Plato: The Complete Works (31 Books). Plato

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СКАЧАТЬ knowing is having knowledge at the time?

      He agreed.

      And not knowing is not having knowledge at the time?

      He admitted that.

      And are those who acquire those who have or have not a thing?

      Those who have not.

      And have you not admitted that those who do not know are of the number of those who have not?

      He nodded assent.

      Then those who learn are of the class of those who acquire, and not of those who have?

      He agreed.

      Then, Cleinias, he said, those who do not know learn, and not those who know.

      Euthydemus was proceeding to give the youth a third fall; but I knew that he was in deep water, and therefore, as I wanted to give him a respite lest he should be disheartened, I said to him consolingly: You must not be surprised, Cleinias, at the singularity of their mode of speech: this I say because you may not understand what the two strangers are doing with you; they are only initiating you after the manner of the Corybantes in the mysteries; and this answers to the enthronement, which, if you have ever been initiated, is, as you will know, accompanied by dancing and sport; and now they are just prancing and dancing about you, and will next proceed to initiate you; imagine then that you have gone through the first part of the sophistical ritual, which, as Prodicus says, begins with initiation into the correct use of terms. The two foreign gentlemen, perceiving that you did not know, wanted to explain to you that the word ‘to learn’ has two meanings, and is used, first, in the sense of acquiring knowledge of some matter of which you previously have no knowledge, and also, when you have the knowledge, in the sense of reviewing this matter, whether something done or spoken by the light of this newly-acquired knowledge; the latter is generally called ‘knowing’ rather than ‘learning,’ but the word ‘learning’ is also used; and you did not see, as they explained to you, that the term is employed of two opposite sorts of men, of those who know, and of those who do not know. There was a similar trick in the second question, when they asked you whether men learn what they know or what they do not know. These parts of learning are not serious, and therefore I say that the gentlemen are not serious, but are only playing with you. For if a man had all that sort of knowledge that ever was, he would not be at all the wiser; he would only be able to play with men, tripping them up and oversetting them with distinctions of words. He would be like a person who pulls away a stool from some one when he is about to sit down, and then laughs and makes merry at the sight of his friend overturned and laid on his back. And you must regard all that has hitherto passed between you and them as merely play. But in what is to follow I am certain that they will exhibit to you their serious purpose, and keep their promise (I will show them how); for they promised to give me a sample of the hortatory philosophy, but I suppose that they wanted to have a game with you first. And now, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, I think that we have had enough of this. Will you let me see you explaining to the young man how he is to apply himself to the study of virtue and wisdom? And I will first show you what I conceive to be the nature of the task, and what sort of a discourse I desire to hear; and if I do this in a very inartistic and ridiculous manner, do not laugh at me, for I only venture to improvise before you because I am eager to hear your wisdom: and I must therefore ask you and your disciples to refrain from laughing. And now, O son of Axiochus, let me put a question to you: Do not all men desire happiness? And yet, perhaps, this is one of those ridiculous questions which I am afraid to ask, and which ought not to be asked by a sensible man: for what human being is there who does not desire happiness?

      There is no one, said Cleinias, who does not.

      Well, then, I said, since we all of us desire happiness, how can we be happy?—that is the next question. Shall we not be happy if we have many good things? And this, perhaps, is even a more simple question than the first, for there can be no doubt of the answer.

      He assented.

      And what things do we esteem good? No solemn sage is required to tell us this, which may be easily answered; for every one will say that wealth is a good.

      Certainly, he said.

      And are not health and beauty goods, and other personal gifts?

      He agreed.

      Can there be any doubt that good birth, and power, and honours in one’s own land, are goods?

      He assented.

      And what other goods are there? I said. What do you say of temperance, justice, courage: do you not verily and indeed think, Cleinias, that we shall be more right in ranking them as goods than in not ranking them as goods? For a dispute might possibly arise about this. What then do you say?

      They are goods, said Cleinias.

      Very well, I said; and where in the company shall we find a place for wisdom—among the goods or not?

      Among the goods.

      And now, I said, think whether we have left out any considerable goods.

      I do not think that we have, said Cleinias.

      Upon recollection, I said, indeed I am afraid that we have left out the greatest of them all.

      What is that? he asked.

      Fortune, Cleinias, I replied; which all, even the most foolish, admit to be the greatest of goods.

      True, he said.

      On second thoughts, I added, how narrowly, O son of Axiochus, have you and I escaped making a laughing-stock of ourselves to the strangers.

      Why do you say so?

      Why, because we have already spoken of good-fortune, and are but repeating ourselves.

      What do you mean?

      I mean that there is something ridiculous in again putting forward good- fortune, which has a place in the list already, and saying the same thing twice over.

      He asked what was the meaning of this, and I replied: Surely wisdom is good-fortune; even a child may know that.

      The simple-minded youth was amazed; and, observing his surprise, I said to him: Do you not know, Cleinias, that flute-players are most fortunate and successful in performing on the flute?

      He assented.

      And are not the scribes most fortunate in writing and reading letters?

      Certainly.

      Amid the dangers of the sea, again, are any more fortunate on the whole than wise pilots?

      None, certainly.

      And if you were engaged in war, in whose company would you rather take the risk—in company with a wise general, or with a foolish one?

      With a wise one.

      And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a companion in a dangerous illness—a wise physician, or an ignorant one?

      A wise one.

      You think, I said, that to act with a wise man is more fortunate than to СКАЧАТЬ