The Trouble With Tigers: The Rise and Fall of South-East Asia. Victor Mallet

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СКАЧАТЬ A miracle that turned sour

      Bangkok in the early 1990s was an extraordinarily energetic city. The peaceful chaos of the streets, where Mercedes-Benzes and BMWs jostled with motorcycles and three-wheel tuktuks for hire, where hawkers cooked noodle soup next to newly-constructed skyscrapers, epitomized the south-east Asian economic boom. When I first set foot in Thailand in 1991, I was impressed not just by the energy but by the easy mixing of new and old, rich and poor, western and Asian. On Ploenchit Road outside my office, a statue of the Buddha, wreathed in incense and garlands of flowers, sat only yards away from a slightly bigger, plastic statue of Colonel Sanders outside a Kentucky Fried Chicken store. On the crowded pavements, foreign backpackers dodged between Thai businessmen talking stock prices into their mobile telephones and disabled women selling lottery tickets to passers-by.

      South-east Asia’s dynamism was seductive for a journalist accustomed to other continents. Europe seemed almost lethargic by comparison, and the sense of purpose in Asia’s cities was a refreshing change from the despair in much of Africa and the Middle East. Books about the east Asian economic ‘miracle’ proliferated. It was impossible not to be impressed.

      But from the beginning I had doubts – both about the supposedly miraculous nature of what was happening and about how long it could be sustained. I do not claim to be alone in this, for my doubts were sparked and then fuelled by the south-east Asians I met and interviewed throughout the region. Most governments and many business executives were supremely confident, but opposition politicians, academics and others repeatedly warned of the dangers ahead: governments were authoritarian or corrupt or both and would be challenged by their subjects; many Asian businesses were successful not because they were well managed but because they were in league with the same corrupt governments; the environment was being destroyed; and the societies and cultures that seemed so stable were actually in the throes of an enormous upheaval. I confess that my scepticism about the ‘miracle’ soon began to waver in the face of accusations that I and some of my journalistic colleagues were too pessimistic and were mistakenly viewing events through ‘western’ eyes. Several more years of rapid economic growth made our doubts seem even more unreasonable.

      Then came the financial crash of 1997. This book was conceived in 1996, so neither the region-wide economic crisis nor the overthrow of President Suharto in Indonesia came as a shock to me or to those Asians who had long advocated political and economic reform. But these events – particularly the abrupt end of the economic boom – did come as a nasty surprise to many south-east Asians and foreign investors. They had assumed that rapid economic growth would continue indefinitely, although they argued about the precise rate of expansion. In the mid-1990s, if you asked anyone in a southeast Asian city a casual question about how things were going, it was surprising how often the reply was a cheerful ‘7.6 per cent’, ‘9 per cent’ or some similarly precise number. Europeans or Americans usually know if their economy is doing well or badly, but most would struggle to remember a recent estimate for the growth of their gross domestic product. For Malaysians, Thais and Singaporeans, however, economic expansion had become an obsession.

      There were good reasons for this. The rapid economic growth these countries had enjoyed in the previous three decades had a palpable effect on people’s lives, whether they were cabinet ministers or factory workers; an economy growing at 8 per cent a year doubles in size in nine years, and most people have correspondingly more money to spend and save. South-east Asia’s success – one of the great achievements of the second half of the twentieth century – was also a source of pride to politicians and ordinary citizens alike. The ten countries of south-east Asia have been involved in the most rapid industrial revolution in history. For the half a billion people who live there, this means being catapulted out of traditional and largely rural societies into the new world of big cities, factories, offices, cars, telephones and mass entertainment. Much has been written about the economic causes of this ‘miracle’. This book is about its effects on the people of south-east Asia, and about how it went wrong.

      Many of the results of rapid industrialization are self-evidently good: people now live longer, and they live better. But some of the leaders who supervised south-east Asia’s industrial revolution became arrogant. They began to believe that their societies were imbued with special ‘Asian values’, and were therefore immune to the political and social pressures that had accompanied previous industrial revolutions. They failed to deal with increasing demands for democracy; the spread of crime and drugs; the ultimately disastrous rise of a class of businessmen better at making friends with politicians than at managing their balance sheets; the destruction of the region’s environment and natural resources; or the need to fend for themselves diplomatically and militarily after the end of the Cold War.

      Whether or not south-east Asia recovers economically – as most economists believe it will after the recent financial crisis – the need to manage these challenges will make the bare statistics of growth seem much less important in the early years of the twenty-first century than they did in the 1990s. Most of the challenges are new to the region, but not to the world. As people become educated, they tend to become more vocal in defending their interests and confronting unrepresentative governments. As they move out of villages into impersonal cities, they loosen the ties to families and small communities. Politics, social life, religion, culture and business are all transformed. But south-east Asia’s industrial revolution has been much more rapid than those that went before in Europe, the US and Japan. The result is a delay of many years between the superficial changes – the arrival of television and mobile telephones – and the more profound shifts in the way people think about their families, their communities, their governments and their gods. South-east Asian leaders made a mistake. Instead of seeing this time lag for what it was, they interpreted the continuing weakness of their political opponents and the strength of social traditions as signs that Asia was different and that they would be spared the trauma of modernization.

      It was an oversight they would later regret. But even after the collapse of confidence in the region’s developing economies in 1997, there is plenty to boast about in the scale and extent of the south-east Asian ‘miracle’. One country, the city state that is the island of Singapore, has completed the industrial revolution, in the sense that it has caught up with other industrialized nations and even started to overtake them. The average Singaporean is already richer than the average Briton. Singaporeans live in an efficient and highly computerized urban society, eat at expensive restaurants, buy expensive clothes and travel widely, just like their fellow consumers in Japan, the US or Italy.

      In Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Burma, on the other hand, the revolution has hardly begun. Most people in these countries are still peasant farmers barely able to subsist on what they grow. But even here the trappings and habits of modern life – motorcycles, tarred roads, televisions, discotheques, tall buildings, toilets, shampoo, banks, advertising, passenger aircraft – are spreading fast. As recently as 1992, the Vietnamese capital Hanoi was a quiet town of elegant but dilapidated French villas where the swish of bicycle tyres was only occasionally drowned by the noise of an army truck; peasant women defecated openly on the pavements. There were no taxis and hardly any cars. The few simple restaurants that existed in what was then a typically dour, communist-run city rarely had names – they were known by their street numbers. Today, the city seethes with noisy activity; the streets are crowded with new motorcycles, cars and taxis, and they echo to the sound of construction as new hotels and office blocks spring up alongside bars and karaoke parlours. In northern Cambodia, far from the capital Phnom Penh, villagers watch videos at night on black and white televisions powered by twelve-volt car batteries which are recharged each day in the nearest town. In communist Laos, young women play cheap, handheld computer games on the banks of the Mekong river.

      Halfway up the ladder come Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. They have a large middle class of relatively wealthy, well-travelled and well-educated citizens living in the big cities; but also millions of poorer people, urban and rural, who are able to enjoy only some of the fruits of the continuing revolution. Malaysia, once known for its plantations of rubber and palm-oil СКАЧАТЬ