All Hell Let Loose: The World at War 1939-1945. Max Hastings

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       The German Winter Offensives 1941

      The rout described by Grossman was a consequence of the success of the German southern thrust. Meanwhile in the north, Leningrad was encircled and besieged. Russian morale was at its lowest ebb, organisation and leadership pitifully weak. Operations were chronically handicapped by the paucity of radios and telephone links. The Red Army had lost nearly three million men – 44,000 a day – many of them in the great encirclements at Kiev and Vyaz’ma. Stalin started the war with almost five million soldiers under arms; now, this number was temporarily reduced to 2.3 million. By October ninety million people, 45 per cent of Russia’s pre-war population, inhabited territory controlled by the Germans; two-thirds of the country’s pre-war manufacturing plant had been overrun.

      Foreign observers in Moscow, especially British, assumed the inevitability of Russian defeat, and merely sought to predict the duration of residual resistance. But on the battlefield, Stalin’s soldiers fought doggedly on. They were half-starved, short of ammunition, sometimes deployed without arms and dependent on seizing those of the dead. Even Molotov cocktails, most primitive of anti-tank weapons, were in short supply until factory women began filling 120,000 a day. The Russians lost twenty casualties for every German, six tanks for every panzer; in October their losses were even worse than those of the summer, with sixty-four divisions written off. But other formations survived, and clung to their positions. On the southern front a Captain Kozlov, Jewish commander of a Soviet motorised rifle battalion, said to Vasily Grossman: ‘I have told myself that I will be killed whatever happens, today or tomorrow. And once I realised this, it became so easy for me to live, so simple, and even somehow so clear and pure. I go into battle without any fear, because I have no expectations.’ Kozlov may even have been telling the truth.

      Russia was saved from absolute defeat chiefly by the size of the country and of its armies. The Germans seized great tracts of territory, but larger ones remained; the 900-mile initial front broadened to 1,400 miles when the invaders reached the Leningrad–Odessa line. They destroyed hundreds of Soviet divisions, yet there were always more. Moscow was shocked by the readiness of its units to surrender, and of subject populations – notably in Ukraine and the Baltic republics – to embrace the Germans. But the dogged animal stubbornness of some Red soldiers, which had initially bewildered the Germans, now began to alarm them; every Russian who died cost the Wehrmacht effort, ammunition and precious time to kill. Hitler’s young crusaders found it intoxicating to ride their bucketing tanks across hundreds of miles of enemy territory, but the strain on machinery was relentless; as men grew tired, so too did their vehicles: tracks wore out, cables frayed, springs broke. The strength of many formations was badly reduced: by autumn, 20 per cent of the original invasion force was gone, and two-thirds of its armour and vehicles; only thirty-eight tanks remained in one panzer formation, and barely sixty in another. A division commander wrote of the importance of reducing losses ‘if we do not intend to win ourselves to death’.

      By September, Moscow was tantalisingly close. But if Russian counterattacks were clumsy, as at Smolensk between 30 August and 8 September, they remained amazingly persistent. Between June 1941 and May 1944, each month Germany suffered an average of 60,000 men killed in the east; though the enemy’s losses were far greater, this was a shocking statistic. One of its symbolic components was Lt. Walter Rubarth, killed on 26 October fighting for the Minsk–Moscow road; this was the man who, as a sergeant seventeen months earlier, led the triumphant German crossing of the Meuse. A worm of apprehension gnawed at his comrades: ‘Perhaps it is only “talk” that the enemy is broken and will never rise again,’ wrote Hans-Jürgen Hartmann. ‘I cannot help myself – I am totally bewildered. Will the whole war still be over before winter?’

      Yet Hitler’s confidence was unimpaired. With Leningrad encircled and his armies triumphant in Ukraine, he had secured his flanks and was ready to resume the assault on Moscow. In an address on 2 October, he described the Wehrmacht’s drive on the capital as ‘the last large-scale decisive battle of this year’, which would ‘shatter the USSR’. Helmuth von Moltke of the Abwehr wrote: ‘If we don’t succeed this month we’ll never succeed.’ But it was perilously late in the season. The price of Germany’s advances elsewhere was that the Russians were granted time to strengthen their line before Moscow. Zhukov, Stalin’s ablest commander, had been sacked as Chief of the General Staff on 29 July for insisting upon the evacuation of Kiev; he then became commander of the Reserve Front, in which role he quickly made himself indispensable, and secured credit for organising the defence of Leningrad. Now, he was recalled to direct the salvation of the capital.

      Six German armies – 1.9 million men, 14,000 guns, a thousand tanks and 1,390 aircraft – participated in Hitler’s Operation Typhoon, the ‘decisive’ assault on Moscow. Once more they swept forward, and once more the Russians suffered vast losses: eight Soviet armies reeled in the path of the offensive, many units broke, many more were cut off. Major Ivan Shabalin, a political officer struggling to lead a mass of stragglers out of an encircled pocket, wrote in his diary on 13 October, a few days before his death: ‘It is wet and cold and we are moving terribly slowly – all our vehicles are bogged down on the muddy roads…More than fifty had to be abandoned in ground that resembled a quagmire; about the same number are stuck fast in a nearby field. At 0600 the Germans opened fire on us – a continuous bombardment of artillery, mortars and heavy machine-guns – and it went on all day…I cannot remember when I last slept properly.’ On 15 October German tank gunner Karl Fuchs exulted: ‘From now on, Russian resistance will be minor – all we have to do is keep rolling forward…Our duty has been to fight and free the world from this communist disease. One day, many years hence, the world will thank the Germans and our beloved Führer for our victories here in Russia.’

      Yet the mud Ivan Shabalin complained of was already proving more dangerous to the Germans, as they struggled to advance, than to the defenders holding their ground. Autumn rains were part of Russia’s natural cycle, but those that began on 8 October 1941 astonished the commanders of the all-conquering Wehrmacht, which was strange, since several of them had fought there between 1914 and 1917. In a vast country with few and poor roads – only 40,000 miles of tarmac, less than 50,000 of rail track – they failed to anticipate the impact of weather upon mobility. Suddenly, the racing panzer spearheads found themselves checked, tank tracks thrashing ineffectually in a morass. The German supply system floundered under the strain of shifting food and ammunition across hundreds of miles in weather that deteriorated daily.

      Soviet reinforcements were arriving from the east, for Stalin’s Tokyo agent Richard Sorge had convinced him that the Japanese would not attack in Siberia. The rains became heavier, and soon it grew cold. ‘We have had continuous sleet and snow,’ lamented German chaplain Ernst Tewes. ‘Our men are suffering – the vehicles are not properly covered СКАЧАТЬ