Safe Haven. Mark Spitznagel
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Название: Safe Haven

Автор: Mark Spitznagel

Издательство: John Wiley & Sons Limited

Жанр: Ценные бумаги, инвестиции

Серия:

isbn: 9781119402510

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СКАЧАТЬ but still do very poorly. It's really about getting the payoffs right. Playing good defense that leads to good offense. So there's more room for error, more room for being right, more room to get it right after getting it wrong. This is cost‐effective risk mitigation. You look and feel like you can see around corners, even though, in actuality, you can't.

      As an archer, you don't try to forecast or pinpoint exactly where your arrow will hit once it leaves your bow. That would be an unproductive way to approach it—leading to target panic. Once you shoot the arrow (and even as you shoot the arrow), it is out of your control and susceptible to endless perturbations. So, instead, as in Herrigel's Zen in the Art of Archery, you aim by deliberately not taking aim—you hone your process and structure (focusing “behind the line” rather than down range) with the intent to specifically tighten your shot grouping around your target. There is this ancient Stoic notion of a dichotomy of control that applies here to investing, as it does to archery: We need to control what we can control in a way that gets us closer to our target (of higher wealth)—and certainly not further from it.

      This is cost‐effective risk mitigation. You look and feel like you can see around corners and can always hit the bullseye, even though, in actuality, of course, you can't.

      You see, a cost‐effective safe haven doesn't just slash risk. It actually lets you simultaneously take more risk. If that twist gave you pause for a moment, then good. It should!

      We will start here at square one with a few basic foundational truths about investing. As the great fourth‐century BCE Greek philosopher (and the world's first real scientist) Aristotle wrote, “The naturally proper direction of our road is from things better known and clearer to us,” from what he called “first principles” or “the first basis from which a thing is known.” They are what comes first, our a priori propositions or universal premises.

      Principle number one is that investing is a process that happens sequentially through time. Investing is not static. It does not occur in just one interval of time, nor in many intervals of time aggregated together as one. (Albert Einstein purportedly noted that “the only reason for time is so that everything doesn't happen at once.”) Time is the medium through which life takes place, and so it is the medium through which investing takes place. We are stretched across time. Investing and risk are a multi‐period problem; and returns are an iterative, multiplicative process. They compound: In each period, we generally invest what we are left with from the last period. Like the geometric growth of offspring across generations, we parlay our capital. This principle fundamentally determines the nature of investing and the way we need to think about and interpret returns.

      Principle number two is that there is only one explicit purpose or goal of investing, and that is to maximize our wealth over time. Period. This is exactly what we are trying to do with every additional, incremental decision that we make as investors. It is the target we shoot at. I'm not talking about the elusive mathematical expectation of wealth, nor our wealth relative to some arbitrary benchmark (though there are plenty of managers incentivized to care only about that). Rather, I'm talking about our actual realized ending wealth—meaning the outcome we're actually left with. (They are not the same.) This is equivalent to maximizing the rate that we grow or compound wealth over time—our compound annual growth rate, or CAGR. All investors are absolute return, compounding investors. I don't believe any thinking person, and certainly not any practitioner, should disagree with this principle. It is common sense.

      And yet, some would still protest that the goal of investing should be to further humanity's progress, ease its burdens, do good to consumers and the world—and the profits will follow. But this is only another way of restating our principle. The consumer is the sovereign king whom capital must serve in order to be profitable; it is because of this that capital investment and entrepreneurship have objectively done more good for the world than any government or charity ever could.

      Others might still protest that the goal of investing should be to maximize our wealth, given a certain level of theoretical risk taken. (This is where things would start to get a little muddled were it not for our next principle.) Since we know that risk mitigation is investing, we can deduce that the explicit purpose of risk mitigation is the very same as the explicit purpose of investing: to maximize the rate at which we compound our wealth over time—in other words, to cost‐effectively lower risk.

       This leads to principle number three: If a risk‐mitigation strategy achieves its purpose by cost‐effectively lowering a portfolio's risk, then adding that strategy raises the portfolio's CAGR over time.

      It makes sense. If we mitigate risk effectively by constraining it deliberately, shouldn't the point be to experience less loss as a result, such that over time we end up making more? And if we don't end up making more, will we still be glad we did it? What would the point have been? Is there any other reason to mitigate risk?

       Risk mitigation, when done well, should provide a tangible, positive economic effect relative to its cost. That is, it should be cost‐effective, and thus a good value proposition. Accordingly, a risk‐mitigation strategy should be evaluated based on its degree of cost‐effectiveness at lowering risk—not just on its effectiveness at lowering risk.

      Of course, we may have mitigated the risk of a remote, extreme loss that never happened. And yet, such a remote loss could happen suddenly at any time, and our risk mitigation could thus raise our CAGR (relative to our position had we not used that mitigation). This is the problem of induction, where the arrival of just one black swan falsifies any claim that all swans are white. But when I say that cost‐effective risk mitigation raises a portfolio's CAGR over time, this also means over a sufficiently broad range of observable outcomes, which largely resolves these epistemological problems. (We will address this with what is known as a bootstrap in later chapters.)

      Amusingly, this principle that risk mitigation, done well, should raise our CAGR over time is actually quite controversial. In fact, most practitioners and academics would probably call it a crackpot idea. Lower risk comes at a cost, they believe, so risk mitigation is incompatible with higher returns.

      To wit, one of the historic commodities trading houses had the German motto: “Besser gut schlafen, als gut essen.” (“It is better to sleep well than to eat well.”) And academics claim that lower returns actually accompany lower СКАЧАТЬ