Return to Winter. Douglas E. Schoen

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СКАЧАТЬ warmth between the two regimes masks a long history of division and hostility, most recently during the Cold War, when the Sino–Soviet split divided the Communist world. The relations of the two countries reached a nadir in 1969, when tensions between them nearly led to all-out war. But since Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to China in May 1989, and especially since the fall of the Soviet Union a few years later, growing strategic affinity has prompted stronger bilateral ties. To be sure, the two nations remain rivals as well as partners in the Far East. The Russians, in particular, worry about Chinese expansionism and the penetration of Chinese refugees into their sphere of influence. The Chinese worry about Russian desires to merge the former Soviet republics into some kind of alternative European Union, thus threatening Chinese economic opportunities in Central Asia.¹⁰ It’s certainly possible that their shared interests could erode under the pressure of competition and divergent goals.

      We understand, too, that Russia and China have compelling economic and political reasons for maintaining strong ties with the United States: All three nations share key mutual interests, such as steadying global financial markets and combating Islamic terrorism. Russia and China have even voted America’s way recently in the UN—on North Korean nuclear proliferation, for example. But these factors only obscure a much longer track record of oppositional and even aggressive action that shows every sign of becoming a formalized, dangerous alliance. Russia and China have mastered the art of a kind of geopolitical two-step: doing the bare minimum necessary to create the impression of cooperation (voting for sanctions on North Korea, for instance) while doing nothing substantive to truly cooperate (not lifting a finger to enforce those same sanctions). Often, the two partners adopt intermittently conciliatory positions to provide themselves with deniability on major international crises—not just in North Korea, but also in Iran and Syria. Indeed, Assad’s use of chemical weapons against his own people in August 2013 was a case in point. American blundering and lack of resolve left an opening for Russia to play conciliator-in-chief by proposing a diplomatic solution to the crisis, although President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry had initially pushed for a military strike. But when Kerry inadvertently stated that Assad could avoid the attack by turning over his chemical weapons to inspectors, the Russians saw their chance and stepped in, announcing their support for that plan and offering their assistance in brokering it. (Unsurprisingly, China supported Putin’s plan.) The agreement did hold off the American attack—but also almost certainly bought Assad time to hide and move his chemical-weapons supplies before inspectors could come in. Indeed, Assad missed his first deadline—December 31, 2013—to turn over the first tranche of Syria’s chemical weapons, forcing Norwegian and Danish ships sent to collect the weapons to turn back.¹¹ The UN blamed security concerns and bureaucracy for the delay, and, in typical fashion, the State Department sought to play down the issue. “As long as we see forward progress that’s what’s most important here, and we have,” Marie Harf, the State Department’s deputy spokesperson, said.¹² But how the process will unfold remains to be seen, and Assad continues to consolidate his power as the June 2014 presidential elections approach.

      The Syria crisis showed the Axis powers (especially Russia) in a new light: They protected a mutual ally and in the process presented themselves as peacemakers trying to walk the Americans back from yet another military intervention in the Middle East. And, in fact, two years into the crisis, Putin’s staunch backing of Assad has now accomplished a nearly complete reversal of fortune for the regime: Whereas the expectation two years ago was that Assad would go—it was just a matter of time—he’s now an essential partner in the process, whatever happens.

      No wonder that Forbes, in its 2013 annual survey of the world’s most powerful people, selected Putin as Number One, elevating him above President Obama. “Who’s more powerful: The omnipotent head of a corroding but still feisty power or the handcuffed head of the most dominant country in the world?” the magazine asked. “This year’s snapshot of power puts the Russian president on top. Putin has solidified his control over Russia (‘dictator’ is no longer an outlandish word to ponder) and the global stage. Anyone watching the chess match over Syria has a clear idea of the shift in the power towards Putin.”¹³

      Nevertheless, in Washington, there seems to be little urgency and even less understanding about the burgeoning Russian-Chinese alliance. Our leaders appear unwilling or unable to grasp the magnitude of the situation and the inadequacy of their approach. American policy has been weak, bordering on negligent—the approach of a nation that seems to be conceding power and the ability to shape events.

      As this book went to press, the United States stood passively by as Russia, following its annexation of Crimea, continued to interfere overtly and covertly in Ukraine, sponsoring pro-Russian militias in the country’s east and south. Faced with Ukraine’s pleas for military assistance, President Obama responded with a meager offer to provide military rations—and even those were slow in coming.¹⁴ Unable to generate consensus among its NATO allies and unwilling to act decisively on its own, America seems to have all but conceded Ukraine to the Russian political orbit. Washington Post columnist Anne Applebaum quoted an exasperated Canadian diplomat who said, “It’s like watching a hockey game with only one team on the ice.”¹⁵

      Even before these events unfolded, President Obama was sending similar signals—not only as regards Ukraine but also in connection with the mounting challenges the United States faces on many fronts. In his State of the Union speech in January 2014, for instance, Obama made clear that the U.S. was practically withdrawing from the field. He put no emphasis on confronting our enemies and made no explicit mention about the need to compete with China and Russia. The administration’s much-heralded “pivot to Asia” got just one sentence, and the president’s comments about the Middle East were perfunctory—save for his reference to Iran, where Obama made it clear that he would do everything in his power to support an agreement that contains such egregious loopholes that the Iranians can continue to enrich uranium at low grades, keep tens of thousands of centrifuges, and restart their full-blown enrichment program on less than a day’s notice. The difficulty of enforcing even the best deals with such adversaries was illustrated a day after Obama’s speech, when reports surfaced that the Russians have tested a medium-range cruise missile, in violation of the landmark 1987 arms-control treaty.¹⁶ The 1987 treaty was thought to be sound; by contrast, few but the most devoted Obama defenders see the Iranian agreement as anything but reckless, a virtual giveaway to an outlaw regime that will endanger the United States and its allies.

      Unfortunately, our allies have become accustomed to such disappointments. Indeed, rather than strengthening relations with American allies, the Obama administration, through its clumsy handling of the NSA wiretapping scandal, has found itself having to apologize to governments from Brazil to France to Germany for unauthorized monitoring of leaders’ and citizens’ phone calls. Indeed, reports have suggested that the NSA has monitored as many as 35 nations. The United States continues to prove far more adept at taping our allies and alienating our strategic partners than at developing and articulating a coherent policy in concert with them. “Fuck the EU,” Victoria Nuland, assistant secretary of state for European affairs, was caught on tape saying, expressing her contempt for European efforts to quell the crisis in Ukraine.¹⁷ German chancellor Angela Merkel, already alienated by American wiretapping, called the comments “completely unacceptable.”¹⁸ Meanwhile, a German newspaper editor opined that Vladimir Putin “should certainly be laughing himself stupid” over the latest fracas.¹⁹

      As the Western alliance frays and the U.S. becomes less powerful, Russia and China become more aggressive in the advocacy of their interests. They grow stronger while we do nothing to stand in their way and arguably become weaker. The stakes are enormous. If we don’t build awareness of what Russia and China are up to, greatly improve our understanding of their actions and motives, and take steps to defend ourselves and protect our interests, we will see our economic and political well-being threatened. And we’ll watch as the international order tilts toward authoritarianism and away from democratic ideals and freedoms.

      That would be a tragedy for America and for the world.

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