The Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy. George Turnbull

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СКАЧАТЬ come out, that virtue is what man is made for. As for the quibling and jangling about obligation, it is sufficient for us to remark,

      I. If by it is meant a moral necessity arising from the power of a superior to enforce his commands, by rewards and punishments, then obligation being so defined, a man cannot be said to be obliged to virtue, but simply in respect of his being under the influence of a superior, who commands him to be virtuous by laws, which he has sufficient power to enforce by rewards and punishments. If by it is meant a moral necessity arising from natural connexions,<172> which make it our interest to behave virtuously, then is man obliged to virtue simply in this respect, (that being then the definition of obligation) because such is the natural order and establishment of things, that virtue is his interest. If by it be meant the same as more reasonable, more becoming, more perfect, &c. then is man obliged to virtue for the sake of virtue, or on account of its becomingness and excellency.

      II. Now in all these different views may obligation be taken if philosophers please. And in all these different senses have philosophers proved man to be obliged to virtue: whence it must follow, that when it is owned, that virtue is fit, becoming, reasonable, and our perfection, if man is not allowed to be obliged to virtue in that sense, it must only be because obligation is thought more properly to mean one or other, or both of the other moral necessities, and not the last one named; and so the debate is merely about the use of the word obligation.

      III. But it is obvious, that in all reasonings to prove that man is obliged to virtue in the first sense, the fitness or becomingness, or the natural beauty and excellence of virtue, must be laid down as the principle upon which they proceed and are founded. For how else can we know the will of the Deity with regard to our conduct; but by knowing what is in itself best and fittest? For how indeed can we prove the Being of a GOD, unless we have first formed and established, adequate and clear ideas of moral excellence and perfection? ’Till we have conceived what virtue or merit is, we cannot have any idea of GOD, or consequently of what he wills and approves.

      IV. With regard to the other sense of obligation in which it means the same as interest. As all reasonings<173> about the obligations to virtue, which suppose its excellence must be highly assistant to virtue, and consequently are of the greatest importance in moral philosophy; so, on the other hand, whatever pretences are made to supporting virtue by any philosophers who deny the dignity of virtue, they are but such adherents to it as some are said to have been to the doctrines of JESUS CHRIST, who followed him for the sake of the loaves with which he fed them. I use this similitude, because if there be a real difference between esteem, love and friendship, for the sake of one’s amiable temper, and great and good qualities, and that hypocritical pretended affection which only eyes some selfish advantage, there must likewise be a real difference between the inward esteem and love of virtue for its own intrinsic beauty, and meer outward conformity to its rules for the sake of some conveniencies and advantages, without any inward liking to it.^a If there be any real difference in the one case there must be a real one in the other. He alone can be said to do a virtuous action, who does it with delight and complacency in it as such; otherwise one who inwardly hates the person he caresses and flatters in order to get his confidence, and then betray him, is his real friend till the moment he hurts him, notwithstanding his dissimulation and evil intention; and he who abstains from robbing for fear of the gallows is as honest as he who would rather suffer the cruelest torments than commit the least injury to any one in thought, word or deed.

      But all that hath been said, (from which it clearly follows, that the laws of our nature with regard to virtue, and private and public good are so fitly<174> chosen) will be yet clearer when we consider our constitution or frame with regard to society. Mean time we may conclude with my Lord Shaftsbury. “Thus the wisdom of what rules, and is first and chief in nature, has made it to be according to the private interest and good of every one, to work towards the general good; which if a creature ceases to promote, he is actually so far wanting to himself, and ceases to promote his own happiness and wellfare. He is, on this account, directly his own enemy: nor can he otherwise be good or useful to himself, than as he continues good to society, and to that whole of which he is himself a part. So that virtue, which of all excellencies and virtues is the chief and most amiable; that which is the prop and ornament of human affairs; which upholds communities, maintains union, friendship and correspondence amongst men; that by which countries as well as private families flourish and are happy; and for want of which every thing comely, conspicuous, great and worthy, must perish and go to ruin; that single quality, thus beneficial to all society, and to mankind in general, is found equally a happiness and good to each creature in particular; and is, that by which alone man can be happy, and without which he must be miserable.”⁶⁵

       CHAPTER VI

      Another class of laws. Those relative to society and the dependence of human happiness and perfection on social union and rightly united force.

      Let us consider another law of our nature. “The law of society. In consequence of which all men are not only led to society by several strong affections and dispositions; but man is so framed for society, that private and public happiness and perfection exceedingly depend upon our uniting together in a proper manner, or under proper<175> laws, and a right form of government, for promoting our common happiness, dignity and perfection.”

      A general view of our social make or form.

      We are led to society by an appetite after it, which cannot be satisfied without company, fellowship, and social communication: nay, so social is our make, that neither the pleasures of the body, nor those of the mind, separated from society or public affection, can afford us any lasting enjoyment.

       Remember, man, “The universal cause

       Acts not by partial, but by gen’ral laws.”

       And makes what happiness we justly call

       Subsist, not in the good of one, but all.

       There’s not a blessing individuals find,

       But some way leans and hearkens to the kind.

       No bandit fierce, no tyrant mad with pride,

       No cavern’d hermit, rest self-satisfy’d;

       Who most to shun or hate mankind pretend,

       Seek an admirer, or would fix a friend:

       Abstract what others feel, what others think,

       All pleasures sicken, and all glories sink;

       Each has his share, and who would more obtain

       Shall find, the pleasure pays not half the pain.

      Essay on man, Epist. 4.⁶⁶

      We have all the affections which are necessary to the maintenance of society, and to receiving happiness by social correspondence and participation: an inclination to propagate our kind; natural affection to our offspring and to our parents; disposition to friendship; tenderness to the sex; regard to reputation, or desire of fame and esteem; gratitude, sympathy and compassion; delight in the happiness of others, in that particularly which is of our own giving or procuring to them; satisfaction in whatever presents us with the agreeable idea of the power, improvement and perfection belonging to our nature. СКАЧАТЬ