On Europe. Margaret Thatcher

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СКАЧАТЬ above all, workers from the East. In particular, hostility to early full membership for Poland has hardened.23

      The present British government is, it seems, still strongly in favour of early expansion. But one may question whether this policy still makes much sense. All that has been seen of developments within the European Union over the last decade confirms that ‘deepening’ – that is the persistent accumulation of more and more powers by European institutions to override national wishes and interests – will go ahead, however much membership ‘widens’. Indeed, as was shown by the decisions made at Nice, even the vague prospect of enlargement provides the excuse for a raft of new measures of centralisation. Similarly, the long-standing British hope that the need to absorb new members would lead to fundamental reform of the European Union’s finances, above all the CAP, shows every sign of proving illusory.

      For all these reasons, I am now unpersuaded by the case for further EU expansion. And although I fully understand the mix of historical, political and economic factors which account for the enthusiasm of the Central and East European countries for full membership, I also doubt whether they are well-advised to press for it on the terms available. Since leaving office, I have had the benefit of many frank and friendly (and that in the proper not diplomatic sense) conversations with senior political figures from these countries. Most of them, when pushed, are uneasy about what the EU may entail. Having endured the best part of half a century living under socialist bureaucracy, and seeing their national identities and rights overridden, they are not at all keen to be ruled from Brussels. Furthermore, although many of them are deeply uneasy about instability to the east, and so still want the reassurance offered by EU (as well as NATO) membership, they have few illusions about the degree to which Europe is dominated by Germany. And that too worries them, though they are not likely to admit it publicly.

      European politicians and officials are wont to talk rather patronisingly of how far the applicant countries have yet to go in modernising and opening up their economies in order to prepare for entry. But what really alarms the Europeans is their own lack of preparedness in the face of low-cost competition. If as part of their preparations for entry the former communist countries are willing to tie themselves up with all the rules and regulations imposed by Europe, they will finish up by giving away much of the competitive advantage they currently enjoy. At which point, presumably, their slower growth rates could be used in order to justify putting off membership once again. In my view, the applicant member countries would therefore be well-advised to consider long and hard whether full membership of the European Union is what they really want. Negotiating free-trade agreements with the EU and with the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) – and, indeed, with Britain (on which, see the next chapter) – might suit their interests better.

      So I believe that:

       The old arguments for expansion of EU membership no longer apply

       The EU should be pressed to concede free-trade arrangements with the applicant countries

       It should also be pressed to stop undermining these countries’ agricultural sectors by dumping its products at their farmers’ expense

       The governments of the applicant countries would be wise to find other ways to modernise their economies and expand their markets – ones which do not involve loss of sovereignty, the acceptance of German dominance, or piling costs on their industries.

      DEFYING DEMOCRACY

      The EU-applicant countries ought also to be aware of the prevailing style of politics within the European Union. This style is difficult to sum up in one word: it is, in fact, an unusual mix of the authoritarian, the bureaucratic and the interventionist on the one hand, with the compromising, the uninspiring and the ineffective on the other. The European Union is for ever awash with plans, programmes and projects. But the result, more often than not, is an inefficient muddle. Its leaders’ eloquence is hyperbolic. But their decisions are characterised by horse-trading. Its ambitions to assert itself as a great power are unmatched. But the means at its disposal are few, and its attempts to play a role on the world stage have been universally embarrassing.

      Perhaps the most significant shortcoming of the fledgling superstate is that it is not, will not be, indeed ultimately cannot be, democratic. This has nothing to do with the much discussed ‘democratic deficit’, which usually refers to the alleged disparity between the power wielded by the Commission and that wielded by the European Parliament. In fact, this is based on a false premise. The Commission and the Parliament share the same federalist agenda – and it is not democratic.

      The real reason why there can be no functioning pan-European democracy is because there exists no pan-European public opinion. No matter how many attempts are made to create links between the political parties of different European countries, those parties know that they have to campaign upon, and that their fortunes will be determined by, national programmes and issues. The impact of European questions on such elections is most likely to be negative – when something that the European Union favours, such as open borders or more immigration, prompts popular anger.

      It is a commonplace, but it is all too frequently ignored, that the European Union nations are extraordinarily deeply divided by language – no fewer than twelve main languages are widely spoken among the present members.24 Even those educated elites which speak foreign languages with reasonable facility may well be a long way from sharing the thought patterns of native speakers of those languages. And it is still the case that for the great majority of Europe’s population, ‘home’ is to be described in national, or local, not Continental terms.25

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