Kant and the Theory and Practice of International Right. Georg Cavallar

Чтение книги онлайн.

СКАЧАТЬ (XII, 380, 30–2; cf. VI, 433, 18–23). Kant’s explicit statements on Frederick are positive, if not flattering. We are interested, however, in what Kant thought but did not dare to write. Allusions and hints in published writings are a source of insight into his privately held judgement. Another method is to sift through Kant’s unpublished material, his letters, notes and preliminary writings, where he is under less constraint. The third method is to find deeper meanings in passages that seem innocuous in a casual reading.

      Kant’s self-restraint and self-censorship when writing consist of four elements.³ Some texts are – apparently deliberately – obscure, confusing the censor with unclear or ambiguous statements. Kant often plays hide-and-seek with his readers. For instance, we do not know whether the term ‘worthy gentleman’ in one particular passage (VIII, 277, 24) refers to the conservative Edmund Burke or not.⁴ Sometimes Kant uses old concepts and gives them a different meaning, while claiming that nothing has changed substantially. His transformation of the sentence salus publica suprema civitatis lex est (the public welfare is the supreme law of the state) is a case in point.⁵ Kant actually replaces the term salus publica with the concept ‘justice’ (justitia), while claiming that the doctrine ‘retains its value and authority undiminished’ (VIII, 298, 14–15). Kant does not apply elements of the political theory that might appear revolutionary or radical to the contemporary political situation in Prussia. Finally, Kant does not always specify the methodological status of his writings. Sometimes the reader gets the impression that something just tolerated provisionally is part of the a priori doctrine.

      The first section of this chapter focuses on Frederick’s domestic policy, Kant’s Enlightenment essay, and the limits of Frederick’s domestic policy. Kant’s judgement on Frederick seems positive or ambivalent, but upon close analysis is ultimately negative. For Kant, Frederick’s humanitarian reforms are based on self-interest, not on morality. What is left is the Frederick of military aggression and of wars, the Frederick who constantly violates international law and right. In the 1790s, Kant of is particularly critical of Frederick. Kant, belonging to the second generation of Enlightenment writers, is no longer satisfied with a reformed system of absolutism. The ultimate goal is the ‘perfect’ republic ‘governed by principles of justice’, which is identical with representative democracy. Kant devalues reformed enlightened absolutism to a mere transitory phase in this process towards republicanism. In Kant’s philosophy of history, selfish Enlightenment rulers like Frederick unwittingly promote noble ends. Progress towards the republican ideal is seen as the work of a ‘cunning nature’.

      Domestic policy I: enlightened absolutism

      Kant’s principles of politics are the background to his judgement on Frederick’s enlightened absolutism. They are rooted in the principle of right or justice (Recht). Right is defined as ‘the sum total of those conditions within which the will of one person can be reconciled with the Will of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom’ (VI, 230, 24–6). Republicanism is the form of government (Regierungsart) where this reconciliation is best achieved; where the subjects are citizens who are entitled to legislate, and they enjoy legal freedom and equality. Executive and legislative are separated. Only the republican constitution corresponds with the idea of justice.

      During his lifetime, Kant encountered several different political systems, including the traditional absolutism of Frederick William I (1713–40) and of Frederick William II (1786–97). Furthermore, he encountered enlightened absolutism, revolutionary France, the parliamentary government of Great Britain, the aristocratic oligarchies of German imperial cities and the evolving democracy of the young American republic. Though Kant occasionally refers to the United States (XV, 630, refl. 1444; VI, 351), France serves as the republican model after 1789. In his later writings, Kant’s comments on England’s parliamentary system are consistently negative. He claims that Great Britain’s allegedly ‘moderate’ political constitution amounts to an absolute monarchy (VI, 319–20; XIX, 606, refl. 8077; VII, 90). There are no explicit statements about traditional absolutism or the aristocratic oligarchies of the Reichsstädte. Thus, Kant’s alternative can be put as follows: enlightened absolutism with reforms ‘from above’ as the means of change, or a revolution to create a republic such as France?

      Kant’s short-lived love-affair with enlightened absolutism in the 1780s ends after the French Revolution; then he is more explicit in arguing that it is only a provisional, pre-republican phase in the evolution towards republicanism.⁶ Kant is attracted by enlightened absolutism, in particular by Frederick’s rule. First, Kant rejects a right to revolution: the people have no right to coerce a despot; Kant is convinced that ‘even what is apparently the most intolerable abuse of supreme power’ (VI, 320, 22) takes place in some sort of – albeit deficient – juridical condition, which is still better than the state of nature. I shall not investigate in detail Kant’s reasons for denying a right of revolution;⁷ he believed in a different mode of political change.

      Kant’s main argument against revolution is highly legalistic, but there is a second argument. In the essay ‘An answer to the question: “What is Enlightenment?”’, Kant contends:

      A revolution may well put an end to autocratic despotism and to rapacious or power-seeking oppression, but it will never produce a true reform in ways of thinking. Instead, new prejudices, like the ones they replaced, will serve as a leash to control the great unthinking mass. (VIII, 36, 28–33)

      Revolutions are seen as counter-productive. They do not lead to what Kant considered fundamental, ‘true reform in ways of thinking (Denkungsart)’. The Denkungsart that Kant wants to promote is characterized by the maxims ‘to think for oneself’, ‘to think in the position of everyone else’, and ‘always to think in accord with oneself’ (V, 294, 16–17). A political revolution may just replace one set of prejudices with another one. What is needed is a change in our way of thinking. Prejudiced, narrow-minded and inconsistent Denkungsart must be overcome, and Kant was convinced that Frederick’s Prussia provided the framework for this ‘true reform’.

      Thirdly, Kant rejects direct democracy as despotic, ‘because it establishes an executive power through which all the citizens may make decisions about (and indeed against) the individual without his consent’ (VIII, 352, 20–2). Kant holds that the supreme legislative, but not the executive power should be in the hands of the united will of the people. Kant advocates representative democracy, where the application of the law is separated from the law-making process. In pre-republican conditions, explicit consent is not necessary and may even be harmful.

      Kant has more to say on the roles of citizens and sovereigns. This is his fourth reason. He holds that individual subjects have the right to express their views publicly, if they think that they or the commonwealth have been wronged by the sovereign (VIII, 304, 9–12). As we shall see later, Kant thought that this ‘freedom of the pen’ (VIII, 304, 15) was guaranteed in Prussia. Finally, rulers have a juridical duty to transform despotic regimes into states conforming to the ‘spirit’ of republicanism by way of reforms without a violent and detrimental revolution (VII, 90–1). Kant’s application theory needs empirical evidence to demonstrate that it works, and Frederick’s Prussia provides this evidence. The first two of the above reasons explain why Kant was diverted from alternatives to enlightened absolutism; the last three explain why he was attracted by it.

      Enlightened absolutism can be defined as ‘a regime in which the ruler possesses or assumes the right to enact legislation without consent, exercises the right extensively and, in doing so, is influenced by “the Enlightenment” as the term is used by historians of the eighteenth century’.⁸ There is consensus among scholars that Frederick the Great of Prussia is one of the ‘classic’ representatives of enlightened absolutism.⁹ There has been disagreement over the motivation of the rulers of enlightened absolutism (sometimes referred to as ‘enlightened despotism’). Many scholars have claimed that the ideas of the Enlightenment are incompatible with despotic or authoritarian СКАЧАТЬ