Blood, Tears and Folly: An Objective Look at World War II. Len Deighton

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СКАЧАТЬ warships got close enough to use even secondary armament, all four ships had suffered damage. Having taken hits from two 11-inch shells, the Ajax lost two of her four turrets, while the hoist failed in a third turret. The main top mast was chopped off by one of Graf Spee’s last salvoes. Three of her guns were still operating but she had used up 80 per cent of her ammunition. Achilles had suffered the least damage but she had no radio gunnery control in operation. Graf Spee had been hit many times but all her armament was still in operation.

      The action was broken off by the British commander, who put up a smokescreen. There is no doubt that Langsdorff would have done better to have pressed home his attack on the battered trio but he did not, and afterwards it was said he had suffered flesh wounds and been knocked unconscious during the encounter. This might have been enough to affect his decision to head for a neutral port.

      According to one account the Exeter had suffered more than one hundred serious hits. Five of her six big guns were out of action and there was so much smoke and flame that the Germans expected her to blow up and sink at any moment. With 61 dead, and many wounded, she made for the Falkland Islands while the two light cruisers trailed Graf Spee to the neutral South American port of Montevideo in Uruguay.

      Had the Germans gained access to the sort of port facilities that the British had provided for themselves at strategic spots throughout the world, Graf Spee could have been replenished with ammunition and her minor battle damage – which might have proved dangerous in heavy seas – quickly repaired. But Germany was unable to provide for such needs in distant seas. With a more audacious captain the Graf Spee might have turned north and braved the northern seas in winter despite the battle damage and her 36 dead and 59 wounded. It was not to be.

      When the Graf Spee docked in Montevideo, many local people, many of them expatriates, warmly welcomed the Germans but diplomats began arguing fiercely about the rights of belligerent warships in neutral ports. The Uruguayan government gave Langsdorff permission to remain in port for no more than 72 hours, the minimum permitted by international law. It was not enough time for repairs to be effected. Langsdorff tried, and failed, to charter a plane from which to see any Royal Navy ships that might be waiting for him.

      To deter Langsdorff from fighting his way past them, the British were keen to give the impression that a large naval force was waiting for Graf Spee. A deception plan included the BBC radio bulletins and the British naval attaché who, knowing that the phones were tapped, called the ambassador in Buenos Aires and told him the Admiralty wanted 2,000 tons of fuel oil to be made available for two capital ships that evening at the Argentine naval base of Mar del Plata. It was enough to get the story circulated. There can be little doubt that Langsdorff believed that a sizeable naval force was ready to pounce on him.

      On the evening of 17 December the Graf Spee moved out of harbour watched by the world’s Press and newsreel cameras. At sunset the great ship came to a standstill and, to the astonishment of most of the spectators, blew up. Torpedo heads had been suspended above open ammunition hatches which led to the main magazines. Petrol was ignited to burn through the ropes. The explosion in the forward part of the ship went as planned but seawater came in and doused the aft fires. Graf Spee lurched forward and settled fo’c’sle down. Langsdorff shot himself. The German crew were interned but many of them escaped and got back to Germany to fight again.

      Those ship designers who said the German pocket battleships were misconceived had been proved right. A commerce raider did not need 11-inch guns to sink merchant ships. With smaller guns the specifications would have been lighter and considerably faster. Raiders which fight and run away live to fight another day.

      Still today little is said of the contribution that German gun-laying radar made to this or any other sea battle. Frequently throughout the war, German naval gunners seemed to enjoy ‘lucky shots’ for which we might read accurate gun-laying. In London the Admiralty was sufficiently impressed by Graf Spee’s performance to offer the government of Uruguay £14,000 for the Graf Spee’s smoking hulk, whose decks remained above water. British radar experts rowed out and boarded her to examine, sketch and dismantle the Seetakt radar. HMS Exeter and Ajax were eventually fitted with British Type 79, an air defence radar that could be used for gun-laying and gave a performance not unlike the German Seetakt.

      While Raeder, the German naval chief, said the Graf Spee should have run rather than fight, Hitler found the loss of his battleship intolerable, but neither man was deterred by the sinking. During the winter of 1940–41 the Scheer, the Gneisenau and the Hipper left their ports to raid Atlantic shipping. The men in the Admiralty had cause to worry, for the German naval Enigma code¹⁰ remained unbroken and the spectre of the German surface raider was given new substance by the trouble that Graf Spee had given them. Precious warships – including battleships, cruisers and carriers – were to spend the next few years chasing phantom German commerce raiders ‘seen’ by nervous merchant seamen on distant horizons.

       The changing map of Europe

      At the start of the war the only fully updated operational maps in Whitehall were to be found in the Admiralty’s Upper War Room. This 300-year-old library had been made into a map room which was manned round the clock. The maps were coloured in pastel shades (because Churchill said primary colours gave him headaches) and pins showed the position of every British and Allied warship and convoy as well as the position of every German vessel reported by intelligence. The U-boat war, complete with a day-by-day account of shipping sunk and the import figures, was the room’s most important concern.

      The map room became a regular treat for guests after Churchill’s Tuesday evening dinner parties. He was first lord of the Admiralty¹¹ at this time, slept nearby, and would appear suddenly in his multicoloured dressing-gown inquiring about the latest news. Last thing at night and first in the morning he was briefed. When in May 1940 he became prime minister he no longer had this map room close at hand but the same officers provided a similar early morning briefing to him throughout the war.

      In September 1939 Germany went to war with only minimal need for ocean trading. Agriculture, which the Nazis had encouraged, supplied enough food; and German mines enough coal and iron-ore. When and if some special top-grade ores were needed by the armaments industry Sweden was very close and willing to sell. Other imports came from Switzerland and Italy. Rubber and oil were the most vital necessities but German scientists were already able to provide adequate synthetic versions of both, and the Romanian oilfields were on the doorstep. Furthermore Germany had a new friend and trading partner – the USSR – which had oil to spare. Poland had been invaded by both countries, split down the middle and shared between them. Direct cross-border trade began. The Germans could now reach the whole of Asia without worrying about the Royal Navy’s blockade.

      All this was evident from a map, but there was little sign that many members of the British government looked at a map. In March 1940 Prime Minister Chamberlain was calling blockade ‘the main weapon’. Britain’s Ministry of Economic Warfare said, and believed, that the German economy was on the point of breakdown. On 27 May 1940 Britain’s chiefs of staff predicted that Germany’s economic collapse would take place by the end of 1941. By September 1940 – with Hitler controlling Europe from Norway to the Spanish border, and the Battle of Britain still undecided – the chiefs of staff had not changed their mind. The prevailing opinion was that Germany’s inevitable collapse would now be speeded by the rebellious people of the occupied countries. The role of the British army in 1942, they cheerfully predicted, would merely be to keep order in that chaotic Europe left by the German disintegration! We must not be too hard on those wishful thinkers: such fantasies kept Britain and her Dominions fighting in a situation that more realistic minds would have pronounced hopeless.

      The division of Poland, between Germany and the Soviet СКАЧАТЬ