The Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy. George Turnbull

Чтение книги онлайн.

СКАЧАТЬ tendency in our breasts to submit all particular connexions and attachments to it, with a strong conviction of the fitness of such submission. Man must first be able to conceive a large whole, and to consider mankind as one family, before he can feel affection to his kind as such: but as one can hardly think at all without being led to perceive the common relation of men to one another as one kind; so every one soon attains to this idea, or rather it obtrudes itself upon all men whether they will or not; and the idea of one’s own child does not more necessarily excite natural<191> affection, than the notion of one kind begets strong public affection toward it as such. Hence it is that no person capable of reflexion is not touched with the distress of a man as man, without any other attachment; and does not, on the other hand, rejoice and perceive pleasure, even at the recital of happiness enjoyed in any part of the world, or at any period of time, however remote from all his private interests. Now this is the cement or attraction towards a common center, which together with the particular attractions between persons nearly joined and related, or particularly adapted and suited one to another, holds the whole system of mankind together, or by which it coheres. This is indeed the natural progress of the human mind.

       God loves from whole to parts: but human soul

       Must rise from individual to the whole.

      Self-love but serves the virtuous mind to wake,

       As the small pebble stirs the peaceful lake,

       The centre mov’d, a circle strait succeeds,

       Another still, and still another spreads,

       Friend, parent, neighbour, first it will embrace,

       His country next, and next all human race;

       Wide, and more wide, th’o’erflowings of the mind

       Take ev’ry creature in, of ev’ry kind;

       Earth smiles around, with boundless bounty blest,

       And Heav’n beholds its image in his breast.

      Essay on man, Epist. 4.⁷³

      The notion of a public good is no sooner formed than due affection arises towards it.

      And our mind is so fitted by nature to form that notion that we cannot avoid forming it.

      The notion of a public good, or of the universal happiness of our kind, is a complicated idea, which is not immediately apprehended so soon as one sees or feels, but requires some reflexion and a progress of the mind to form it; whereas particular generous affections are immediately excited by their proper objects, some of which are ever assailing the mind; (as in the case of natural affection, properly so called, sympathy with the distressed,<192> and complacency with the happiness of others, naturally dear and near to us.) But nature has fitted the mind to form the idea of our kind, and of its general good; for every particular exercise of the mind in the benevolent social way, naturally tends to beget and establish such a prevalency of good humour, tenderness, and benevolence in the general temperature of the mind; as when it is formed, must naturally dispose it to seek for exercise and entertainment to itself in the most enlarged way; and thus the inclination to extend benevolence growing with every particular exertion of it, the idea of good to be pursued, will naturally expand itself, till it not merely comprehends our own kind, but takes in and embraces all beings in general, or the whole system of nature. As the excitement of every particular object naturally supposes its object present to the mind, either really or in fancy; so the notion of public good must precede the desire and pursuit of it; but in proportion as the temper is sweetned by particular exercises of generous affection, the mind will enlarge and open itself to make more room for benevolence to exert all its benignity; and so a more comprehensive object will naturally be imagined. And when the idea of public good is but once so far extended as to take in our own species as one kind, it naturally, and as it were necessarily inflames the breast with affection, large, extensive and overflowing, in proportion to the greatness and comprehensiveness of the idea which bestirs it.

      But benevolence, like other affections, is liable to changes, and may be diminished or strengthened.

      This will be strongly felt, if one who hath experienced any of the particular and more limited outgoings of the mind in natural affection, compassion, or friendship, will but ask his own heart.—And if this be duty, what then does my country require at my hands?—Hath the public no claim upon me?—For if he but understands these questions, and can put them to himself; nature will quickly give the<193> answer by a sudden overflowing of the warmest affection towards the public,^a to which he will feel every other passion submitting itself, as conscious of its fit subordinacy or inferiority to it.

      It is difficult to determine the original forces of any affections in our hearts.

      But it cannot be asserted that there is nothing social in our nature, without denying the most evident truths or facts.

      Let it however be remarked, that the analogy between moral and natural gravitation must fail in this respect, that whereas the latter is only a mechanical principle which we cannot change; the former is a moral principle, and therefore subject to diversities superinduceable by ourselves, in consequence particularly of the law of habits and associations of ideas already mentioned; insomuch that benevolence may be exceedingly weakened and diminished, thro’ the prevalence of other passions. If therefore in some constitutions benevolence is very weak, and self-love is almost the only prevailing principle, let it be called to mind that in other constitutions self-love is really too weak, and some generous affection is too strong. From hence it follows, that as in the latter case it would be absurd to argue from some few instances, that the principle of self-love had originally no place in our frame; so, by parity of reason, it would be equally absurd to infer from a few particular instances, where self-love is too strong, and benevolence almost quite extinct, that originally there was no social principle in our nature. Such changes are all accountable whether on the one side or on the other, and in general with regard to all passions, in the same way; that is, from different associations of ideas, and different contracted habits. The only inference, experience leads to with regard to them is, “That passions are overpowered by passions; and that passions grow more powerful in proportion as they are indulged; or<194> as circumstances have conduced to excite and employ them; since by repeated acts all passions are proportionably wrought into temper.” It may indeed be difficult, perhaps impossible, to determine the original forces of benevolent passions in any particular constitution antecedent to all particular exitements and exercises; since from the beginning objects which naturally excite and employ them are continually affecting us, and calling them forth into exercises or acts: but then it is no less so for the same reason to determine precisely the forces of the private or selfish affections. We see variety in both cases, and we know how this variety must arise from circumstances of exercise and action in either case. But he who denies any social tendency in our nature to our kind, or the original implantation in us of any principles besides the meer selfish affections, and ascribes all that is social or kindly in us to education, custom and superinduced habits, is obliged to give an account of moral phenomena, which are absolutely in explicable upon that supposition; since we may appeal even to the most selfish person, to him who has studied and laboured the most to make himself such, and to extinguish all regards to others, whether he has been able to succeed: whether he can attain to his ends, so as never to feel any stirrings within him of social and public affections; and whether he can ever seriously and deliberately, in conversation with his own heart, approve to himself such an aim. If benevolence is superinduced, and not originally from nature, whence comes it universally that this customary and superinduced nature, is stronger than original nature itself; insomuch that, СКАЧАТЬ