Getting Started in Shares For Dummies Australia. Dunn James

Чтение книги онлайн.

СКАЧАТЬ Japan, the Nikkei 225 Index fell 61 per cent from its high in July 2007 to a low in March 2009.

      

In Hong Kong, the Hang Seng Index fell 65 per cent from its all-time high in October 2007 to a low in October 2008.

      According to the World Federation of Exchanges, its 53 member markets lost US$34.4 trillion in value between November 2007 and February 2009; a fall of 54.5 per cent.

      The bluest of blue chip Australian stocks were hammered in the GFC slump: Rio Tinto lost 80 per cent; BHP, 41 per cent; ANZ Bank fell 63 per cent; Commonwealth Bank slumped by 61 per cent; National Australia Bank lost 60 per cent and Westpac plunged 53 per cent. Wesfarmers lost 63 per cent, Telstra lost 40 per cent. The best-performing blue chip, Woolworths, managed to limit its loss to 30 per cent.

      The slump had its roots in the early part of the 2000s, when the US economy struggled to deal with recession and the shock of the September 11 terrorist attacks. To stimulate the economy, the Federal Reserve Board cut US interest rates, all the way to a 46-year low of 1 per cent, in 2003.

      The monetary treatment worked on the economy, but a side effect of the historically low rates was to kick off both a debt binge and the biggest housing boom in US history. Both individuals and companies simply took on far too much debt.

      As people scrambled to get into the US housing market, banks and non-bank lenders adopted a market-share-at-all-costs attitude, with lending standards going out the window.

      House prices were pushed higher as more people got home loans, making lenders even more eager to lend. Sub-prime lending (to borrowers with poor credit histories and limited capacity to service their loans) grew to account for 25 per cent of total US home loans. Many of these loans were packaged by investment banks into mortgage-backed securities and sold around the world. But when US house prices began to fall in 2006, the bubble burst.

      Faced with falling house prices, sub-prime borrowers simply walked away from their loans, because many owed more than their houses were worth. Because the mortgages weren’t being paid, the cash flows on the mortgage-backed securities collapsed, which led to the prices of those securities plunging. No one wanted to buy them. Falling prices meant margin calls for many hedge funds and investment banks that held these securities: Suddenly unable to sell what had become illiquid assets, investors found they had to sell higher-quality, more liquid assets to raise money – thus spreading the contagion into other credit markets around the world, even areas that had no exposure to sub-prime mortgages at all.

      The low-interest-rates policy of the Federal Reserve had also allowed institutional investors to borrow heavily, and invest in mortgage-backed securities. Much of the mortgage-backed derivatives house of cards was kept off the banks’ balance sheets, in a variety of investment vehicles. But the banks were forced to bring their exposures back on to the balance sheets, even though they had not set aside enough capital to back them. This resulted in massive write-downs, a river of red ink flowing through the books of some of the biggest names in global finance.

      By June 2007, Wall Street investment bank Bear Stearns was in financial difficulty, having leveraged its balance sheet 35 to 1: For every dollar of equity, Bear Stearns had $35 of borrowings. Because many of the assets (securities) that had been bought with this borrowing were now worthless, both lenders and investors lost confidence in Bear Stearns. In March 2008 it was sold to JP Morgan Chase in a bail-out organised by the Federal Reserve.

      The financial industry was in disarray: No one knew which bank was holding which liability, and who was a counterparty of whom. The availability of credit virtually ceased. If portfolios such as those held by Bear Stearns were to be liquidated, no one knew which other banks or investors could collapse. Confidence evaporated.

      The GFC peaked following the collapse of Wall Street investment bank Lehman Brothers and the bail-out of global insurance giant AIG by the US Federal Reserve in September 2008. The following six months saw unprecedented stress in global capital markets. By now investors were questioning the very solvency of banks, and global stock markets were slumping. By this stage short-sellers were attacking stocks like sharks around a sinking cruise ship, magnifying the share price falls.

      What no one could have foreseen was how what had essentially been a financial industry problem affected the real economy when Lehman Brothers collapsed. Bank-lending to businesses, the life blood of the economy, shut down; banks were unwilling to lend to each other, let alone businesses. Letters of credit – which finance 90 per cent of global trade – were starting to be dishonoured.

      Because businesses could not get letters of credit, world trade ground to a halt. The Baltic Dry Index (a proxy for the cost of world shipping, and thus an indicator of world trade) fell 85 per cent between May and October in 2008. With goods unable to leave the docks, factories cut their activity and industrial production slumped. By late 2008/early 2009, the fear was no longer whether the world had a functioning financial system, it was whether the global economy still functioned.

      In the first quarter of 2009, at annualised rates, the US economy shrank by 6.1 per cent, while Japan’s economy contracted by 15.2 per cent, Germany’s by 14.4 per cent, the UK’s by 7.4 per cent and the Eurozone by 9.8 per cent. With demand slumping, world trade fell by 12 per cent in 2009, according to the World Trade Organization (WTO).

      By 2010 the focus of the GFC had spread to the debt held by governments. The European sovereign (government) debt crisis mainly hit the so-called PIIGS countries – Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain – which typically run huge budget deficits. In 2010, Greece and Ireland had to be bailed out by the European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In July 2011 even the US (considered to be the world’s best credit risk), went close to technically defaulting on its debt.

      Slowly the banking system has repaired its balance sheets, after US$2.8 trillion worth of write-downs (slashed asset values). In 2008 the Federal Reserve began pumping trillions of dollars into the US financial system through its quantitative easing policy, by which it increased the quantity of available money by buying assets such as government bonds and mortgage-backed securities, and creating new money to pay for them. In this way, the Federal Reserve pumped about $US3.7 trillion into the global financial market.

      The European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan conducted similar programs – with the Japanese mounting a quantitative easing programme even larger than that of the US, relative to the size of the economy.

GFC economic recovery: Quick to lose, slow to come back

      Post-GFC, the major issues for the world economy – and thus, the sharemarkets – have been continued economic weakness in Europe, Japan and North America; a slow-down from the locomotive of world economic growth, China; and an amassed mountain of debt. The McKinsey Global Institute calculates that global debt has increased by nearly 20 per cent since 2007, growing by US$57 trillion.

      Initially, China’s economic growth provided support to the world economy: China grew its economy by 10.3 per cent in 2009. But China’s growth rate has slowed as the country transitions to what Beijing considers more sustainable growth – that is, growth generated more by domestic consumption than growth driven by massive infrastructure investment. This well-advertised process saw China’s official 2015 second-quarter annual growth rate come in at 7 per cent, the slowest pace since the GFC in 2009, and the World Bank expects the growth rate to start with a 6 by 2017.

      Economic growth in the Eurozone has struggled, with the bloc slipping back into recession in 2012 – for the second time since the GFC – and narrowly avoiding a ‘triple-dip’ recession in 2014 with the escalating crisis in Greece. In mid-2015, Greece became the first developed country to default on a payment to the IMF, and investment markets were once again plunged into turmoil by the possibility of Greece leaving the eurozone, with unknown СКАЧАТЬ