A Methodical System of Universal Law. Johann Gottlieb Heineccius

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СКАЧАТЬ conscience be the rule of human actions?

      Whence we see what judgment we are to form of the opinion of those who assert that conscience is to be held for the internal rule of human actions. For if a rule cannot answer the end of a rule unless it be right, certain, and invariable (§5); who will admit conscience to be a rule which is sometimes erroneous (§39); sometimes only probable (§40); sometimes doubtful and wavering; (§41) and frequently overpowered by perverse appetites (§42); wherefore, tho’ he be guilty who acts contrary to conscience, whether certain or probable; yet he cannot for that reason be said to act rightly and justly, who contends that he has acted according to his conscience.^† <31>

      SECTION XLVI

      Why action ought to be suspended while conscience doubts?

      Hence we may conclude, that while conscience is uncertain, and fluctuates between contrary opinions, action ought to be suspended. This we assert in opposition to Ger. Gottl. Titus,² in his observations on Puffendorf de off. hom. & civ. l. 1. C. 1. §6. And for one to do any thing with such an obstinate obdurate mind, as to be very little concerned about knowing the divine will, and determined to do the same, even tho’ he should find it to be prohibited by God, is the heighth of perverseness.^*

      SECTION XLVII

      The weaknesses or defects of the understanding, ignorance and error.

      From what hath been laid down, it is plain that ignorance and error are the great hinderances to conscience in the application of a law to a fact. By the former is understood the mere want of knowledge; by the other is meant the disagreement of an idea, a judgment, or a reasoning to truth, or the nature of the thing. One therefore is said to be ignorant who hath no idea before his mind; and one is said to err, who hath either a false idea of the object, that is, an idea not conformable to it; an obscure, confused, or unadequate idea. For an error in the idea must of necessity infuse itself into the judgment made concerning an object, and from thence into all the reasonings about it. <32>

      SECTION XLVIII

      Whether ignorance and error of all sorts be culpable?

      But because all men are not under an obligation to find out the more abstruse truths which may be said to lie at the bottom of a deep well; and in reality the ignorance of some things is rather attended with advantage than detriment;^* (yea, as Terence observes, Hecyra.³ the ignorant and illiterate often do more good in one day, than ever the learned and knowing do;) hence it may be inferred, that ignorance and error of every kind is not evil and blameable.

      SECTION XLIX

      What kind of ignorance and what kind of error is culpable?

      Yet since the will makes no election unless it be excited to it by the understanding; and therefore the understanding concurs in producing moral actions (§30), the consequence from this is, that they are not blameless who are grosly ignorant of those truths relative to good and ill, just and unjust, which it was in their power easily to understand, or who err with regard to these matters, when error might have been avoided by due care and attention to acquire right and true knowledge.

      SECTION L

      Ignorance is either vincible or invincible, voluntary or involuntary, efficacious or concomitant.

      Hence arise various divisions or classes of ignorance and error, so far as it is or is not in our power <33> to escape ignorance, it is vincible or invincible.^* So far as one is or is not the cause of it himself, it is voluntary or involuntary. Finally, if one does any thing he would not have done had his mind not been obscured by ignorance, such ignorance is called efficacious or effectual. But if he would have done the same action tho’ he had not been in the state of ignorance in which he did it, it is called concomitant. Repentance is the mark of the former; but the latter discovers itself by the approbation given to the action done in a state of ignorance, when that ignorance no longer takes place. Now all this is equally applicable to error.

      SECTION LI

      What will is?

      We proceed now to consider the other principle of human or moral free actions, viz. the will, (§30) which <34> is that faculty of our mind by which we choose and refuse. Hence it is justly said, that truth and falshood are the objects of the understanding; but that the will is conversant about good and ill. For the will only desires truth as it is good, and is averse to falshood only as it is ill.^*

      SECTION LII

      Its nature and acts.

      From this definition we may conclude that the will cannot choose any thing but what is exhibited to it by the understanding under the shew of good, nor turn aside from any thing but what appears to it to be ill. The greater good or ill there seems to be in any thing, the stronger in proportion is our inclination or aversion; and therefore the desire of a lesser good or a lesser evil may be overpowered by the representation of a greater good or evil. Aversion does not consist in a mere absence of desire, but hath something positive in it, which is called by Koehler, exerc. jur. nat. §167.⁴noluntas vel reclinatio, refusing or aversion.^† <35>

      SECTION LIII

      Its spontanity and liberty.

      From the same definition it is clear that man, with regard to his will, acts not only spontaneously but freely. For spontaneity being the faculty of directing one’s aim to a certain end, but liberty being the power of choosing either of two possibles one pleases; it is plain from experience, that both these faculties belong to our minds. The servile subjection one is under to his perverse appetites and affections till virtue makes him free, is not inconsistent with these properties. For these obstacles are of such a kind, as hath been observed, that they may be removed and overpowered by the representation of a greater good or evil to the understanding (§52).^* <36>

      SECTION LIV

      Do temperament or bodily constitution affect it?

      Hence it is evident, that bodily constitution, (which philosophers call temperament) does not infringe upon the liberty of human will. For tho’ the mind be variously affected by the body, so as to be rendered by it more propense to certain vices; yet that propensity hath no more of compulsion or force in it than there is in the inducement to walk out when fine weather invites one to it. But who can deny that the will is left intire, and not hindered or prevented from choosing either to walk out or not as it shall appear most reasonable, when inticed by all the charms of spring?

      SECTION LV

      Whether affections and habits encroach upon it?

      The same is true concerning all the affections and motions excited in the mind by the appearances of good and ill. For tho’ the mind, with respect to the first impression, be passive, every thing else is however intirely in its power; to resist the first impulse, not to approve it, nor to suffer it to gain too much force. And it likewise holds with regard to habits, i.e. propensions confirmed by long use and practice. For tho’ these gradually become so natural, that tho’ expelled with never so much force, they recoil, Hor. ep. 1. 10. v. 24. (si expellas furca, tamen usque recurret)⁵ yet they are not incorrigible, but may be amended, if one will but exert his liberty.^*<37>

      SECTION LVI

      What СКАЧАТЬ