Shaping Future 6G Networks. Группа авторов

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      However, there has been significant, sustained debate on the current situation, mostly driven by the post‐2016 White House [12]. Former President Trump had called for US leadership in the mobile industry to be reestablished while also demanding progress toward 6G [13]. Partly this has served to highlight US successes in 5G deployments, but it has also been part of a long‐lasting series of attacks against what the administration sees as the commercial and political rivals of the United States, most notably China [14].

      As a result, unprecedented tensions have emerged that have begun to have an impact on market players, with other governments echoing some of the former president’s remarks [15]. In the United Kingdom, this has led to the identification of what has been defined as “high‐risk vendors” (HRVs) and a clear policy to ensure that operators choose alternatives to such actors [16].

      The advice goes so far as to define functional elements that are deemed to be “high‐risk,” thereby providing a template for operators to follow. Specifically, the advice notes that “the cyber security risk of using HRVs in the network functions set out below cannot be managed…if effective risk management of HRVs is to be undertaken, their products and services should not be used in the following network functions” [16].

      A detailed list of such elements is provided. For 5G networks, this includes – but is not limited to – “5G core database functions, 5G core‐related services,” such as “Authentication Server Function” and “Network Slice Function,” to name but two in a lengthy, comprehensive, and diverse set of instructions [16]. In other words, operators in the United Kingdom are now obliged to diversify their supply chains, an issue to which we shall return.

      Similarly, the European Union has also started to move in a similar direction, with the European Commission reported as expressing the view that “progress is urgently needed to mitigate the risk of dependency on high risk suppliers” [17]. While this climate could settle through the creation of new trade agreements or political changes, it has also created considerable uncertainty, not to say unease, in the market and what seemed firm, long‐standing global commercial relationships have been severely disrupted. These shifting sands will likely have an impact on the future standardization of 6G.

      3GPP has become a global success story, drawing contributions from stakeholders from around the world. Chinese vendors, in particular, have made important and valuable contributions, alongside counterparts from elsewhere. While this has undoubtedly boosted the industry and accelerated 5G realization, it did not please the then current US leadership – so much so, that attention has now turned to the international standards that support the development of the mobile industry. According to The Economist, companies with manufacturing operations in America have “been frozen out of some standard‐setting as an accidental consequence of the American government’s attack” [18]. This report adds:

The effect has been particularly acute at standards bodies that convene outside America, where the organisers are less inclined to make arrangements to accommodate firms that are subject to export‐control rules. At those meetings, in some instances, Huawei and other Chinese companies have had a voice where American companies have not. Some, such as 3GPP, a body that deals with 5G, and IEEE, an engineering body, have declared themselves to be “open” meetings, in an attempt to remove liability from firms with American operations. But uncertainty persists [18].

      Moreover, this “uncertainty” has led to “talk of competing bodies being set up outside America, to make truly global discussion possible” [18]. Whatever the outcomes of the political noise – bluster, negotiation, a return to the status quo – the ground is already set for a possible return to the situation pre‐2013, in which 3GPP2 acted as a counterpart to 3GPP.

      Plus, the very ITU operational model of setting requirements, not standards, for mobile communications, and which allocates spectrum, but which does not license it, could easily enable multiple bodies to set independent standards paths to realize the same goals.

      ITU recommendations explicitly allow for this possibility, which is not without precedent, as we have seen. They may be said to encourage diversity. Indeed, it has been argued in this chapter that recent harmonization of global standardization activities for mobile broadband are a deviation from the past – and cannot be said to represent an enduring norm.

      Allowing for such uncertainty from political and governmental stakeholders is one thing, but disruptive factors from within the industry, both in commercial approaches and as a consequence of the current standards, are quite another. There are disruptive influences that must be considered as we look toward 6G standardization. To put these in context, however, we must first look at the benefits of standardization towards a single template.

3.6 Standards, the Supply Chain, and the Emergence of Open Models

      The global mobile supply chain has become increasingly limited, with high entry costs leaving operators dependent on a handful of vendors. As we have seen, there are political moves to change supplier models, but there are other industry initiatives that could also have a lasting impact on the ecosystem.

      Standards are designed to be replicable; that’s to say, any vendor should be able to follow a template and develop a solution that can be deployed in the appropriate network domain or as part of infrastructure.

      They have delivered universal mobile access across multiple generations of technology, which have gradually converged on a single template for the realization of 5G. Again, this is very positive for the market, as it allows manufacturers and suppliers to build solutions, while enabling operators to follow a clear path toward service delivery.

      However, there is a complication: standards can also limit choice and have led to unintended consequences. There are several reasons for this. First, standards can create challenges for market entry for new actors; it is not easy to implement, test, and validate established standards.

Second, it is expensive to ensure continuing compliance with what are often moving targets, subject to regular evolution and iteration. Third, they can increase dependency on a small number of suppliers. It can be argued that standards which, on the one hand enable interoperability, have actually become a barrier to an open and competitive market.

      The barriers to entry emerge because it is extremely costly to develop appropriate solutions that implement the desired functionality. Moreover, operators insist on strict performance requirements, partly to meet customer expectations and partly to meet the needs of regulators and law enforcement agencies [19]. While fulfilling the requirements of a standard is necessary to enter the market, it is far from sufficient. A new entrant must ensure that they can meet the criteria defined by target operator customers, which proves a challenge for many.

      As a result, the number of vendors has declined, through consolidation and acquisition – or even withdrawal from sectors of the market – leaving operators to:

      choose from a relatively limited menu of products from a small number of suppliers [19].

      Numerous analysts and vendors have reached similar conclusions.

      Thus, while interoperability and multi‐vendor strategies have been goals for many operators, in practice, few have achieved this, relying on a small handful of suppliers. Dependence on a single supplier increases risk and exposure to the shifting sands of political change.

      This has not gone unrecognized. The flaws in the current model have led to new initiatives that seek to change the situation, a process that began long before political tensions were wound up in 2020. For example, the open radio access network Alliance, or “O‐RAN Alliance,” is an effort to:

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