The Arctic and World Order. Группа авторов

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СКАЧАТЬ Paul C. Avey, “The Icebreaker Gap Doesn’t Mean America is Losing in the Arctic,” War on the Rocks, November 28, 2919, https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/the-icebreaker-gap-doesnt-mean-america-is-losing-in-the-arctic/.

      76 76. Thomas Nilsen, “Russia’s Top General Indirectly Confirms Arctic Deployment of the Unstoppable Kinzhal Missile,” The Barents Observer, December 19, 2019, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/12/russias-top-general-indirectly-confirms-arctic-deployment-unstoppable-missile; Zachary Cohen, “Satellite Images Indicate Russia is Preparing to Resume Testing its Nuclear-powered Cruise Missile,” CNN, October 20, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/10/20/politics/russia-nuclear-powered-cruise-missile-test-satellite-images/index.html; J. M. Doyle, “Cruise Missiles in the Arctic Seen as Another Outcome of Great Power Competition,” Seapower, September 10, 2020, https://seapowermagazine.org/cruise-missiles-in-the-arctic-seen-as-another-outcome-of-great-power-competition/.

      77 77. Spohr, op. cit.; Holly Ellyatt, “Russia Drops Out of Top 5 Global Military Spenders While US and China Up the Ante,” CNBC, April 29, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/29/russia-drops-out-of-top-5-global-military-spenders.html.

      78 78. It is noteworthy, that, with the clear intention of setting geopolitical signals, joint Sino-Russian sea maneuvers began in 2012. Michael Paul, “Partnership on the High Seas: China and Russia’s Joint Naval Manoeuvres,” SWP Comment, no. 26, June 2019, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2019C26_pau.pdf. Sergey Sukhankin, “The Northeastern Dimension of Russia’s ‘Ocean Shield 2020’ Naval Exercises,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 17, 125, September 11, 2020 (Part 1), https://jamestown.org/program/the-northeastern-dimension-of-russias-ocean-shield-2020-naval-exercises-part-one/; Ibid., Eurasia Daily Monitor 17, 127, September 15, 2020 (Part 2), https://jamestown.org/program/the-northeastern-dimension-of-russias-ocean-shield-2020-naval-exercises-part-two/. Spohr, op. cit.

      79 79. Sukhankin, op. cit.

      80 80. Spohr, op. cit.

      81 81. “Other Developing Nations Can Adopt China’s Growth Model: President Xi Jinping,” The Economic Times (India), October 18, 2017, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/other-developing-nations-can-adopt-chinas-growth-model-president-xi-jinping/articleshow/61134034.cms; Mengjie, “President Xi Delivers New Year Speech Vowing Resolute Reform in 2018,” Xinhuanet, December 31, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-12/31/c_136863397.htm.

      82 82. Spohr, op. cit. See also Marc Lanteigne, “The Twists and Turns of the Polar Silk Road,” Over the Circle, March 15, 2020, https://overthecircle.com/2020/03/15/the-twists-and-turns-of-the-polar-silk-road/.

      83 83. Ryan Hass and John L. Thornton, “The Trajectory of Chinese Foreign Policy: From Reactive Assertiveness to Opportunistic Activism,” Brookings Institution 3/2018, p. 7, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/fp_20171104_hass_the_trajectory_of_chinese_foreign_policy.pdf.

      84 84. Thomas Nilsen, “Major Step Towards a Europe-Asia Arctic Cable Link,” The Barents Observer, June 6, 2019, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2019/06/mou-signed-set-arctic-telecom-cable-company; Frank Jüris, “Handing Over Infrastructure for China’s Strategic Objectives: ‘Arctic Connect’ and the Digital Silk Road in the Arctic,” SINOPSIS, March 7, 2020, https://sinopsis.cz/en/arctic-digital-silk-road/#fn4.

      85 85. Jüriis, op. cit.

      86 86. Ibid.; and Clayton Cheyney, “China’s Digital Silk Road: Strategic Technological Competition and Exporting Political Illiberalism,” ISSUES & INSIGHTS 19—Working Paper #8, Pacific Forum, July 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20200226180229/https://www.pacforum.org/sites/default/files/issuesinsights_Vol19%20WP8FINAL.pdf.

      87 87. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Arctic Policy. January 2018 (First Edition), http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. Cf. Mariia Kobzeva, “China’s Arctic Policy: Present and Future,” The Polar Journal 9, 1 (2019), pp. 94–112, https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2019.1618558; Martin Kossa, “China’s Arctic Engagement: Domestic Actors and Foreign Policy,” Global Change, Peace & Security 32, 1 (2020), pp. 19–38, https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2019.1648406; Idem, Marina Lomaeva and Juha Saunavaara, “East Asian Subnational Government Involvement in the Arctic: A Case for Paradiplomacy?,” The Pacific Review (2020), https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2020. 1729843.

      88 88. Adam Vaughan, “How the Coronavirus Has Impacted Climate Change—For Good and Bad,” New Scientist, October 14, 2020, https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg24833040-900-how-the-coronavirus-has-impacted-climate-change-for-good-and-bad/#ixzz6cZFZ9XB4; Bill Gates, “COVID-19 Is Awful: Climate Change Could Be Worse,” Gates Notes, August 4, 2020, https://www.gatesnotes.com/Energy/Climate-and-COVID-19.

       Chapter 1

       Shifting Ground: Competing Policy Narratives and the Future of the Arctic

       Oran R. Young

      Policy narratives are interpretive frameworks that both analysts and practitioners develop and use to facilitate thinking in an orderly and coherent fashion about issues arising in policy arenas. Because they are social constructs, the core elements of such narratives are non-falsifiable. Nevertheless, policy narratives exercise great influence not only during processes of agenda formation in which they help to identify emerging issues and to frame them for consideration in policy arenas but also, and more specifically, in efforts to assess the pros and cons of alternative ways to address those issues that move to the top of the agenda. Sometimes, a single appealing narrative comes to dominate an issue domain so that there is broad agreement regarding ways to think about specific issues arising within that domain. At other times, by contrast, alternative narratives compete with one another for the attention of those active in policy arenas. In such cases, debates about the suitability of different narratives often play roles that are more important as determinants of agreement and disagreement among policymakers than differences regarding matters of fact.

      Policy narratives are not simply products of unbiased efforts to explain or predict the course of events in the realm of public affairs. They reflect the outlooks of those who create and deploy them: interests on the part of policymakers and representatives of nonstate actors and intellectual commitments on the part of scholars and commentators. This means that efforts to shape prevailing policy narratives and debates about the relative merits of using different narratives to interpret real-world developments are political in nature. Both practitioners and analysts devise and deploy narratives that reflect their own mindsets and cast their preferred interpretations of reality in a favorable light. But this does not detract from the significance of policy narratives. On the contrary, it makes it easy to understand why debates about the suitability of different narratives are often protracted and can spark intense controversy in specific settings.

      In this chapter, I apply these observations about policy narratives to the recent history of the Arctic to explain both the remarkable rise of cooperative initiatives in the region in the aftermath of the Cold War and the growth of conflicting perspectives on Arctic issues in recent years, a development that makes it increasingly difficult to arrive at mutually agreeable responses to prominent Arctic issues arising on policy agendas today. Coming into focus initially toward the end of the 1980s, what I will call the Arctic zone of peace narrative provided the conceptual foundation for a series of cooperative measures that the Arctic states launched during the 1990s. Foremost among these initiatives were the adoption of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy in 1991 and the establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996, along with a series of activities carried out under the auspices of the council in the 2000s (e.g. the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment completed in 2004, the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment СКАЧАТЬ