The Philosophy of Philosophy. Timothy Williamson
Чтение книги онлайн.
Читать онлайн книгу The Philosophy of Philosophy - Timothy Williamson страница 30
Название: The Philosophy of Philosophy
Автор: Timothy Williamson
Издательство: John Wiley & Sons Limited
Жанр: Афоризмы и цитаты
isbn: 9781119616726
isbn:
6 6 For intuitionist logic in general see Dummett (1977). For its application to the problem of vagueness see Graff and Williamson (2002: 473–506) and Chambers (1998).
7 7 One proves by mathematical induction on n that if An is the conjunction of n instances of excluded middle then ¬ is intuitionistically inconsistent.
8 8 This point does not generalize to the semantics of conditionals in fuzzy logic, given the popular rule that if the consequent is lower than the antecedent in degree of truth then the degree of truth of the conditional falls short of 1 by the amount by which the consequent falls short of the antecedent in degree of truth; otherwise the degree of truth of the conditional is 1. Hence if A has a higher degree of truth than B but both are indefi nite then A → B is indefi nite while B → A is perfectly true. Thus the information that the antecedent and consequent are indefi nite does not determine whether the conditional is indefi nite.
9 9 See Graff and Williamson (2002: 279–351) on higher-order vagueness.
10 10 See Williamson (1994a: 193–5).
11 11 Of course, monolingual speakers of another language may know whether Mars was always dry or not dry without ever hearing of the original question, which is an interrogative sentence of English; they use a synonymous sentence of their own language. They do not know whether the original English question has a positive answer. Someone may even know whether the original English question has a positive answer without understanding the question, because the knowledge can be passed along a chain of testimony; understanding of the original question is needed only at one end of the chain. These quibbles do not affect the argument.
12 12 The issue of Smith’s intentions concerns his thoughts, but we may suppose that the question immediately at issue is whether Smith was even involved in Jones’s death.
13 13 Non-testimonial evidence may be taken to include non-linguistic items such as a bloodied knife; this is what lawyers call “real evidence.” For an argument that all evidence in an epistemologically central sense of the term is propositional see Williamson (2000a: 194–200). For example, the evidence in this sense might include the proposition that the bloodied knife was found at the scene of the crime, but not the knife itself.
14 14 Popularization has its place, in philosophy as in physics, but should not be confused with the primary activity.
3 Metaphysical Conceptions of Analyticity
1
“Philosophical questions are more conceptual in nature than those of other disciplines”: that can easily pass for a statement of the obvious.1 Many philosophers consciously seek conceptual connections, conceptual necessities, conceptual truths, conceptual analyses. In effect, they present themselves as seeking far more general and less obvious analogues of “Vixens are female foxes.” The suggestion is that an armchair methodology is appropriate to their quest because it concerns truths in some sense less substantial, less world-involving than those of other disciplines: in Humean terms, relations of ideas rather than matters of fact. Our conceptual or linguistic competence, retained in the armchair, is to suffice for a priori knowledge of the relevant truths.
As already argued, philosophical truths are not generally truths about words or concepts. However, analytic truths are not supposed to be always about words or concepts, even if words or concepts are supposed to play a special role in explaining their truth. The sentence “Vixens are female foxes” is in no useful sense about the word “vixen” or any other words; it is about vixens, if anything. Its meaning is not to be confused with that of the metalinguistic sentence “ ‘Vixens are female foxes’ is true.” Similarly, the thought vixens are female foxes is not about the concept vixen or any other concepts; it too is about vixens, if anything. It is not to be confused with the metaconceptual thought the thought VIXENS ARE FEMALE FOXES is true.
How can a sentence which comes as close as “Vixens are female foxes” does to being a definition of “vixen” be about vixens rather than about the word “vixen”? Uttering it in response to the question “What does ‘vixen’ mean?” normally enables the questioner to work out the answer to the question, by pragmatic reasoning, even though the literal meaning of the sentence does not directly answer the question, just as does uttering “That is a gnu” while pointing at one in answer to the question “What does ‘gnu’ mean?.” If core philosophical truths are analytic, they may exhibit significant features of words or concepts without describing them.
Does the conception of philosophical truths as analytic or conceptual vindicate a form of the linguistic or conceptual turn without misrepresenting the subject matter of philosophy as itself linguistic or conceptual? The case study in the previous chapter gave no support to such a conjecture. Nevertheless, let us examine the matter more systematically.
Many philosophically relevant truths are clearly not conceptual truths in any useful sense. For instance, in arguing against subjective idealism, a defender of common sense metaphysics says that there was a solar system millions of years before there was sentient life. Similarly, a defender of common sense epistemology says that he knows that he has hands; that he knows that he has hands is no conceptual truth, for it is consistent with all conceptual truths that he lost them in a nasty accident. Some philosophers of time argue that not only the present exists by appeal to Special Relativity. Philosophers of mind and language dispute whether there is a language of thought; whatever the answer, it is no conceptual truth. Naturalists and anti-naturalists dispute whether there is only what there is in space and time; again, the answer is unlikely to be a conceptual truth. Moral and political philosophers and philosophers of art appeal to empirically discovered human cognitive limitations, and so on. Such philosophical arguments cannot be dismissed on general methodological grounds. One must engage with them on their merits, in the normal way of philosophy.
Despite such examples, philosophy may be thought to have a central core of truths which are all conceptual; perhaps the rest of philosophy counts as such through its relation to the central core. Let us charitably read this restriction into the appeal to analyticity or conceptual truth in the epistemology of philosophy.
Notoriously, the idea of analyticity has been under a cloud ever since СКАЧАТЬ