a dedicated professional none the less.’19 This 53-year-old autocrat distrusted all foreigners, including his French allies, thought that Roman Catholics were likely to be pacifists and detested all politicians, especially Socialists, into which category he was inclined to put anyone with new ideas. These shortcomings were grave, all the more so because Haig proved totally unequipped for the unprecedented military task he had taken upon himself.
In the higher ranks of the British army Haig made sure that important promotions came only to the prewar regulars. Even worse, promotion was decided by the traditional system of age, service and seniority. This ensured that only the grossest incompetents were ever removed, and they almost invariably got a job where they could do even more damage.
The German army was equally reluctant to allow the working class across the great divide into the exalted realm of the commissioned ranks. Officers had always enjoyed a privileged place in German society, and German schools of all kinds prepared youngsters СКАЧАТЬ