Putin's Master Plan. Douglas E. Schoen

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СКАЧАТЬ for the Baltic States in innumerable ways, including a massive 2007 cyberattack on Estonia,²² aggressive misinformation and propaganda campaigns in all three countries,²³ and even the threat of nuclear war.²⁴ In 2014, Russian agents slipped across the border and abducted Estonian security officer Eston Kohver,²⁵ who was held in Moscow for more than a year before being released in an exchange for a Russian spy.²⁶ Alarmingly, Russia has launched a “review” of the “legality” of the independence of the Baltic States after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union.²⁷

      The Baltic States have much to lose if Putin’s master plan comes to pass. After a century marked by war and totalitarian Soviet rule, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians have finally carved out a decent life in their corner of the world. Only a few hours from St. Petersburg, democracy and free markets thrive in the region, citizens vote in European parliamentary elections, and tourists from around the EU travel freely and spend euros. The Baltic States are a thumb in the eye of Putin’s autocracy and a constant reminder to Russians across the border that Putin and his cronies are denying them the fruits of European integration. Indeed, the ethnic Russians living in the Baltics are better off than their compatriots in Russia proper, though many are bitter about being ruled by non-Russians. That is why Putin has turned his relentless “hybrid” warfare on the Baltics, and why these countries may yet prove to be the flashpoint that ignites a wider conflict between Russia and the West. It is one thing for Russia to bully Ukraine or exploit and manipulate the Belarussians and Moldovans. But the Baltic States are NATO members, and a Russian attack against them would trigger Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, obligating America and its Western European allies to assist.

       THE CAUCASUS

      The Caucasus region, where a towering mountain range divides Europe and Asia, has been a key success for Putin’s designs. Putin has utilized his full playbook to get what he wants in the Caucasus, from energy politics and interethnic rivalries to hybrid war and “frozen” conflicts—that is, struggles in which armed hostilities have ended but no peace agreements or political resolutions have been reached, meaning that the situation can enflame again at any time. The Caucasus is strategically vital to Russia, as it serves not only as a gateway to the Middle East but also as a transit route for abundant Central Asian oil and gas on its way to thirsty European markets.²⁸ And Putin has more control there now than ever before. Wedged strategically between Turkey and Iran, Armenia is a member of Putin’s Eurasian Economic Union and hosts Russian troops. It is essentially a Russian client state, dependent on Moscow for its economy, national security, and political stability. Oil- and gas-rich Azerbaijan is more wary of Putin, due in part to its simmering conflict with Armenia and close ties with Iran, but Moscow is pushing hard for Azerbaijan to join the Eurasian Economic Union as well.²⁹ Arastun Orujlu, head of the Center for East-West Studies, warns that “Azerbaijan is going to be next after Ukraine,”³⁰ while ordinary Azeris believe that “if the West doesn’t do anything to stop Russia, they will be emboldened to take back Azerbaijan by force as they did a hundred years ago.”³¹ Putin already has a toehold here, as Russian-backed Armenian forces already control the Nagorno-Karabakh region in southeastern Azerbaijan. This flashpoint, dormant since the early nineties, could be reignited by Putin, just as Crimea was.

      Georgia has put up more of a fight than its Armenian or Azeri neighbors. In 2007, newly elected Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili was openly defiant of Putin and vowed to plot a new course forward out of Georgia’s Soviet past, flirting with NATO and even EU membership. In 2008, Putin invaded, seized, and eventually annexed Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two ethnically (and religiously) distinct regions in Georgia. (Abkhazians are Sunni Muslim, and Ossetians are religiously mixed but mostly Christian, like other Georgians.) Even after the war ended, Putin continued a propaganda and economic campaign against Georgia, and against Saakashvili personally. Today, less than a decade after Moscow invaded Georgia, the country is moving closer to Russia and away from the West.³² Saakashvili has been replaced by politicians friendlier to Russia.

      Putin has been unambiguous about what the future in the Caucasus holds: “As for the Trans-Caucasus region, Russia will never leave this region. On the contrary, we will make our place here even stronger.”³³ Indeed, in the region, Putin has things going his way: Armenia has acquiesced, Azerbaijan sees few alternatives, and Georgia is drifting back into Russia’s orbit.

       SCANDINAVIA, FINLAND, AND THE ARCTIC

      Putin has two key objectives in Scandinavia: cowing the countries into accepting Russian regional dominance and securing valuable Arctic energy resources and shipping lanes. Putin knows he will never absorb Sweden or Denmark into the Eurasian Economic Union or any of his other thinly veiled imperial projects. Rather, his goal is to convince them to sit on the sidelines while he makes his move on the nearby Baltic States, and as he stakes aggressive Russian claims to the oil-rich Arctic seabed, where as much as 20 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil lies.³⁴ The Swedes and Finns, though not NATO members, are armed to the teeth, and Putin would rather not challenge them head on. Instead, he has developed a set of intimidation tactics designed to demonstrate just how vulnerable Scandinavia is to Russian attack. These have included numerous violations of national airspace by Russian fighters and bombers on a scale not seen since the end of the Cold War. In one incident, a Russian jet fired a flare at a Swedish fighter, an unsubtle reminder that it could just as easily be a missile next time.³⁵ There have even been sightings of what many suspect are Russian minisubmarines off the Swedish coast, just miles from Stockholm, though the Swedish navy denies that the Russians can sneak up on them so easily.³⁶

      So long as the Scandinavians live in fear of a sudden Russian attack, they will be unwilling to intervene if Putin attacks the Baltics, and halfhearted in their competition with Russia for lucrative Arctic drilling rights. Putin has even gone as far as to plant a titanium Russian flag on the North Pole seabed, staking a claim to billions of dollars of oil and gas.³⁷ And while Green-minded Scandinavians worry about climate change, Putin eagerly awaits melting Arctic ice caps that will open up new shipping lanes on Russia’s northern coast, providing a speedier route to Asia for European exports as well as access to Russia’s vast (and dubious) Arctic territory claims.³⁸ If he can neutralize Scandinavia and Finland with his over-the-top scare tactics, Putin will open the door to Russian domination of the Arctic and increase his odds in the Baltics. If Russia encounters resistance—especially from the non-NATO Finns and Swedes, who would have to fight on their own—Putin may very well go beyond the use of mere flybys and minisubs.

       THE BALKANS

      Russia has had interests in the Balkans for centuries, and deep religious, linguistic, and cultural connections will always exist between Russia and the countries of the Balkan Peninsula. But Putin’s interest in the Balkans is not academic or benign; the Balkan countries are Europe’s weakest flank, beset by shoddy economies, corrupt politics, and a legacy of ethnic conflict. The EU and NATO have worked hard to achieve progress in the Balkans, expanding their membership and the promise of a European future to much of the region.³⁹ Now, Putin is working to undo all that progress. Leveraging long-standing Russian ties to the Balkans, Putin is attempting to turn countries such as Greece, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Serbia into Russian allies within Europe. If he succeeds, as he appears to be doing, he will have snuck a Trojan horse into NATO itself and compromised the EU’s consensus-based decision-making process.

      Plainly dissatisfied with European institutions and teetering on the brink of economic ruin, Greece is the most vulnerable of the Balkan states. Putin has been quick to position Russia as Greece’s last true friend, hosting Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras in Moscow and allowing rumors to circulate that Russia would bail out Greece’s economy if the EU refused to.⁴⁰ The Greeks, understandably starved for positive reinforcement from abroad, like what they are hearing from Moscow.

      Bulgarians, meanwhile, are less enthused about the interest Putin has taken in their country, СКАЧАТЬ