Military Alliances in the Twenty-First Century. Alexander Lanoszka

Чтение книги онлайн.

СКАЧАТЬ established formal military alliances when territorial disputes were in train. US alliances with South Korea and Japan come to mind, as does China’s and the Soviet Union’s alliances with North Korea. Perhaps, then, the leaders of these two countries have personal idiosyncrasies such that they do not believe in the worth of a treaty (see Han and Papa 2020; Silaev 2021). Perhaps they fear each other by dint of their large size, population mass, and nuclear arsenals. Perhaps it is just a matter of time.

The case of Taiwan and its current relationship with the United States is also illustrative. The island’s international status as a sovereign country has deteriorated in recent years as more and more countries have withdrawn diplomatic recognition. By 2020, only fifteen countries had retained diplomatic relations with Taipei. Although its geopolitical challenge is almost exclusively mainland China, Taipei has sometimes adopted a conciliatory approach, with the political party Kuomintang emphasizing economic links across the strait when in power in Taiwan’s democratic era. For its part, the United States has, until recently, favored a strategy of political and economic engagement with China. Washington may have supplied Taipei with military weapons, but, in order to minimize protest from Beijing, it restricted those arms transfers to include only those that serve defensive purposes – a policy established in 1979 in anticipation of the United States ending its formal alliance with Taiwan at the time. More recently, however, both Taiwan and the United States have worked more closely together in face of a perceived threat from China. Since Xi Jinping became Paramount Leader in China in 2012, concerns have grown among leaders in Taiwan – especially those from the Democratic Progressive Party – that China might act on unifying the island with the mainland using military force. China’s military build-up and steady abrogation of the “one country, two systems” policy in Hong Kong have only fueled these anxieties. Under the Trump administration, the United States adopted a confrontational posture toward China in light of the latter’s economic policies and military assertiveness in the East and South China Seas. Early indications suggest that the Biden administration will keep some pressure on China, too. An alliance with Taiwan was long unthinkable because the United States wished neither to antagonize China nor to rekindle a smoldering sovereignty dispute in the Taiwan Strait. Now, such inhibitions may be weakening amid greater wariness with China. Although this alliance would be asymmetric, it need not involve Taiwan making major concessions. A formal military alliance would instead reflect converging threat perceptions and help advance the United States’ interests in keeping China mostly hemmed in within the First Island Chain.

Still, an alliance may not yet happen, if ever at all, despite the overlapping threat perceptions. Perhaps leaders in the United States believe that the price of an alliance with Taiwan is too high. Needless to say, it would inflame tensions with China. More uncertain is what would happen if Washington and Taipei were to decide to reformalize ties: would war break out or would the confrontation with China escalate into a new phase of hostilities? Or perhaps, again, it could be just a matter of time before the two former allies start to salami-slice their way toward a rejuvenated alliance precisely to avoid giving China a clear pretext for aggression.

      Конец ознакомительного фрагмента.

      Текст предоставлен ООО «ЛитРес».

      Прочитайте эту книгу целиком, купив полную легальную версию на ЛитРес.

      Безопасно оплатить книгу можно банковской картой Visa, MasterCard, Maestro, со счета мобильного телефона, с платежного терминала, в салоне МТС или Связной, через PayPal, WebMoney, Яндекс.Деньги, QIWI Кошелек, бонусными картами или другим удобным Вам способом.

/9j/4AAQSkZJRgABAQEAyADIAAD/7SBkUGhvdG9zaG9wIDMuMAA4QklNBCUAAAAAABAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAOEJJTQQ6AAAAAAEBAAAAEAAAAAEAAAAAAAtwcmludE91dHB1dAAAAAUAAAAAUHN0 U2Jvb2wBAAAAAEludGVlbnVtAAAAAEludGUAAAAAQ2xybQAAAA9wcmludFNpeHRlZW5CaXRib29s AAAAAAtwcmludGVyTmFtZVRFWFQAAAAPAFIASQBDAE8ASAAgAE0AUAAgAEMANAA1ADAAMwAAAAAA D3ByaW50UHJvb2ZTZXR1cE9iamMAAAAMAFAAcgBvAG8AZgAgAFMAZQB0AHUAcAAAAAAACnByb29m U2V0dXAAAAABAAAAAEJsdG5lbnVtAAAADGJ1aWx0aW5Qcm9vZgAAAAlwcm9vZkNNWUsAOEJJTQQ7 AAAAAAItAAAAEAAAAAEAAAAAABJwcmludE91dHB1dE9wdGlvbnMAAAAXAAAAAENwdG5ib29sAAAA AABDbGJyYm9vbAAAAAAAUmdzTWJvb2wAAAAAAENybkNib29sAAAAAABDbnRDYm9vbAAAAAAATGJs c2Jvb2wAAAAAAE5ndHZib29sAAAAAABFbWxEYm9vbAAAAAAASW50cmJvb2wAAAAAAEJja2dPYmpj AAAAAQAAAAAAAFJHQkMAAAADAAAAAFJkICBkb3ViQG/gAAAAAAAAAAAAR3JuIGRvdWJAb+AAAAAA AAAAAABCbCAgZG91YkBv4AAAAAAAAAAAAEJyZFRVbnRGI1JsdAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAEJsZCBVbnRG I1JsdAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAFJzbHRVbnRGI1B4bEBpAAAAAAAAAAAACnZlY3RvckRhdGFib29sAQAA AABQZ1BzZW51bQAAAABQZ1BzAAAAAFBnUEMAAAAATGVmdFVudEYjUmx0AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAVG9w IFVudEYjUmx0AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAU2NsIFVudEYjU

СКАЧАТЬ