Kant and the Theory and Practice of International Right. Georg Cavallar

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СКАЧАТЬ to talk of an unjust enemy in the state of nature, as this state itself is one of injustice and lawlessness. On the other hand, Kant asserts that the concept of the unjust enemy must be part and parcel of any genuine theory of international right. This is possible because Kant implicitly posits a transitory state in international relations, a semi-juridical state in between the state of nature and the juridical state. Again, this semi-juridical state links pure theory with the realities of eighteenth-century international relations.

      Chapter 8 (‘Kant’s Society of Nations: Free Federation or World Republic?’) deals with one of the favourites of Kant interpreters. I argue that in a crucial passage of Perpetual Peace, Kant was so obsessed with facts and ‘the will of the nations’ – that is, something empirical – that his theory was ‘contaminated’ in advance. Instead of developing his rational theory first and then attempting to relate it to polices, Kant chose the approach of the thinkers he had fought against: his theory was, from the outset, a mixture of rational and empirical concepts. I argue that Kant’s concept of a federation of states is more convincing if a free federation is seen as the first step in an evolutionary development towards a world republic with coercive authority as the true ideal of reason. Again, I think that Kant’s major motive for writing rather confusing passages in Perpetual Peace and elsewhere is that he tried to develop a theory that is not only rational but also feasible.

      The last chapter (‘Moving Beyond Nationalism: Constitutional Patriotism and Cosmopolitan Enthusiasm in Kant’) maintains that Kant saw nationalism as a delusion (Wahn) which has to be transformed into something that can be rationally and morally justified: constitutional and cosmopolitan patriotism. Still, nationalist feelings are Kant’s starting-point. Criticizing some contemporary interpreters, I argue that Kant does not attempt to defend conventional ethnic patriotism (as a watered-down form of nationalism). Jürgen Habermas and Kant share similar perspectives. Only constitutional patriotism is by definition all-inclusive and comprehensive, because it is based on the universal principle of right. Nevertheless, constitutional patriotism and cosmopolitanism allow for some forms of emotions and feelings, above all cosmopolitan enthusiasm. The true cosmopolitan may have ‘affections’ for her or his country but should also have ‘the inclination (Neigung) to promote the welfare of the whole world’ (XXVII, 2, 1, 673, 38–674, 2). Kant advocates a proper reordering of priorities.

      My interpretation of Kant is, I think, completely opposed to the way Kantian theory of international relations and right has traditionally been seen, especially in English-speaking countries. For Martin Wight, Kant was the intellectual figurehead of the ‘revolutionist’ tradition in international theory, and he characterized Kant as an impractical idealist and utopian.¹⁵ This label became ‘a professional kiss of death’.¹⁶ Above all, this pigeon-holing does not help to understand Kant. Quite to the contrary, as I try to demonstrate with my analysis, Wight’s labels block any proper understanding of Kantian international theory. Kant is indeed an idealist in the sense that he sets up principles a priori as guidelines for political action, but they are designed to relate to practice. For that reason Kant is neither a utopian nor an ‘impractical reformer’. Furthermore, ‘revolutionist’ has connotations of violence, which is just the opposite of Kant’s evolutionary approach. Kant approves only of revolutions of the mind – intellectual and moral.

      I also disagree with another interpretation of Kant’s political philosophy. Kimberly Hutchings argues that Kant’s political thought fails to establish a convincing relationship between the principle of right and history:

      The attempt to relate ideal to real is fraught with paradox, as Kant himself recognizes, and none of the ways in which Kant grounds a connection between right and reality is genuinely secure … these struggles are capable of resolution only through retreat to one or other side of the gulf, giving the possibility of either the utter condemnation or unquestioning endorsement of existing legal and political relations.¹⁷

      I think this interpretation is unfounded. Kant has skilfully worked out an elaborate edifice (his application theory and his philosophy of history) to bridge the gulf between right and reality, and I think one can trust this construction. The philosopher (or citizen, for that matter) does not have to retreat to one of the shores, there is a way and ground (on that bridge) in between ‘utter condemnation’ on the one hand and a defence of any status quo on the other. I think Kant’s judgement on Frederick’s rule is a case in point. Kant steers a middle course. He appreciates any trends and political decisions that approach the normative ideal. However, Kant also criticizes or ‘condemns’ existing legal relations or foreign policy. Hutchings’s dilemma would be real for humans who only knew how to set up principles, but did not know how to judge, and apply those principles.

      I think that since the first edition of this book in 1999, many interpretations have developed an approach to Kant similar to the one presented here. Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka, Francis Cheneval, Pauline Kleingeld, Reidar Maliks, and Arthur Ripstein are outstanding examples. I hope that more publications will follow this lead.

       1 • The Contemporary Context: Kant’s Judgement on Frederick’s Enlightened Absolutism

      My overall thesis is that Kant’s political philosophy should be read as an attempt to mediate between theory and practice, between norms and the status quo. This is true for international relations, but also works on the domestic level. There is a systematic parallel between Kant’s treatment of Frederick’s rule and the way in which Kant deals with the idea of a federation of states, for instance. Both are seen as transitory, but indispensable stages in the historical development towards the ideal of reason. Kant interprets his own state, Prussia, as non-republican, but capable and in the process of evolving towards republicanism. Kant’s judgement is ultimately complex. Frederick’s rule is considered an improvement, but also deficient. Kant has a short-lived love-affair with enlightened absolutism in the 1780s. After the French Revolution, he is more explicit in arguing that it is only a provisional, transitory, pre-republican phase in the evolution towards republicanism. Nevertheless, enlightened absolutism is an important historical event Kant personally witnesses, which shows him that the politics of reform do work. Revolutions are not necessary for the gradual ‘evolution of a constitution governed by natural right’ (VII, 87, 13–14) – though they might sometimes help as a ‘natural event’ outside the legal sphere. Kant describes how republican principles can be realized in history. Rulers have a duty to transform despotic regimes into states conforming to the ‘spirit’ of republicanism by way of reforms without a violent and detrimental revolution. Kant’s philosophy of history develops a teleological design, an idea (Idee) or sketch (Entwurf) that needs empirical evidence. Frederick’s Prussia provides this evidence.

      Kant’s judgement on Frederick the Great and the system of enlightened absolutism has not yet been addressed in a satisfactory manner.¹ Many Kant interpreters have neglected this topic and focused on the French Revolution instead. Consequently, mistaken assessments abound; the reforms in Prussia and the Habsburg Empire are often simply ignored.² My analysis proceeds on three levels. The first examines Frederick’s theoretical writings, the second is concerned with his royal policies, while the third shifts to Kant’s views on enlightened absolutism as exemplified in Frederick’s theory and practice. The task is not made any easier since Kant was reluctant to criticize Frederick’s rule directly. Finding what Kant wrote about Frederick is easy; finding what he thought about the monarch is difficult. One of Kant’s statements suggests the problem: ‘Although I am absolutely convinced of many things that I shall never have the courage to say, I shall never say anything I do not believe’ (letter to Mendelssohn, 8 April 1766; XII, 69, 23–6). Kant was willing to censor his own thoughts, while at the same time following the moral demands of honesty. After or during his conflict with Wöllner and the cabinet order of King Frederick William II, СКАЧАТЬ