Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, Volume 56, Number 349, November, 1844. Various

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СКАЧАТЬ subtle, unusual, and speculative, but of an ordinary practical character, such as they were concerned with every day of their lives in administering the criminal law of the country.

      First, then, were there any bad counts in the indictment?

      The judges were unanimously of opinion that two of the counts were bad, or insufficient in law – and two only – which were the sixth and seventh counts. They hold positively and explicitly, that the remaining nine counts were perfectly valid.

      The Chief-Justice (Tindal) thus delivered this unanimous opinion of himself and his brethren on this point.9

      "No serious objection appears to have been made by counsel for the prisoners, against the sufficiency of any of the counts prior to the sixth. Indeed, there can be no question that the charges contained in the first five counts, do amount in each to the legal offence of conspiracy, and are sufficiently described therein.

      "We all concur in opinion as to the eighth, ninth, and tenth counts, (no doubt whatever having been raised as to the sufficiency of the eleventh count,) that the object and purpose of the agreement entered into by the defendants and others, as disclosed upon those counts, is an agreement for the performance of an act, and the attainment of an object, which is a violation of the law of the land."

      With reference to the sixth and seventh counts, in the form in which they stand upon their record, the judges were unanimously of opinion, that these counts "did not state the illegal purpose and design of the agreement entered into between the defendants, with such proper and sufficient certainty as to lead to the necessary conclusion that it was an agreement to do an act in violation of the law." They did not show what sort of fear was intended by the alleged intimidation, nor upon whom it was intended to operate, nor was it alleged that the "physical force exhibited" was to be used, or intended to be used.

      Observed, therefore, on what grounds these two counts – two only out of eleven – are held defective: they are deficient in that rigorous "certainty" now held requisite to constitute a perfectly legal charge of crime. To the eye of plain common sense – we submit, with the deepest deference, to those who have held otherwise – they distinctly disclose a corpus delicti; but when stretched upon the agonizing rack of legal logic to which they were exposed, it seems that they gave way. The degree of "certainty" here insisted upon, would seem to savour a little (possibly) of that nimia subtilitas quæ in jure reprobatur; et talis certitudo certitudinem confundit: and which, in the shape of "certainty to a certain intent in every particular," is rejected in law, according to Lord Coke, (5 Rep. 121.) It undoubtedly tends to impose inevitable difficulty upon the administration of criminal justice. Sir Matthew Hale complained strongly of this "strictness, which has grown to be a blemish and inconvenience in the law, and the administration thereof; for that more offenders escape by the over-easy ear given to exceptions in indictments, than by their own innocence." – 12 Hal. P. C. 193; 4 Bla. Co. 376. The words, in the present case, are pregnant with irresistible "inference" of guilt; an additional word or two, which to us appear already implicitly there, as they are actually in the eleventh count, would have dispersed every possible film of doubt; and Lord Brougham, in giving judgment, appeared to be of this opinion. But now for the general result: The indictment contained two imperfect counts, and nine perfect counts, distinctly disclosing offences not very far short of treason.

      Thus, then, the first question was answered.

      To the second question the judges replied unanimously, "that the findings of the jury in the first four counts were not authorized by the law, and are incorrectly entered on the record." One of the judges, however, and a most eminent judge, (Mr Justice Patteson,) being of a contrary opinion.

      Thus we have it unanimously decided by the judges, whose decision was acquiesced in by the House of Lords, that there were two bad counts, (the 6th and 7th,) on which there were good findings by the jury, and, with the exception of Mr Justice Patteson, four good counts, (the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th,) on which there were bad findings. The effect of this twofold error was thus tersely stated by Mr Baron Gurney, and adopted by the Lord Chancellor.10

      "I cannot distinguish between a bad finding on a good count, and a good finding on a bad count. They appear to me to amount to precisely the same thing – namely, that upon which no judgment can be pronounced. The judgment must be taken to have proceeded upon the concurrence of good counts and good findings, and upon nothing else."

      Here, then, at length, it seems that we have hit upon a blot– a petty, circumscribed blot to be sure, upon a vast surface of otherwise unsullied legal sufficiency; but still – in the opinion of the judges – a blot.

      What was to be held the effect of it? Or had it any effect?

      The traversers' counsel, at the bar of the House of Lords, took by surprise every one whom they addressed – all their opponents, all the judges, all the law lords, and all the legal profession, as soon as they had heard of it – by boldly affirming, that if this blot really existed, it would invalidate and utterly nullify the whole proceedings from the beginning to the end! They hammered away at this point accordingly, hour after hour – day after day – with desperate pertinacity; being compelled from time to time, during their hopeful argument, to admit, that up to that moment the rule or custom which they were seeking to impeach had been universally acted upon from time immemorial, to the contrary of that for which they were contending. This strange and novel point of theirs gave rise to the third and eleventh questions put to the judges. These questions are substantially identical, viz., whether a single bad count in an indictment on which there has been a general verdict of guilty, with judgment accordingly, will entitle the fortunate defendant to a reversal of that judgment?

      We heard a considerable portion of the argument; and listened to this part of it with a comfortable consciousness that we beheld, in each counsel arguing it, as it were, a viper gnawing a file! If this be law, thought we, then have many thousands of injured gentlemen been, in all human probability, unjustly hanged, and transported for life or for years, been fined, imprisoned, sent to the tread-mill, and publicly whipped; for Heaven only knows how many of the counts in the indictments against – say Mr Fauntleroy; Messrs Thistlewood, Brunt, Tidd, and Ings; Messrs Greenacre, Courvoisier, and many others – have been defective in law! How many hundreds are now luxuriating in Norfolk Island who have, on this supposition, no just right to be there; and who, had they been but popular miscreants, might have collected sufficient funds from their friends and admirers to enable them to prove this – to try a fall with justice and show her weakness; to overhaul the proceedings against them, detect the latent flaws therein, return in triumph to the bosom of their families and friends, and exhibit new and greater feats of dexterity in their art and mystery! Why should not that "innocent" convict – now passing over the seas – Mr Barber, on hearing of this decision, soon after his arrival at the distant paradise to which he is bound, take new heart and remit instructions by the next homeward bound ship for a writ of error, in order that he may have his chance of detecting a flaw in one of the many counts of his indictment?

      But, to be serious again, how stands the case in the present instance? Of eleven counts, six must be in legal contemplation expunged from the record: four, (the first, second, third, and fourth,) because, though in themselves sufficient in law, the findings upon them were technically defective; and two, (the sixth and seventh,) because they were technically defective in point of law, though the findings on them were unobjectionable.

      Then there remain five perfect counts with five perfect findings, in the opinion of all the judges and of all the law lords; those five counts containing the gist of the whole charge against O'Connell and his confederates – those five findings establishing that the defendants were guilty of the offences so laid to their charge. Blot out, then, altogether from the record the six counts objectionable on the above-mentioned СКАЧАТЬ