Название: Claves del derecho de redes empresariales
Автор: AAVV
Издательство: Bookwire
isbn: 9788491330684
isbn:
2. BUSINESS NETWORKS AND STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
Business networks are a specific manifestation of inter-organizational relations. They consist of multiple members and are purposefully formed. In management and organization theory, they are also labeled alliance networks (Koka & Prescott, 2008), multilateral alliances (Kleymann, 2005), alliance constellations (Gomes-Casseres, 2003) or alliance blocks (Vanhaverbeke & Noorderhaven, 2001). Business networks have spread over the last years across a variety of industries, and their strategic effectiveness— that is, their means of achieving and sustaining competitive advantage — is undisputed.
Scholars have acknowledged the role of various industry contexts that influence the design of networks in competitive interaction (Lazzarini, 2007; Vanhaverbeke & Noorderhaven, 2002). They have even observed some network-intensive industries where competition is said to take place among cooperating sets of firms rather than individual firms (Gomes-Casseres, 1994; Nohria& García-Pont, 1991; Silverman and Baum, 2002). The automobile, biotechnology, mainframe, and airline industries have all been described as being, “polarize(d) into competing alliance constellations” (Gimeno, 2004: 821).
However, alliances and networks as cooperative relationships are inherently unstable (Das &Teng, 2000): studies regularly report failure rates of more than 50 percent (Park &Ungson, 2001). In contexts and situations where network membership is essential for firms’ economic performance, the network’s fitness and survival are major member concerns. Exits or member failures can result in troublesome repercussions for remaining partners. Especially in highly specialized networks with only a few large-sized members, the exit of one firm can lead to serious gaps in the remaining members’ service portfolio, potentially leading, in turn, to the failure of the whole network. For example, in the global airline industry, Star Alliance suffered from failures of members Ansett Australia (bankruptcy in 2001) and Varig (ceased operations in 2007), which resulted in substantial white spots on the Star route network. The remaining members from the United States, Europe, Africa and Asia were hindered in their ability to offer seamless connections to and from Oceania and South America, putting them at a competitive disadvantage. Mergers and acquisitions also impact members of competing networks. For example, LAN from Oneworld acquired TAM, a Star Alliance member, in 2012, and subsequently announced that the merged company, Latam, will turn to Oneworld for both of its airline brands. As Latam’s chief executive explained, “We evaluated all possibilities and we chose Oneworld, because it is the alliance that offers the best benefits, connections and products for our passengers, as well as better synergies for the Latam group” (as cited in Pearson, 2013).
For this reason, network members have an interest in establishing stable yet adaptable network structures as well as in attracting and keeping the “right” members in their ranks.
3. BUSINESS NETWORK DYNAMICS
Business networks are cooperative entities formed by more than two firms in order to generate competitive advantages for each member. However not all business networks are alike: they vary with regard to their purpose, structure, size, effectiveness and efficiency. In many industries, firms can join alternative networks, and will select whichever brings the greatest advantage, as the Latam example illustrates. Cooperative entities are thus faced with specific forms of network competition as a main driver of network dynamics (see figure 1):
First, business networks can be challenged in their purposeby other competing networks (competition in network formation). Such competing networks might be substitutes with regard to their raison d’être and the function they serve for their members. Firms may consider the membership in their present network (incumbent network) as obsolete or less advantageous, project higher benefits (of whatever kind, e.g. financial benefits or higher status) to their membership in the newcomer network, and can decide to switch from one to the other. If many member firms decide to follow this logic, incumbent networks that are unable to match the benefits of competing networks, or have lost sight of their specific advantage for their members, will degenerate. On the other hand, this type of competition gives rise to innovative networks that provide timely and relevant benefits to their members and do not lose sight of their purpose.
Second, networks compete for growth and stability in their member constellation (competition in network composition). They attempt to attractnew members, but also to retain existing members. To do so, networks need to employ processes and tactics that produce more or unique member advantages. This relates to network competition with regard to membership structure.
Third, networks compete in achieving and maintaining an effective and efficient administrative structure (competition in network governance): The most effectively organized network can generate more benefits for its members than other networks, or it can generate similar benefits than other networks faster, at lower costs, or with greater frequency or reliability. In order to devise the most effective governance for a network, questions of decision-making mode, organizational structures and processes need to be addressed.
FIGURE 1: Three forms of network competition as drivers of network dynamics
In the remainder of this chapter, I will further elaborate on each of these network competition forms, present one exemplary research study for each and suggest implications for network and corporate management.
3.1. Competition in Network Formation
Competition in network formation occurs when a firm (or a group of firms) discovers an opportunity to realize a relevant benefit or advantage that can most effectively be exploited by cooperating with others. In this case, competitors will ponder whether they are brought into a disadvantageous situation and consider a potential reaction. Of course, a firm will strive to compensate any potential disadvantage brought about by a rival. Network formation as a competitive move has only slowly gained research attention (Silverman & Baum, 2002). Gimeno (2004) analyzed alliance formation dynamics between competitors; that is, how firms respond to their rivals’ alliance strategies. He suggested that firms react by either trying to ally with the same partner that the rival has formed cooperative ties with, or building a countervailing alliance with different partners that provide similar benefits (see figure 1).An example is T-Mobile’s exclusive 2007 distribution agreement for Apple’s fashionable iPhone in Germany, a move that put the firm’s competitors at a major disadvantage. T-Mobile’s rivals (for example, Telefonica’s O2, or Vodafone) were faced with two options:
FIGURE 2: Illustration of Reaction-Types in Alliance Formation
Source: adapted from Gimeno (2004)
First, try to neutralize T-Mobiles’s advantage by imitating its move and form an alliance with Apple that would challenge T-Mobile’s exclusivity (a “rival’s partner link” in Gimeno’s terminology). This would depend on the exclusivity clause in the T-Mobile-Apple agreement, but also on T-Mobile’s bargaining power. Since Apple intentionally foregoes additional revenues and efficiency potentials in exploiting its resources by restricting its customer base to those of a single network, T-Mobile will have to pay an exclusivity premium. Depending on the size and bargaining power of T-Mobile and its competitors, however, the exclusivity premium and clause will be more or less enduring and strict.
Second, T-Mobile’s rivals could establish countervailing alliances. Within this option, two further possibilities exist: forming an alliance with one of Apple’s competitors, ideally a close substitute, such as Samsung or СКАЧАТЬ