Trust in Computer Systems and the Cloud. Mike Bursell
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СКАЧАТЬ is a matter of context. Specifically, “context” is one of the words most repeated in this book, and I must say that its use is justified in all cases. Not only is the meaning of trust analysed in all possible contexts, including some essential philosophical and psychological foundations, but the concept is also applied to all possible ICT contexts, from basic processor instructions to cloud and edge infrastructures; and different trust frameworks are explored, from hierarchical (CAs) to distributed (DLTs) approaches. A must-read book to understand how one of the bases of human civilization can and must be applied in the digital world.

      —Dr. Diego R. Lopez,

      Head of Technology Exploration, Telefónica and Chair of ETSI blockchain initiative

      As we have moved to the digital society, appreciating what and what not to trust is paramount if you use computer systems and/or the cloud. You will be well prepared when you have read this book.

      —Professor Peter Landrock, D.Sc. (hon),

      Founder of Cryptomathic

      Trust is a complex and important concept in network security. Bursell neatly unpacks it in this detailed and readable book.

      —Bruce Schneier, author of

      Liars and Outliers: Enabling the Trust that Society Needs to Thrive

      This book needs to be on every technologist's and engineer's bookshelf. Combining storytelling and technology, Bursell has shared with all of us the knowledge we need to build trust and security in cloud computing environments.

      —Steve Kolombaris

      - CISO & Cyber Security Leader with 20+ years experience. Formerly Apple, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America.

       Mike Bursell

      Around 2001, I found myself without a job as my employer restructured, and I was looking for something to do. I had been getting interested in peer-to-peer interactions in computing, based on a project I'd been involved with at a previous company and the question of how trust relationships could be brokered in this sphere. I did a lot of reading in the area and nearly started a doctorate before getting a new job where finding time to do the requisite amount of study was going to be difficult. Not long after, my wife and I started trying for a family, and the advent of children in the household further reduced the amount of time—and concentration—available to study at the level of depth that I felt the subject merited.

      Operators, as telecommunications providers are known in the industry—think Orange, Sprint, or NTT Docomo—have long known that they need to be careful about the hardware they buy and the software they run on it. There were a handful of powerful network equipment providers (NEPs) whose business model was building a monolithic software stack on top of well-defined hardware platforms and then selling it to the operators, sometimes running and monitoring it for them as well. The introduction of VMs offered the promise (to the operators) and the threat (to the NEPs) of a new model, where entrants into the market could provide more modular software components, some of which could run on less-specialised hardware. From the operators' point of view, this was an opportunity to break the NEPs' stranglehold on the industry, so they (the operators) were all for the new NFV world, while the NEPs were engaged in the ETSI process to try to show that they were still relevant.

      From the security point of view, we quickly realised that there was a major shift taking place from a starting point where operators were able to manage risk by trusting the one or two NEPs that provided their existing infrastructure. This was beginning to develop into a world where they needed to consider all of the different NFV vendors, the components they supplied, the interactions the components had with each other, and, crucially, the interactions the components had with the underlying infrastructure, which was now not going to be specialised hardware dedicated to particular functions, but generic computing hardware bought pretty much off the shelf. I think the Sec-WG thoroughly exasperated much of the rest of the ETSI NFV consortium with our continuous banging on about the problem, but we were equally exasperated by their inability to understand what a major change was taking place and the impact it could have on their businesses. The trust relationships between the various components was key to that, but trust was a word that was hardly even in the vocabulary of most people outside the Sec-WG.

      The СКАЧАТЬ