The Arctic and World Order. Группа авторов

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      First, and in some ways foremost, a set of biophysical links, notably involving the Earth’s climate system but extending to other major systems (e.g. the global ocean circulation system) as well, connect the Arctic to the Earth system as a whole. Crucially, the impacts of climate change are advancing more rapidly and more dramatically in the Arctic than anywhere else on the planet:¹⁵ surface temperatures are rising more than twice as fast in the Arctic; polar sea ice is receding and thinning at an unprecedented rate; acidification is particularly pronounced in cold water; permafrost is decaying and collapsing; melting on the surface of the Greenland ice sheet is adding freshwater to the North Atlantic.

      Needless to say, these developments attributable largely to outside drivers are giving rise to extraordinary challenges to human communities in the Arctic that must cope with the impacts of dramatic changes involving coastal erosion, the melting of permafrost, shifts in the distribution of fish and marine mammals, and more.

      What happens in the Arctic as a result of climate change is also generating profound global consequences.¹⁶ This is a function in part of feedback processes in which the loss of sea ice, reductions in snow cover, and the growth of terrestrial melt water ponds lead to increased absorption of solar radiation. It is also a function of system dynamics in which the impacts of climate change in the Arctic are affecting weather patterns in the Northern Hemisphere through shifts in the Polar Jet Stream and the operation of the global ocean circulation system resulting from the flooding of freshwater into the Arctic Ocean and the North Atlantic.¹⁷ As a result, any belief that it is realistic to treat the Arctic as a distinct region in biophysical terms is no longer tenable.

      With respect to policy, an increasingly common response to these observations is to fold the Arctic into an emerging global climate emergency narrative. This narrative starts from the proposition that we now face not just a climate problem but a full-fledged climate emergency developing on a global scale. In fact, we need to recognize that coming to terms with this emergency is or should be an overriding concern for policymakers at all levels. With regard to the Arctic, this environmental narrative has consequences both for mitigation and for adaptation. There is, to begin with, a need to minimize or even terminate initiatives aimed at producing the massive reserves of hydrocarbons located in high northern latitudes. There is a pressing need as well to make a concerted effort to address the disruptive impacts of climate change on the well-being of the Arctic’s human residents and to take all appropriate steps to minimize the damage to Arctic ecosystems. Overall, the adoption of a global climate emergency narrative suggests that it does not make sense to think of the Arctic as a distinctive region with a policy agenda of its own. Rather, we need to integrate the Arctic into global perspectives, evaluating both developments in the region and the impacts of these developments on global systems from an Earth system perspective.

      Paradoxically, though not surprisingly, some analysts and practitioners prefer a lens that focuses on the extent to which these biophysical forces have increased the accessibility of the Arctic, opening up new opportunities for industries interested in extracting the region’s natural resources and moving them to southern markets. The leaders of post-Soviet Russia have chosen to ground the economic reconstruction of their country squarely on the extraction of natural resources in the Arctic and, more specifically, on the exploitation of massive reserves of oil and especially natural gas located within the country’s jurisdiction. The extraction of natural gas from the Yamal Peninsula and adjacent areas along with the development of the Northern Sea Route as a corridor for shipments of liquid natural gas both westward to Europe and eastward to Asia provides a dramatic example.¹⁸ Responding to opportunities that seem attractive politically as well as economically, China has made substantial investments in the development of Russia’s Arctic gas, taken steps to develop its capacity to engage in commercial shipping along the Northern Sea Route, and articulated a vision of the Arctic Silk Road as an element of its overarching Belt and Road Initiative.¹⁹

      Nor are initiatives involving the extraction of Arctic natural resources limited to the Russian North. As a petro-state, Norway is taking steps to expand the production of both oil and gas in the Barents Sea. Alaska, dependent on revenues derived from the production of hydrocarbons to cover the lion’s share of the state’s budget, is desperate to stimulate its own development of new oil reserves and especially to find ways to move the North Slope’s large proven reserves of natural gas to markets in Asia. Those who favor an early transition to full-fledged independence for Greenland are aware that such a move would make little sense in the absence of the revenues to be derived from the development of hydrocarbons or from mining operations, including the exploitation of major deposits of rare earths.²⁰

      Embedded in the thinking of those who promote the exploitation of natural resources or who are engaged in carrying out such activities is what I call the energy from the North narrative. The central themes of this narrative are that industrialized societies cannot thrive in the absence of plentiful supplies of energy and various raw materials and that modern technology is now adequate to allow for the extraction and shipment of natural resources from the North without serious environmental impacts. Moreover, resource development provides the best option for securing the economic sustainability of northern communities and remote areas. Implicit in this perspective is the proposition that mutually beneficial economic activities can provide a basis for enhancing social welfare and securing peaceful relations as well as a presumption that one way or another we will find effective responses to the climate problem that do not require drastic changes in the character of industrialized societies. A striking feature of current debates regarding matters of Arctic policy is the pronounced tendency of proponents of the global climate emergency narrative and the energy from the North narrative to operate within the confines of their own discourses without engaging in any sustained effort to resolve the disconnect between the two narratives.

      Then there is the shift toward a heightened sensitivity regarding great-power politics in the Arctic.²¹ A revitalized Russia has taken steps to reclaim its status as a great power, a development featuring the modernization of Russia’s Northern Fleet based largely on the Kola Peninsula, the reoccupation of military installations abandoned in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, and the acquisition of an expanded fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers. China has taken steps to increase its influence in the Arctic largely through economic initiatives including the incorporation of the Arctic into its signature geopolitical vision articulated in the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. Having shown relatively little interest in Arctic politics for a number of decades, the United States has now begun to articulate muscular assertions regarding the rise of high politics in the Arctic, the need to act vigorously to counter Russian and Chinese efforts to exercise power in the high latitudes, and the importance of embarking on a concerted effort to strengthen American capabilities to operate effectively under Arctic conditions.²² This has resulted both in a number of concrete measures, such as the reactivation of the U.S. Navy’s 2nd Fleet, and in a raft of calls for enhanced capabilities justified by an asserted need to be prepared to engage successfully in high politics in the Arctic.

      The resultant Arctic power politics narrative is, for the most part, a straightforward application of the tenets of the theories of realism or neo-realism to current developments in the Circumpolar North.²³ Some analysts find it easy to slip into relatively extreme formulations of this narrative. They assert that there is a “new Cold War” in the Arctic;²⁴ some even argue that the original Cold War never ended with regard to developments in the Arctic.²⁵ Several commentators have gone so far as to assert that armed conflict among the great powers is now a distinct possibility in the far north, a prospect that could trigger the onset of World War III.²⁶ No doubt, these are extreme views, articulated in some cases by observers who have little knowledge or even distorted conceptions of the geography of the Arctic and the biophysical, economic, and political realities of the region. But it is surprising how easy it is to revert to a power politics narrative in the effort to craft a coherent story regarding developments occurring in the Arctic today.

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