Stakeholder Capitalism. Klaus Schwab

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СКАЧАТЬ unload these costs to their citizens, many will increasingly struggle to balance their books.

There are more growing government liabilities. The Global Infrastructure Hub calculated the world faces a $15 trillion infrastructure funding gap from 2016 to 2040.³² But infrastructure represents an investment, on which a return could be earned. The problem posed by pensions and retirement savings is an order of magnitude larger, and returns are much lower: unless policies are changed, the World Economic Forum estimates³³ the pension savings gap will balloon to $400 trillion in the eight countries with the world's largest pension systems by 2050, with unsecured public pension promises making up the lion's share of that shortfall.

      On top of this debt burden is low inflation. Historically, interest rates and inflation tended to be inversely correlated, and central banks used their power to set interest rates as a tool to either curb inflation or stimulate it. By setting high interest rates, central banks gave people, companies, and governments an incentive to save money rather than spend it, easing upward pressure on prices. By setting low interest rates, they gave people the reverse incentive, namely to spend money and push up prices, since saving it wouldn't yield interest anyway.

      Since about a decade, however, this inverse correlation has all but ceased to exist in the West, with the situation particularly dire in Europe and Japan. Despite years of near-zero interest rates, inflation often remained close to zero as well. While this is no problem in the short run, it does take away a long-term lever to ease the debt load. With rising prices, nominal debt tends to become relatively less of a burden. With flat prices, however, historical debt remains as heavy as a burden tomorrow as today.

      But the nexus between low growth, low interests, low inflation, and increasing debt has one more ingredient, and it could be the most lethal of them all: slowing productivity growth.

      Declining Productivity Growth

      Compounding many of the structural issues outlined in this chapter is the fact that productivity gains have been low in recent years. Indeed, it was because of rising productivity, more so perhaps than demographic growth, that the middle class in the West saw their incomes rise quickly during the first decades after the war.

      Productivity goes up most often because of innovations in the way things are made or done. Well-known examples of productivity gains are the assembly line Ford introduced in the early 1900s, the introduction of digital computers instead of typewriters in the 1970s and 1980s, or the optimizing of a taxi route thanks to apps such as Waze today. All these innovations enable a given worker to produce the same output, or do the same job, in considerably less time. That in turn allowed companies to increase wages.

In the past, the world knew periods of high productivity gains, which translated into high wage growth. During America's golden age of capitalism in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, the annual productivity growth was almost 3 percent per year.³⁴ But productivity gains afterward fell to lower levels, and, problematically, even when productivity did rebound, less of it was translated into take-home pay for American workers. Instead, it remained with the businessowners and executives, a phenomenon known as the “decoupling” of wages from productivity.³⁵

      Since the 2007–2009 financial crisis, US productivity growth has fallen to the meager level of 1.3 percent per year. That is a problem, because it means it is not possible to grow the pie for everyone anymore. The distribution of today's economic gains is a quasi-zero-sum game. Other countries, such as Germany, Denmark, and Japan, have kept up productivity gains better and translated them also in higher wages. But the trendline is unmistakable: productivity gains in the West are experiencing a marked decline.

      Taken together, the indicators presented in this chapter—growth, interest rates, debt, and productivity—point to a systemic design error in the Western economic development model. Much of its prosperity model was based on perpetual economic growth and productivity gains. Now, that growth is grinding to a halt, and problems that had been festering under the surface are becoming more acute by the day.

      Kuznets’ curse is coming back to haunt us. GDP was never a perfect measure for well-being. And now that it is becoming an ever-greater challenge to grow it, we will have to deal with a whole basket of other problems we created while pursuing that higher growth.

The Second Kuznets’ Curse: Inequality

      While the original Kuznets’ curse of our recent past is the result of the blind pursuit of GDP growth, there is a second Kuznets’ curse. This one relates more directly to the phenomenon Kuznets became known for in his lifetime: the so-called Kuznets curve.

As Kuznets continued his work as an economist in the 1950s, he started to theorize on an interesting phenomenon. He noticed that US income inequality had started to decline in the post-war period, as the economic boom intensified. That contrasted to the pre-war period, in which America had become a major economic power, but income and wealth were concentrated in the hands of a few. A similar observation, though less extreme, could be made for many other developed countries.

Kuznets theorized about the numbers he found, in a paper for and presidential address to the American Economic Association.³⁶ He derived a potential game-changing insight for development economics, provided the findings held true over time. Indeed, it implied a sort of economic law. Inequality worsens as a nation begins to develop, but as development continues, inequality subsides. In other words, the price of inequality societies pay for development early on is offset by higher development and lower inequality later.

The theory put forth by Kuznets became a worldwide sensation, especially after Kuznets won the 1971 Nobel Prize for Economics, awarded for his contributions to national income accounting (rather than the theory of the Kuznets curve). Throughout the 1980s, economists built on Kuznets’ optimistic theory, plotted graphs that showed how it applied to various countries and periods, and prescribed economic development models because of it.

       Figure 2.2 Kuznets waves: How income inequality waxes and wanes over the very long run

      Source: Redrawn from Lindert, P. H., & Williamson, J. G. (1985). Growth, equality, and history. Explorations in Economic History, 22(4), 341–377..

      There was just one problem: over time, the theory no longer held true. Some of the facts we face today reveal this.

      Inequality in fact began rising again in highly developed countries. In a 2016 note, economist Branko Milanovic suggested that the current upswing in inequality could be viewed "as a second Kuznets curve", or indeed, as a "Kuznets wave" (Figure 2.2).

      Income Inequality

      There is a festering wound in our global economic system, and that wound is rising income inequality.

The story starts with an unexpected twist. Global income inequality, measured by plotting incomes of everyone from all over the world, has actually been steadily declining over the last 30 years³⁷ (see Figure 2.3). This may come as a surprise to many readers, given the perception СКАЧАТЬ