China's Leaders. David Shambaugh

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       To the greatest extent possible, China must remain as autonomous and self-reliant (自力更生) as possible vis-à-vis other nations; (inter)dependency is a recipe for manipulation.

       Avoid open confrontation with others, but use deception and a variety of Sun Zi-like tactics to neutralize and overcome adversaries.

       A strong state is the best defense against both internal and external threats.

       Disorder (乱) is an ever-present possibility, but to be avoided at all costs. Consequently, a premium is placed on maintaining “stability” (稳定) and order (秩序).

       Regional and local centrifugal forces are always strong and pull against the centripetal power of the Center. As a result, there is a tendency for the periphery to feign compliance with the Center (a phenomenon known as “the sky is high and the emperor is far away”: 天高皇帝远).

       Elite politics can be a zero-sum game of “tigers eating tigers.” Never trust others, as they likely are seeking to subvert your power and position.

       Maintenance of “face” (面子) and avoiding embarrassment is essential not only in Chinese society, but also in dealings with foreigners. Elaborate lengths are gone to in order to avoid public embarrassment and maintain appearances of confidence and grandeur.

       The people of China are a “loose sheet of sand” who need to be led through the tutelage of enlightened elites.

       Maintain flexibility and avoid dependence in foreign relations.

       Play the long game and keep a clear eye on end goals. Time is always an asset. Do not be impatient. Maneuver is a constant tactical feature, as all relationships are eternally fluid.

       Vigilantly safeguard China’s territories and claimed sovereignty.

      These are many of the operative assumptions I believe China’s leaders are inculcated with. They are subliminal assumptions, which individual Chinese may not even be conscious of, but these assumptions all are inherited from the past and have real impact on people’s behavior. Additionally, China’s leaders have in common with leaders of other developing countries their nation’s historical encounters with Western imperialism and colonialism, the strong mission to gain independence and autonomy, and thus the imperative to undertake modernization and nation-building.¹⁹

The Influences of Chinese Leninist Culture

      In addition to these historical and cultural influences, all Chinese Communist Party leaders must operate within, and are deeply influenced by, the fact that the CCP is a Leninist-type party. This has both institutional and normative dimensions and consequences.

      Institutional Imperatives

      The former involves the institutional structures and policy processes that are unique to communist parties: the Central Committee and its departments, the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee, Leading Small Groups (领导小组), Party committees (党委), Party groups (党组), and Party teams (党班子) that are embedded within the vast majority of institutions in society (factories, schools, neighborhoods, media, the military, all provinces, all cities, all counties, all villages, etc.). Leninist communist parties are like cellular organisms that permeate all elements of a society—they penetrate into the society and thereby control from the inside. The embedded institutional structure of the CCP is pervasive throughout China. China’s leaders must operate within this institutional framework. Among other manifestations this means that there are built-in mechanisms of constant surveillance among Party members and by the Party vis-à-vis all levels of government and throughout society.

Party congresses are held every five years (since 1982). In between, plenary sessions (or plenums) are held—usually once or twice per year. It is customary that each plenum focuses on a specific policy area (third plenums are about the economy, fourth plenums about the Party and ideology, fifth plenums usually about legal and administrative affairs, sixth plenums are about culture, and so on). While there is no fixed requirement, and it has fluctuated a great deal over time, the Politburo (政治局) usually convenes only for plenums, while the Politburo Standing Committee (政治局常委) usually meets once or twice per month. The state (government) structure is entirely separate (although also penetrated by the CCP at all levels). It includes the State Council and all of its ministries, commissions, bureaus, and agencies. It is headed by the Premier—who is also a senior leader, but not the preeminent one (technically the Chairman of the National People’s Congress outranks the Premier). Also on the government side is the state (PRC) President and Vice-President, but both are simply titles and do not come with attached institutions. The national judiciary is similarly a separate system (also referred to as the political-legal system, 政法系统) from the Party and government, but national leaders rarely interface with it. Finally, the preeminent leader is also normally Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC, 中央军委), a Party institution (although there has been a separate state CMC since 1982, with identical membership).

There has been fluctuation in these positions, their occupants, and their terms of occupation over time. The evolution of the five principal Chinese leaders of this study, as well as other top leaders, can be found in Table 1.1. With the exception of Hua Guofeng, prior to the 1990s those leaders who held these Party, military, and government positions were divided—but since Jiang Zemin’s tenure (1989–2002) China’s preeminent leader has held the trifecta of positions: CCP General Secretary, CMC Chairman, and PRC President. Only two leaders (Hua Guofeng and Zhao Ziyang) served both as CCP leader and State Council Premier (Hua simultaneously, Zhao consecutively), while “normally” the Premier has not held another position. Similarly, some served only as state President.

      In China power does not always correlate directly with institutional positions. While the table below lists no fewer than eighteen individual leaders over the past seven decades, it is fair to say that only the five analyzed in this book have been the “paramount leader.” Some readers may question why I have not included Hua Guofeng, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang as “paramount leaders” worthy of their own individual chapters. The reasons vary in each case. Hua Guofeng was certainly China’s preeminent leader following Mao’s death and the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976, but his authority over the military was certainly constrained by Marshal Ye Jianying—and by mid-1977 Deng Xiaoping had returned to the senior leadership and immediately and progressively began to whittle away at Hua’s institutional positions and authority. By September 1990, Hua was stripped of the premiership in favor of one of Deng’s chosen disciples, Zhao Ziyang. Less than a year later, in June 1981, Deng himself seized the CMC chairmanship from Hua, while inserting his other disciple Hu Yaobang as CCP Chairman. Thus, Hua Guofeng’s tenure was really too short and too constrained to merit a separate chapter and consideration as one of China’s principal leaders. While there is a better case to make for Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, each of them very much operated under Deng’s preeminent status and each only possessed a single portfolio (and neither served as President or CMC Chairman). Hu and Zhao certainly played significant roles, and we will consider them in Chapter 3, but I do not feel that either merits inclusion among the principal leaders of the PRC.

Table 1.1: China’s Principal Leadership Positions and Leaders Since 1949

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