China's Leaders. David Shambaugh

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СКАЧАТЬ operated on the assumption that the West and the noncommunist world (particularly the United States) seeks to usurp and overthrow CCP rule and the PRC. This is an axiomatic belief of all Chinese communist leaders.

      The United Front. The concept of the “united front” arose during the Communists’ rise to power. There were two ways the CCP adopted “united front” tactics.²⁸ The first was to cooperate with the Nationalists (Guomindang or KMT). This occurred twice: the first beginning in 1924 on the Soviet Comintern directive to infiltrate the KMT (the “bloc within”), which ended in the bloody April 12, 1927, Shanghai massacre by the Nationalists against the Communists; a second CCP–KMT united front was formed in 1937–1941 to fight together against Japan. This was one definition of united front in CCP history: to collaborate with the KMT. A second definition was for the CCP to enlist and co-opt various social groups in support of the CCP cause. This was extended to foreigners as well.²⁹ The tactic was also applied to most domestic opponents. Some who could not be co-opted must be unremittingly resisted, but the CCP theorizes that a majority segment of people inside and outside of China can be “won over” through various inducements—and thereby neutralized and effectively controlled.

      Inside the CCP there is an entire department in the Central Committee (one of only five), the United Front Work Department (中央统战部), charged with this task domestically and abroad. Externally, there are also other CCP and PRC departments and agencies devoted to co-optation of foreign elites (so-called “elite capture”) and sectors of foreign societies. In both cases the operative normative assumption is that the CCP and PRC must neutralize and co-opt various groups at home and abroad.

Reeducation and Rectification. In addition to co-optation, another set of CCP norms for dealing with deviant behavior are the twin methods of reeducation and rectification. Early in the 1950s, when the CCP was actively dealing with the 2 percent of “enemies” that were remnants of the “old regime,” Mao put forward the instruction to “cure the disease but save the patient.” In other words, through “reeducation” (brainwashing and indoctrination), deviant tendencies could be “corrected,” “proper” behavior inculcated, and many “enemies of the people” could be remolded so that they could rejoin society. Mao said this was the appropriate way to deal with “non-antagonistic contradictions among the people.” The same principle was applied to deviant Party members—the practice of “rectification” (整 风). Yet not all rectification movements in CCP history (and they have been numerous) practiced reeducation and rehabilitation. Chinese Communist history has been replete with purges. Tens of millions of Party members have been purged from the Party, stripped of their membership and “rights,” usually incarcerated for periods, and subject to lifelong stigmatization.

      Ideology and Correct Thought. Another core operative norm for the CCP and all Chinese leaders is the imperative of ideology and enforcement of “correct thought” (正确思想) among Party members and all citizens.³⁰ To be sure, this is not unique to the PRC, as it has deep roots in imperial and republican Chinese history. Ever since Confucius and his orthodoxy, one of the principal responsibilities of all subsequent emperors was to reinterpret the original doctrine for contemporary times. The orthodoxy therefore was supposed to evolve with the times. Today’s core doctrinal orthodoxy is known as “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” which of course is based on Marxism-Leninism but Sinicized over time. Each leader adds his own element to the canon. According to the CCP Constitution, the current liturgy is as follows: “The Communist Party of China uses Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Theory of Three Represents [Jiang Zemin], the Scientific Outlook on Development [Hu Jintao], and Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era as its guides to action.”³¹ The CCP, principally via its Propaganda Department (中央宣传部), is the principal enforcer of “correct thought,” conformity of narrative (提法), and “unifying thinking” (统一思想) among Party members and the public.

Secrecy. The CCP thrives and operates on secrecy. All policy decisions are made in secret by Party leaders and cadres, and many are implemented via secret internal (秘密内部) channels. Internal Party deliberations and procedures are obscure, if known at all. The personal lives, families, and health of senior leaders are not known in any detail. One manifestation of this system is that information is highly prized and compartmentalized. There is limited freedom of information in China. Much information about official decision-making that is normally made public in democracies remains secret in China. Divulging such information brings heavy punishment, discipline is enforced, and as a result leaks do not occur. Consequently, leadership dynamics and normal policy deliberations remain out of public view, and no other institutional checks and balances exist to scrutinize leaders’ decisions and actions. The CCP’s Central Secrets Bureau (中央机密局), the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (中央纪委), and National Supervisory Commission (中国人民共和国国家检查委员会) are the principal internal monitors to enforce secrecy.

Oscillation Between Hard versus Soft Leninism and the “Fang-Shou Cycle.” The final normative feature of the CCP as a Leninist party has been the repetitive oscillation between tight control and loosened control and modest liberalization. As the great Sinologist and political scientist Lucian Pye astutely observed in his book on Chinese political culture more than 30 years ago, “The rhythm of Chinese politics is not the left-right swings of Western systems, but the up and down motion of tightening and loosening controls, of centralization and decentralization; any increase in anxiety on the part of the leadership is likely to translate into a greater degree of repression.”³² All communist parties have experienced periods where they have experimented with allowing modest liberalization and personal freedoms—only to be followed by periods of retrenchment and enhanced repression. These periods of brief liberalization are usually the result of a combination of two factors: built-up pressure from below combined with more liberalminded leaders who decide to relatively relax the draconian controls over society. Thus, what I call “hard Leninism” (or hard authoritarianism) is the main pattern, but these periodic bursts of relaxation represent reformist “soft Leninism” (or soft authoritarianism).³³ In Chinese this is known as the fang-shou cycle (放-手周期). Think of Ulbricht’s East Germany in 1953, Khrushchev’s Soviet Union in 1956, Nagy’s Hungary in 1956, Dubček’s Czechoslovakia in 1968, and so on. In China, Mao flirted with such a liberalization during the Hundred Flowers Movement of 1956 (prior to the ensuing crackdown), but otherwise the Mao era was one long totalitarian period of hard Leninism. Post-Mao, however, we have witnessed repeated periods of liberalization oscillating with tightened controls. These are depicted in Table 1.2.

Table 1.2: China’s Political Orientation Since Mao

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Period/Leader	Political Orientation
1978–1983 Deng Xiaoping/Hu Yaobang	Democracy Wall & Political Relaxation
1984 Deng Xiaoping/Hu Yaobang	Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign
1985–1986 Deng Xiaoping/Hu Yaobang	Neo-Authoritarianism
1987 Deng Xiaoping/Zhao Ziyang	Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign
1988–1989 Deng Xiaoping/Zhao Ziyang	Neo-Authoritarianism
1989–1992 Deng Xiaoping/Jiang Zemin/Li Peng	Neo-Totalitarianism
1993–1997 Jiang Zemin