The Chrysanthemum and the Eagle. Ryuzo Sato

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СКАЧАТЬ Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait have all been taken as proof of the correctness of U.S. foreign policy. As Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union move toward a free-market economy, the world seems to be revolving around the American axis. Under the circumstances, it should come as no surprise that Americans have shifted their focus to the economic arena and that after the Berlin Wall the next barrier they hope will fall will be the one surrounding Japan.

      Does Money Give Anyone the Right to Buy Someone Else’s Soul? Economic activities and trends inevitably have their own rules. Economics is the science of finding those rules. The problem is that sometimes an economy operates according to the rules and sometimes it does not. When the latter happens, measures must be taken to counteract events or trends that run counter to expectations.

      In the late 1980s Japan was busily buying up American assets with the excess cash from its huge trade surplus. Logically speaking, this activity was a natural consequence wholly in line with the laws of economics. The question is: Should something be allowed to happen just because it accords with economic laws? Shouldn’t some consideration be given to whether the activity is ultimately in the best interests of the parties involved? Viewed in that light, the situation takes on a completely different complexion. This is what makes the laws of economics so much more unpredictable than the laws of physics or chemistry. The field of economics has recently come to make greater use of mathematical models and is becoming a more scientific discipline. In North America and Europe it is now regarded as having more in common with the sciences than with the humanities. Because economics deals with people and its testing ground is society rather than a laboratory, however, we should not insist that it is an exact science. Economic problems have a nasty tendency to develop into political and social problems.

      When rain falls on a mountain, for example, and forms into a river, it waters the fields at the foot of the mountain and enriches the lives of the people who live there. This is referred to as the workings of nature. But if several inches of rain were to fall in the course of an hour, the river would overflow and the village at the foot of the mountain would be washed away. That, too, is a law of nature, but the villagers do not just sit back and allow this to happen. They build a dam upstream to control a possible flood. And this human action to reverse the laws of nature is praised as a good policy.

      Let’s transpose this analogy to the economy. Since the end of the 1980s, $50 or $60 billion worth of Japanese investment a year, the equivalent of Japan’s annual trade surplus, has flooded through the world, much of it buying up American land, buildings, companies, and even people (lobbyists). Should Americans stand idly by simply because an economic law is operating? Isn’t it necessary to build some sort of dam? When a policy runs counter to economic laws, however, far from being praised—as in the case of flood control—it is criticized as protectionism, regulation, or interference. Why? One reason is that natural phenomena can be readily observed, but economic phenomena are not easy to visualize. We can see the flow of water, but we cannot actually see the flow of investment around the globe. This is puzzling for economists and even more puzzling for ordinary people. But when the flow of investment does become visible, shouldn’t policymakers take bold steps, such as containment, even though that means temporarily acting contrary to economic laws?

      In the late 1980s Japan’s “buying America” became clearly visible to the naked eye. There seemed no end to the land or the companies the Japanese acquired. Japan has argued that it is not the only country to have bought American property, that British holdings are even larger than Japan’s. But this argument inadvertently lets the cat out of the bag. The truth is that Japanese investment is rapidly catching up with the British, Dutch, and German investments that have been made over a long period of years. It has been a veritable torrent rather than a gently falling rain, and no one can claim that a torrential rainfall in the space of a few hours has the same effect as an equivalent amount of rain falling over a ten-day period.

This situation is most dramatically manifested in the growth of Japanese direct investment abroad. Valued at a mere $10.6 billion during the period 1975-79, direct investment for 1985-89 had risen to $118.8 billion, a more than tenfold increase in just ten years’ time. In the United States alone, Japanese direct investment went from $67.3 billion in 1989 to $83.5 billion in 1990.* Thus, more than half of these acquisitions were in the United States and quite visibly concentrated in Hawaii, California, and New York. This was not just a torrent but more like a flash flood.

      The analogy can be taken only so far, however. In the natural world, no one benefits from a flood, but in the economic world, this flow of investment clearly was to the benefit of Japan, and inevitably it inflamed American chauvinism. Excessive growth, excessive gains in any area, are bound to produce a hostile reaction. According to an opinion poll of American chief executive officers conducted jointly by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun and the U.S. polling organization Booz Allen for the Wall Street Journal, only 54.8 percent welcomed Japanese investment in the United States. To give some idea of how low that figure is, the highest approval rate for investment by another country was 93.8 percent for Canada, with Britain, the Netherlands, and Germany falling between 76.8 and 87.7 percent. The number of respondents who said Japanese investment was not welcome was 22.6 percent.

      Another reason why this concentrated investment in the United States was not welcome is that, despite the strong yen and the weak dollar, America’s trade deficit with Japan has not been reduced at all. The proposal by Fallows and other revisionists to adopt managed trade as a containment policy is a reflection of American irritation with this situation. The fact that the

* The slowdown in the Japanese economy has temporarily halted the growth of Japanese investment abroad, but as Japan’s trade surplus continues to grow, the excess will have to be invested somewhere, this time most likely in Asia.

      United States, the standard bearer for free trade since World War II, has been tempted to adopt a managed trade policy gives some indication of the extent of American frustration. The very term managed trade creates a negative impression. It describes a human activity that interferes with the free working of the “invisible hand”—the golden rule of capitalism. The unspoken assumption behind the U.S.–Japan Structural Impediments Initiative talks was that America would desperately like to avoid resorting to such a course.

      This is what happens when economic activity does not operate according to logic. Certainly, as Akio Morita, the chairman of Sony, has said, it is not the concentrated outpouring of Japanese exports, but the concentrated American absorption of these products, that is the problem. There is a certain logic, too, in his statement that if Columbia Pictures is a piece of America’s soul, then the problem lies not with those who bought it, but with those who were willing to sell it. In economics, however, some ideas cannot be put across simply by brandishing the correct argument, particularly when national pride is linked to economic interests.

       America’s Sun Has Not Yet Set

      The Supremacy of the Dollar. Structural Impediments Initiative talks or “containing Japan”—call it what you will—both are indicative of a desperate fight for the preeminence of the U.S. economy. Why has America, a country whose overwhelming postwar power and affluence led it to assume the roles of the world’s banker and policeman, seen its formidable lead in world economic affairs slowly slip away? The answer is inherent in the very nature of the postwar monetary system, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was advantageous to the United States in the short run, but not in the long run.

      Because the American dollar is the key global currency, other countries have to export to earn foreign currency (dollars) and then use those dollars to buy (import) the things they need. After the war, for example, Japan wanted to import because it had no natural resources, but it needed dollars to do so. It launched an export drive to earn those dollars and, finally, СКАЧАТЬ